Weapons of mass deception

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Into the heart of darkness Assault on heritage Weapons of mass deception Butchery by any other name Analysis: New weapons for the weak Case study: 'Either we surrender, or we resist' Analysis: Weapons of mass financial destruction 'This is for Yopougon!' Brain-wake Documents: Violence unconstrained Violence Iraq 2004: the facts Testimonies: Iraq Iraq 2004 timeline Testimonies: Palestine Palestine timeline 2004 Palestine 2004: the facts Testimonies: Sudan Case study: Chechnya A dangerous profession Photo gallery: Brutality knows no bounds; Casualties of occupation; Violence, violence everywhere

"In Iraq, there was no sign of an 'immediate threat' from weapons of mass destruction." -- Hans Blix, former UN chief weapons inspector

"Based on my experience with the administration in the months leading up to the war, I have little choice but to conclude that some of the intelligence related to Iraq's nuclear weapons programme was twisted to exaggerate the Iraqi threat." -- Joseph Wilson , US diplomat posted to Africa to find out whether Iraq had been purchasing WMD; when he concluded that they had not, his wife was outed as a CIA operative.

"My summary view, based on what I've seen, is we're very unlikely to find large stockpiles of weapons. I don't think they exist." -- David Kay, who stepped down in January 2004 as the special adviser leading the CIA's Iraq Survey Group, a team of experts looking for WMD in the wake of the invasion on Iraq.

The October 2004 final report of the CIA-affiliated Iraq Survey Group, led by Charles Duelfer, a longtime weapons inspector, found no evidence that Iraq produced any weapons of mass destruction after 1991. Duelfer also concluded that Saddam's weapons capability had in fact weakened under UN sanctions. -- The findings of the Duelfer report included the following conclusions:

Chemical weapons: Iraq unilaterally destroyed its hidden chemical weapons stockpile in 1991, and there is no evidence Iraq ever resumed producing such weapons.

Biological weapons: There is no evidence of any biological weapons work after 1996, and Saddam expressed no interest in biological weapons after that time. No evidence was uncovered that Iraq had biological weapons production systems mounted on trucks or rail cars.

Nuclear programme: Saddam ended his nuclear programme in 1991 after the Gulf War, and there is no evidence he tried to restart it. Senior Iraqi officials believed Saddam would restart a nuclear programme if UN sanctions imposed after the end of the Gulf War were halted.

Ballistic missiles: There is no evidence Iraq had any Scud missiles at the time of the US-led invasion.

Compiled by Rasha Saad