Global representations
Proposals to reform the UN are firmly on the table. Africa will benefit, but which state exactly has yet to be decided, writes Ayman El-Amir
United Nations reform is a cyclical phenomenon that reflects exasperation at the inadequacy of the global order and its main instrument in times of crisis. It often ends up in compromises that undermine any meaningful improvement in the efficacy of the system. Therefore, the expansive reform package that was completed by a high-level panel of 16 eminent persons in December last year, and presented to the resumed session of the General Assembly by Secretary-General Kofi Annan last week, will be all the more testing since it proposes to revamp the powerhouse of the UN: the Security Council.
The 191 members of the world body have vested interest in making the Security Council more representative. This makes good sense not only because membership has almost quadrupled since the UN was created in 1945, but also in recognition of the deep geopolitical change the world has undergone since then. In the opinion of the majority, the council, with its present structure, has failed to fulfil its mission of maintaining international peace and security. It is true that for the past 60 years the world has not seen a repetition of the last world war that cost the lives of 40 million people. But it is also true that during the same period an estimated 160 million people have lost their lives in inter-state wars, civil strife, totalitarian purges and ethnic cleansing.
One reason is that the five, veto-wielding permanent members of the council have done more to advance their national interests in the context of international relations than to ensure that the conduct of these relations safeguards the interests of vulnerable nations. This is how a war of choice was waged on Iraq two years ago, against the will of the Security Council, how the Bosnian town of Srebrenica, designated a UN safe haven, was ethnically cleansed of 8,000 of its Muslim population in 1995 and how Rwanda had the tragic experience of genocide in 1994, when almost one million of its Tutsi population were murdered by their rival Hutus while the ubiquitous international community stood by. It is telling that signals of impending genocide at the time were completely ignored by the United States and other Western powers on the Security Council. The State Department had been instructed, following the 1993 debacle in Somalia where 19 US marines were ambushed and killed in the streets of Mogadishu, to place Africa at the bottom of its list of priorities.
To redress imbalances in decision-making such as these, both the panel of eminent persons and the Secretary General proposed to expand the Security Council's membership from the current 15 to 24. They offered two options for the increase: to create six new permanent seats and three two-year non- renewable seats distributed among the four geographical regions of the world, or to add eight four-year-term (renewable) non-permanent seats and one two-year, non-renewable, non- permanent seat. Both scenarios preclude the introduction of additional veto-empowered members -- clear recognition that the power of veto has constrained more than helped the decision- making process.
The logarithms are not as complicated as they may appear and the final effect is that the proposed reform expands the status quo, with a difference. Should the new composition, in one of its two formulas, be approved, the five permanent states will retain their exclusive hold on the veto. It will also make consensus building among 24 members, and consequently decision-making, more laborious because of the diversity of national interests represented. The two-thirds majority required to pass a Security Council resolution will increase from the present nine to 16 members. This will impact big power politics in two ways. In case of the failure to mobilise the two-thirds consensus, a unilateralist power such as the United States will drift out of the council and initiate its own action through a custom-tailored interpretation of the charter or of previous resolutions. This was the case when the US, the UK, and a ragtag of minor allies invaded Iraq in March 2003. It was also the case when, in 1999, NATO mounted a 60-day bombing campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to loosen its grip on Kosovo. NATO powers recognised that, with Russia holding veto power, there was no chance they could elicit a Security Council resolution that would compel Yugoslavia to withdraw from the autonomous province.
In other scenarios, when a two-thirds majority supporting a resolution is attained and a veto-holding power casts a negative vote, the magnitude of frustration with the system will be on a much wider scale. The recurring example of this scenario is the liberal use by the US of its veto to block resolutions censuring Israel for its illegal actions. Frustration breeds despair, and despair is one of the ingredients of terrorism.
In the envisioned restructuring of the Security Council, Africa is one of the four designated regional areas that would benefit from possible expansion. South Africa, the leading contender, is campaigning not only for a permanent seat but also for veto power. Africa will get either two permanent seats or two long-term, renewable seats, depending on which model is endorsed. Other leading contenders are Egypt and Nigeria. Africa, not the Arab region, is recognised as one of the four regional areas. Traditionally, the prevailing principle of equal geographical distribution usually assigns seats in international organisations to sub-regions. In the case of Africa, a seat is usually reserved for a country from North Africa. Thus, Egypt may stand a good chance of getting the second permanent seat, unless it is rivalled by Algeria. If the race among African contenders ends in a dead heat, members of the African Union may opt for rotation of the permanent seats assigned to Africa.
The reform of the Security Council has been debated for the past 12 years in an "open-ended" committee which media correspondents covering the United Nations dubbed "the never- ending committee". With the package of comprehensive reforms formally presented to member-states by the secretary- general, they will have almost six months to mull over it before the heads of state of the membership meet in New York in September to mark the 60th anniversary of the world organisation, and to give their verdict on the reform package. Between now and then, a lot of water, and backdoor bargaining, will flow under the bridge.