Syrian dithering

Why make agreements and fail to keep them? Syria could and should have avoided this humiliation, writes Amin Howeidi*

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Don't you agree that we, the Arabs, are going from one crisis into another as if caught in an endless tunnel of doom, not able to find the exit? In most cases, the crises are of our own doing. From the Atlantic to the Gulf, illegitimacy is the word, crimes are prevalent, lawlessness is common, and powerful neighbours devour powerless ones. A zone of disorder is of course an invitation for foreign powers to step in, for any number of reasons, only adding to the confusion. The only thing absent from the scene is a local and capable hand that is wise enough to manage the crises.

The latest crisis is the Syrian-Lebanese crisis. The crisis is being played out under the shadow of the 1989 Taef Agreement and Security Council Resolution 1559. Taef is a Syrian- Lebanese agreement backed with Arab guarantees. Resolution 1559 is an international resolution backed with US-French guarantees and it is determining the course of the crisis right now, although some people prefer to think that this is not the case.

The Taef Agreement, signed following 17 years of civil war, arranges for Lebanon to restore state power in the entire country within one year, through the deployment of police and army forces, with Syrian forces allowed to help for no more than two years, after which the two governments agree on the redeployment of Syrian forces in Al-Beqaa, on the size and duration of stay of these forces, and on their relations with the Lebanese authorities. The agreement also calls for disarming the militia -- not the resistance -- in six months.

Resolution 1559 makes a pledge to Lebanon's safety and security and proceeds to call for all foreign parties to withdraw their forces, for the disarming of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militia and for free elections to be held with no foreign interference. The resolution was passed in September 2003, that is after the US invasion of Iraq but before Al-Hariri was assassinated in February 2005. The resolution was sponsored by the US and France, two countries that differ on many other things. In Lebanon, the US and France share a common objective, that of getting the Syrian forces and intelligence operatives out of Lebanon. The US is using Resolution 1559 to pressure Syria, a country it accuses of supporting Iraqi resistance and abetting Palestinian factions and Hizbullah. France wants the Syrians out of Lebanon, a traditionally Francophone state, in response to the wishes, perhaps even the pleas, of some Lebanese.

Al-Hariri's assassination opened a Pandora's box of accusations. Everyone, murderers and conspirators included, are demanding action. Many accuse Syria of either masterminding the assassination or failing to stop it. Thomas Friedman, writing in The New York Times on 17 February 2005, had this to say: "About two weeks ago, a friend of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Al-Hariri stopped by my office to update me on Lebanon and pass on a message from Al- Hariri, whom I have known since reporting from Beirut in the late 1970s. The message was that the Lebanese opposition to the Syrian occupation was getting united-- inspired both by the example of Iraq and by the growing excesses of the Syrian occupation. Al-Hariri, his friend said, was planning to use the coming Lebanese parliamentary elections, and a hoped-for victory by the opposition front, to send a real message to the Syrians: It's time for you to go." Friedman follows this with an incendiary conclusion. "It will be difficult to prove who killed Al- Hariri. But the gang ruling Syria had all the ability, experience and motive to murder the Lebanese statesman for the way he had teamed up with Paris and Washington to pass the recent UN Resolution, 1559, calling for Syria's immediate withdrawal from Lebanon. Al-Hariri pressed for that UN resolution, and resigned his office, after Syria perverted Lebanese democracy by forcing Lebanon's parliament to accept a three-year extension for a Syrian puppet, Émile Lahoud, as Lebanon's president."

The Lebanese paper An-Nahar translated the article for the benefit of the Lebanese public. Meanwhile, the world was treated to a report by Peter Fitzgerald, head of the international fact finding team, who blamed Syria for the political tension preceding the assassination and held Syrian intelligence and Lebanese security services responsible by way of negligence for the assassination. Fitzgerald proposed that an international investigation committee look further into the matter.

Since the assassination, Syria has come under mounting international pressure to implement 1559 and pull out completely from Lebanon. The Lebanese street is divided between government loyalists and the opposition, with both sides hoping to fill the vacuum the Syrians would leave behind. President Mubarak acted again with prudence, calling on Syria to withdraw from Lebanon before the elections, an advice that recalls his warnings to Saddam before the US invasion. This time, President Al-Assad headed the advice and started pulling out his troops. The world still awaits a report from Kofi Annan's envoy Terje Roed Larsen on the progress of the withdrawal.

Meanwhile, Damascus is procrastinating in the implementation of the second phase of withdrawal, although it has no more than 6,000 men in Lebanon. The procrastination does not make much sense, unless the Syrians are hoping to sign a new agreement with the new government in Lebanon.

Syrian dithering on the Taef Agreement has cost it much, both regionally and internationally. Had Damascus pulled out its troops from Lebanon as soon as the situation stabilised following the civil war, it would have averted the humiliation of having to withdraw under international pressure and with the prodding of the Lebanese opposition. Egypt had in the past withdrawn its forces from Yemen, Iraq and Algeria quietly, once the mission was done; and I am not going to mention Egypt's withdrawal from Syria because it took place after officers were assassinated, troops were surrounded and hostility aired on the radio.

The crisis was played out in Lebanon's streets, as if masses decided that they needed to say aloud what they used to say only in whispers. The intellectuals and political parties took to the streets, just as happened before in Georgia and Ukraine, flying colourful flags, summoning the power to expel armies and bring down governments, sending a rainbow over the political horizon.

The crisis teaches us two lessons: first, that political misjudgement can undermine great deeds, even tarnish the memory of what Syria once did to help Lebanon, and second, that the streets can muster more power than armies, forcing those who were not listening to change their ways. In laboratories, guinea pigs learn things by trial and error. In real life, human beings have two options: act as guinea pigs and learn the hard way, or act as scientists and learn by observation. The curtain has not fallen yet. There is much the spectators are waiting to know. For example, when will full withdrawal take place? Who will fill the political vacuum? And above all, whodunit?

* The writer is former minister of defence and chief of General Intelligence.