Pre-election offensives

US and Iraq forces may crush the insurgency in Sunni areas. This is not the same as winning the peace, writes Salah Hemeid

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Officials of the US backed interim government of Iyad Allawi say US forces -- which have launched a wide- scale offensive in Samaraa, a stronghold of anti- American insurgency in the Arab Sunni triangle -- are supporting the Iraqi National Guard in a campaign to retain control of the town. The offensive appears to be part of an ongoing strategy to root out insurgents in three key provincial capitals, in addition to Falluja. US soldiers open up the cities, Iraqi forces move in, and then US troops leave to avoid becoming targets or fuelling further anti-US sentiment.

But the campaign has aroused concerns among Iraqis, and some Americans, who fear it will fail to end the insurgency, let alone establish any kind of stability. At least 150 people have died in the offensive in the predominantly Sunni city north of Baghdad.

After two days of fighting buildings in the city's commercial district were either riddled with bullets or partially destroyed and the streets littered with burned out vehicles. US military commanders estimate 10 per cent of the dead are civilians: local hospitals say the percentage is higher.

Despite the bloodshed interim Interior Minister Falah Al-Naqib said the operation had been successful and hinted at further action ahead of 30 January elections. Defence Minister Hazem Shaalan said Iraqi National Guard forces had captured 40 foreign fighters in Samaraa since reclaiming the centre of the city from insurgents.

Local religious leaders blasted the Samaraa operation, calling it a "massacre", and warned the interim government that the US-influenced strategy would plunge the country into yet more chaos.

Many experts believe Falluja, scene of a major American campaign in April, will be next on the list, their predictions fuelled by statements by US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld who said the retaking of Samaraa was a model for military action likely to be taken elsewhere.

"What has to be done in that country is what basically was done in Samaraa over the last 48 hours," he told the Council on Foreign Relations.

For weeks US planes have been bombing buildings where the US military say rebels suspected of links with Abu Mussab Al-Zarqawi have been hiding. On Tuesday more than 3,000 US and Iraqi troops launched an offensive south of Baghdad, seizing what they claim is an insurgent training camp and capturing more than 160 suspected rebels. The force also took control of a bridge across the Euphrates River believed to be used by insurgents moving in and out of Baghdad and Falluja.

The Sunni insurgency is centred in Anbar province, a vast desert area north and west of Baghdad, Salahaddin province, north of the capital and Baqouba to the east. Since the end of the war the three Baathist strongholds have been the site of growing activity by Sunni Islamist fundamentalists.

In addition to US led offensives Allawi's government is attempting to weaken the resistance by making deals with tribal leaders in Sunni areas. A combination of targeted military attacks, economic isolation, and the threat of a major military offensive is being used to pressure insurgents into cooperating. Government officials have been holding meetings with tribal and other leaders in an attempt to get them to break with hard- core insurgents, offering a government amnesty to those who have not participated directly in fatal attacks as well as pledges of jobs and other benefits. The government is planning to shift around $3 billion of the $18.4 billion in reconstruction funds granted by Congress for reconstruction projects to programmes designed to build Iraqi security forces and create jobs.

Observers remain sceptical over the impact of such economic moves. The insurgency, they argue, is not about economics, and the brandishing of economic incentives may well encourage further conflict as groups seek to strengthen their hand in negotiations over who will control power and wealth in the new Iraq.

Meanwhile, US commanders say future offensives in the Sunni areas will be modelled on August's attempt to remove the Shia leader Moqtada Al-Sadr from Najaf. Then American forces launched an intensive bombardment of militia positions, forcing Al-Sadr's supporters to turn the city over to Iraqi forces. But there is no guarantee that the same scenario will be repeated: Al-Sadr militias have continued to operate in other Shia areas and have been refusing to engage in the US- backed political process.

So what next? It has been long argued that Iraq's deepening crisis requires a political, rather than military, solution. Many Iraqis, caught between Washington's war-mongering strategists and an increasingly bloody insurgency, believe their only hope for security is a legitimate and effective government.

Spiralling violence, in the absence of a comprehensive political solution, is likely to result in a civil war and the eventual breakup of Iraq. The best scenario many Iraqis envisage involves holding the country together. Few expect a full-fledged democracy. (see p.10)