Counting the casualties

Any mission in Iraq, far from being accomplished, has barely begun, writes Ayman El-Amir*

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Violence in Iraq has spun out of control and the Bush administration is handling the situation in the only way it knows -- it is throwing money at it. Throughout the country daily carnage has become the norm, bouncing off television screens and into the living rooms of a benumbed world. Two years after the US- led invasion, and after President George W Bush's announced "mission accomplished" from aboard the aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln, Iraq is as impoverished and unstable as it has ever been. The implications for US policy, for Iraq and the Middle East, do not bode well.

Gruesome facts lie behind the rosy picture of an emerging democratic, stable and prosperous Iraq that was painted following parliamentary elections earlier this year and the formation of the nebulous government of Prime Minister Ibrahim Al-Jaafari three weeks ago. A joint survey by the Iraqi Ministry of Planning and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) estimates the number of war-related casualties at between 18,000 and 29,000 "and probably higher". Entire families that perished have been excluded from a survey that also states that 12 per cent of deaths were among those under 18 years of age. According to the report the country continues to struggle with high unemployment, unreliable utility services and growing poverty. The majority of households in Iraq have lower income today than in 1980.

It is true the US invasion rid Iraq of the brutal regime of Saddam Hussein -- a feat no power in the region could have achieved. But it has done so at the cost of unleashing widespread violence and sectarian division -- two demons that will haunt Iraq well into the future. In trying to weed out the vestiges of Saddam's regime the US invasion administration disbanded the Iraqi army, some elements of which now make up the bulk of the insurgency force. Having failed to improvise a non-Saddamist, non-Baathist replacement army, the US is now trying to assemble professionals from the old Iraqi military to form the nucleus of a new army. It is an offer Saddam's Baath Party loyalists will find difficult to refuse.

Some US policy-makers now realise they have no hope of capping the escalating insurgency without working out a deal with a reformed Baathist-Sunni faction. These policy- makers, however, want to create a glorified internal security force rather than a viable, national army with the primary mission of safeguarding Iraqi interests.

For both Shia and Kurds the return of Saddam's old-guard to the army command conjures up the terrifying spectre of Saddam's murderous repression. How well a Sunni- dominated, Baathist-oriented army will sit with the majority Shia government or, for that matter, with the Kurds, remains to be seen. One sign of unease over the equation is the still-contested portfolio of defence in the government of Al-Jaafari. Meanwhile, with US policy increasingly adrift in Iraq, the Congress has approved an additional $82 billion in funding for Iraq and Afghanistan, raising the cost of the war effort to more than $300 billion since 2001.

On the home front Prime Minister Al-Jaafari has stitched together not a government of national unity but a coalition of sectarian interests that attempts to balance the relative distribution of power in the country. It will result in a political formula more fragile than even the Lebanese model. Once ethno-religious sectarian interests are recognised and empowered no government or constitution will be able to guarantee the pursuit of unified national interests. Such is the blood-stained lesson learned at a staggering human cost in both Lebanon and the former Yugoslavia.

The growing casualties in Iraq, estimated at more than 500 so far this month, is one way pro-Saddam loyalists are demonstrating to both Washington, and the Al-Jaafari government in Baghdad, that if they are not given a solid role in governing Iraq they will make it ungovernable. The unsettling impact of the insurgency was acknowledged by the chairman of the Joint US Chiefs of Staff, General Richard Myers, when he conceded last week that insurgencies last between three and nine years before they expire. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's hurried visit to Iraq earlier in the week is another demonstration of how worried Washington is about the intractable dilemma Al-Jaafari faces.

The US has no clear exit strategy and is waiting for the developments in Iraq to help present one. It is assumed that the Vietnam scenario is the most plausible -- declare victory and then get out of the mayhem. The significance of such a course of action would not be lost on Iraq, entrenched Middle Eastern regimes or the terrorist organisations that are challenging US interests. In such a case the US will have succeeded only in creating sectarian civil strife -- a far cry from the democratic, stable and prosperous model it promised other nations in the region. Targeted regimes would gleefully point to the US failure as an example of misguided policy that confirms the wisdom of their own monocracies. It would inevitably embolden terrorist organisations to destabilise what they regard as undemocratic, repressive regimes that collaborate with Washington's policies of hegemony and globalisation. America's European allies who opposed the campaign against Iraq would wag a we-told-you-so finger of reproach.

For the Iraqis, victims of so much suffering, stability and security are the primary prerequisites. It would be helpful, in this context, for the US to announce a timetable for withdrawal from Iraq. This could take much of the wind out of the insurgents' sails. It would also be useful for the government of Al-Jaafari to engage Sunni factions in a meaningful dialogue leading to mutually acceptable arrangements for power-sharing. But above all Iraq needs a process of national healing. A conference of national reconciliation, organised prior to finalising the drafting of the constitution, would be a good starting point. To consolidate the potential accord Iraq's new constitution should be formulated on principles promoting Iraqi national identity above sectarian, factional or religious affiliations. It is the only way to restore Iraq to its suffering people.

* The writer is former correspondent for Al- Ahram in Washington, DC. He also served as director of United Nations Radio and Television in New York.