Dramatic shifts

Its not just Ramses who is on the move. In 2004 the political climate seemed to finally respond to global warming, writes Amira Howeidy

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Last June the Ministry of Culture announced that the red granite statue of Ramses II -the 19th-Dynasty Pharaoh- would be moved from its location in Ramses Square, where it has stood for the past 49 years, to some safer location. The move, which is scheduled for sometime in 2005, was ten years in the pipeline.

But then 2004 was a year of dramatic shifts, when issues simmering beneath the surface finally broke through to impact on our lives. Reform, the subject of endless, and many might argue, pointless discussions, was eventually used as a bargaining chip to promote moves on the Egyptian- Israeli track in the direction Washington desired.

The year also saw the most radical cabinet reshuffle in a long time and the emergence of public opposition to President Hosni Mubarak's 23-year- old rule. A deadly attack targeted Israeli tourists in Sinai. There was growing frustration among Egypt's Copts, and among the more general public. This is the backdrop against which, for better or worse, next year's presidential and parliamentary elections will be played out.

If 2003 was dominated by the US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq, 2004 was the year when the word reform was on everybody's lips.

On New Year's Day President Mubarak gave a radio interview in which described as "nonsense" rumours that his 41-year old son Gamal was being groomed to succeed him. A few weeks later the government formed the National Council for Human Rights to help improve Egypt's far from clean human rights image.

Determined to remind the Arabs of its plans for the region, the US floated the Greater Middle East Initiative in February, coinciding with the launch of the Washington-based, US Congress financed Al-Hurra Arabic TV channel, re-triggering protests -- the loudest of which were voiced in Egypt -- over "imposed" foreign strategies.

As statements and counter statements continued to bounce between Washington and Cairo, Egypt hosted the much hyped Arab Reform Conference at the Bibliotheca Alexandrina. The conference issued a declaration emphasising the urgency of reform that comes from "within". Meanwhile, in Cairo, the decision to participate in the Israeli Knesset's commemoration of the 25th anniversary of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty infuriated independent and opposition MPs and public opinion alike. The delegation was saved when Egypt cancelled the visit altogether in protest at Israel's assassination of the aged and crippled Hamas leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin. It was declared the "end of the peace process" by Mubarak.

The situation worsened when, hours after Mubarak concluded an official US visit in April, President George W Bush met with Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to publicly declare his support for Israel's controversial disengagement plan and deny millions of Palestinian refugees the right to return.

Amid the explosive situation in the occupied territories, many in Egypt wondered what had happened to all that talk of reform. More importantly, why wasn't it raised during Mubarak's US visit and meetings with Bush? What prompted Washington to lose interest in its Greater Middle East Initiative?

Events shaping the second half of the year offered an answer to these questions. Despite a vicious Israeli military offensive on Rafah in May, Cairo was voicing impatience with Palestinian president Yasser Arafat for "not being cooperative" vis-ˆ-vis the stalled peace process. By June Egypt's proposed security plan in Gaza, to be implemented in the event of an Israeli withdrawal, was announced, much to the chagrin of Palestinians who opposed "reducing Egypt's role to that of Israel's policeman".

It seemed ominous that while Egypt's "role" was under scrutiny 76 year old Mubarak would suddenly fly to Germany for a surgical operation on his back on 20 June. For 17 days the nation was plunged into a debate on sensitive issues. The constitutional and political void caused by the president's absence, and serious concerns over his health, provoked alarm in the absence of a vice president. Mubarak's return on 7 July ended rumours over his health but failed to dispel speculation regarding who would succeed, speculation likely to escalate in the months ahead of the 2005 October presidential elections.

A week later Mubarak made a major cabinet reshuffle replacing 14 of the outgoing cabinet's 34 ministers and appointing the "young", 52-year old former CIT minister Ahmed Nazif as prime minister. The step technically removed the "old guard", replacing them with a group close to the president's son, Gamal. Despite much trailed reformist credentials, the new government has all but ignored demands for political reform, provoking a "campaign for change" to be launched by political groups opposed to the expected renewal of a fifth presidential term for Mubarak. The campaign reached its peak when it held the first-of-its-kind public protest against the president earlier this month under the slogan "enough is enough".

Despite its small size, this silent demonstration -- indeed, the fact that it was allowed at all -- generated attention. Critics warned that ignoring demands for political and social reforms would lead to a backlash. The three bombings that targeted Israeli tourists in Northern Sinai in October, in response to Israeli brutality on the other side of the border, and which killed 33 was interpreted as an expression of such frustration. The second, and equally serious repercussion, came from Egypt's seven million strong Coptic minority earlier this month when thousands of Copts clashed with the police as rumours that a priest's wife had been abducted and forced to convert to Islam spread like wild fire. The bitterness and anger of the demonstrators, as well as of the church at the government, spoke volumes about the simmering discontent felt by Egypt's Copts.

Instead of dealing with public demands the government compounded them by releasing an Israeli spy half way through his prison sentence and then turning a new page in its economic and political relations with Israel. Cairo seems to have decided to throw caution to the wind, and Sharon was suddenly promoted as the "only chance for peace". The year is closed with the signing of the QIZ agreement with the US and Israel, a sudden diplomatic rift with Iran, and visits to Tel Aviv by the chief of Intelligence Omar Suleiman, who is discussing Egypt's role in Gaza with Israel.

How will these dramatic shifts affect the decisive year ahead? (see pp 2&3)