Looking ahead
Whatever the results of the US elections the Arabs must turn their attention to restoring relations with the US to an even keel, writes Ibrahim Nafie
The US presidential campaign has riveted international attention like never before. In Arab capitals, as elsewhere, intellectual and cultural elites locked in heated debate over which of the two candidates would better serve the interests of their part of the world. Then, shortly before polling stations opened Arab media switched to special programming and to up-to-the-minute coverage of the vote.
As intense as our focus on this campaign has been what concerns me is where do we go from here? Specifically, have we thought about how we are going to interact with the next US administration? Are we going to take some initiative in steering this relationship or will we continue our customary passivity?
Arab-US relations have deteriorated markedly over the past few years. Although a large part of this can be attributed to the fallout of 11 September and the policies the Bush administration adopted in its wake we must admit that the Arab world never made a serious attempt to reach out to the American public. Instead, we have set store on old links and ties, failing to comprehend the dynamics of those anti-Arab forces that have worked so relentlessly to damage US-Arab relations.
The influence of these forces is palpably evident. Iraq is under occupation, Washington is doing all in its power to bolster the aggressive and criminal policies of a right-wing Israeli government, and the US public is blinded by a grossly distorted image of the Arabs. Such developments are indicative of a relationship that has hit such a nadir that our conventional approach can no longer turn it around.
There may have been a time when certain factors worked to regulate the tenor of US-Arab relations and keep them above a certain threshold. This is no longer the case. The attrition on these factors is evidenced by the fact that those in the US who had stressed the importance of Egypt's regional role and its leadership of the peace process have virtually vanished from the American scene. Similarly, any appreciation for Saudi Arabia and its sponsorship of a comprehensive Arab peace initiative dissipated in the wake of 11 September and the revelation of the national origins of the perpetrators.
The repercussions of 11 September have also strengthened the hand of the alliance between the American ultra right and Zionist organisations, which has succeeded in recruiting the support of new generations of congressional members for their hard-line positions. Take, for example, the bill proposed by the Jewish Democratic congressman Tom Lantos in July, to divert $570 million of the military aid package to Egypt to economic aid. Although the bill was defeated, in large measure because Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice moved in swiftly to stress the vital importance of US relations with Egypt, the vote itself was telling: more than a third of the House had voted in favour of the bill.
If that bill is a litmus test for the erosion of Arab stock in the US and among American popular opinion, it is also an indicator of the way our thinking should be heading. Our relations with the US, as well as with the EU, have deteriorated in large measure because we left the field wide open to Zionist organisations to spread their invective against us. Perhaps the laws recently passed in the US and France against anti-Semitism best illustrate this point. While Zionist organisations moved forcefully and in concert to promote this legislation, the Arabs made no effective attempt to present their views on the prejudicial nature of these laws.
If we are to counter the attrition on Arab-US relations caused by the fallout from 11 September and aggravated by the activities of Zionist organisations, we must look beyond the customary touting of common interests, exchanges of official visits and seasonal PR campaigns. We need to formulate a new proactive Arab vision for interacting with the US. This vision must be carefully attuned to the character of American society and to the perceptions of the next administration. It must be comprehensive, coherent and translatable into a concrete and realisable agenda. It must also be consistent with a collective Arab perception of how best to promote higher Arab interests and rectify the image of our culture and civilisation, while simultaneously taking into account the considerations of individual Arab nations with regard to their bilateral relations with the US.
It is not too late for the Arabs to take the initiative to resuscitate their relations with the US and other international powers. But they must act now, and should begin by drawing up a comprehensive and feasible plan to this end. I have no doubt that once we set our plan in motion it will bear immediate fruit. There is considerable scope for a convergence of opinion between the Arabs and these powers, especially in view of the justice of our causes and the support and sympathy they enjoy among broad segments of international public opinion. If we are to capitalise on these factors, our task now is to abandon our habitual passiveness and role up our sleeves and get to work.