Collapsing orders

Gamil Mattar* reviews a disastrous year

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2004 was an unhappy year. It ended in catastrophe for many Asian states. For Africans it was catastrophic throughout as AIDS continued to stalk the continent and civil wars destroyed what stability remained. Armies continued to occupy neighboring territories while the West intervened more and more, either to pillage, evangelise, take control or create chaos.

It was also dreadful for the Arabs. If Arab politics are measured by what is done for the Palestinians, then last year it scraped the 'bottom of the barrel'. Palestinian rights continued to be eroded at a faster rate than in previous years.

Western analysts concede that Palestinian reform now tops their agenda rather than the issue of occupation that lies at the heart of the conflict in the Middle East. The British Prime Minister arrived in the region and, in a dismissive and demeaning way, called for an international conference to be held in London to discuss Palestinian reform, inviting many countries from the region to attend.

In the eyes of America, the UK and Israel the issue has become one of a troublesome people and disorderly leadership. Meanwhile, in the occupied territories, assassinations, poverty, hunger, the terrible living conditions of the refugees and the degradation of an entire people have been reduced to a sideshow.

President Bush backtracked on his promise that there would be a Palestinian state by 2005, delaying the issue until the last days of his presidency. Here, of course, there are precedents - Bill Clinton did the same, dealing with the Palestinian issue only as his term in office was coming to a close. After the failure of that initiative Yasser Arafat was accused of causing a guaranteed solution to fail. Well, it may have been guaranteed but it wasn't a solution. The negotiations at Camp David failed to bear fruit because no genuine, sustainable solution was ever put forward.

In the Arab world 2004 did not just see a repeat of earlier problems. Rather, the region was transformed into a theatre for several wars. The war on terror continued and the casualties -- freedom of expression, the right to participate and moderation -- mounted. Those who accused the Iraqi resistance of being terrorists continued with their charges . The prediction of many American analysts that one of the goals of the war in Iraq was to gather the forces of Islamic terrorism in one spot seemed to be accurate.

American strategists had concluded that it was impossible to completely extirpate "Islamic" terror when it was scattered across the region. Instead, they opted to lure them to Iraq.

It had come as a surprise to the Americans that, two years into their war on terror, the terrorists were still capable of opening up new fronts in the Arab world and beyond. But they didn't fall into the trap set for them in Iraq, though it didn't escape their notice that 150,000 Americans sitting in camps were an easy target.

There were media victories on both sides. The Americans benefited because they could prove they were really fighting terrorism. The terrorists benefited because they could demonstrate that they were a real and strong presence.

The year also saw an escalation in the "reform war" against Arab regimes, and I use the term 'war' not least because targeted Arab states reacted to the campaign for reform as if it was a hostile military assault. The first thing they did was to gather their diplomatic, political and security forces to block, or at least sidestep, the attack. Local media began employing ingenious slogans such as "reform starts from within". Much mention was made of "our special Islamic and Arab identity". Democratisation had to be gradual, and dictated by individual circumstance, though no one cared to spell out what those circumstances were. Several regimes demonstratively promoted programmes to support women and busied themselves revamping education policy. And almost all regimes appeared to be busily engaged in economic reform. And all of this was a smoke screen intended to deflect the West's prioritisation of reform.

The casualties grew to encompass individual freedoms and human rights. Tolerance declined. Liberals were out on a limb, and it became apparent to the public that in most Arab countries, they could operate only with the protection of authorities that were themselves undemocratic and dictatorial.

Religious movements -- no matter how moderate and no matter how vital it was to involve them in the interests of the happiness and security of the country -- were systematically excluded from discussions of reform, let alone organized political activity. It seemed as though neo-liberals were genuinely frightened and troubled by the thought of sharing government patronage with people who would compete with them for jobs and benefits obtained in return for propagating misinformation about the general state of the political scene and fighting politico-religious movements.

The year was awful even when one examined the details.

In at least two areas of the Arab world relations between countries deteriorated. The dispute between Algeria and Morocco intensified. Neither fellow Arab countries, nor other states, were able to calm matters down. I don't say resolve the dispute, nor return things to normal -things have a long way to go before the two sides are even ready to think about such things. Likewise, the extraordinary dispute between Libya and Mauritania escalated.

In the Gulf it was inevitable that events in Iraq would have an impact and the year weighed heavily on its citizens. They were pressured from all sides, from all across the border with Iraq and across the ocean from Iran. There was the pressure of internal disquiet and from the war for reform.

The Arab East (ie Syria, Egypt, Sudan and Somalia) continued to set an example other states followed, and they too sank to the same level. It was an awful year.

* The writer is director of the Arab Centre for Development and Futuristic Research.