Who, what and where next?

Despite so much talk, the major parameters of reform in the Arab world have yet to delineate, writes Gamil Mattar*

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One tour of the Arab world is hardly enough to form an opinion as to where the region is heading. But it is perhaps enough to show that the more things change the more they stay the same. I don't wish to sound pessimistic. People in this region -- not all, of course -- want change, but they are ponderous, cautious and fearful even, about it. I often hear people noting that change, whether externally or internally induced, has destabilised certain parts of the Arab world, and that chaos is to be expected once our turn comes.

Change, if multi-faceted, requires a revolutionary mindset. Change that comes as an outcome of gradualism may not quite deserve the name. In Britain, reformists have fought for centuries to free the country from certain traits of its past. The outcome was a change on a scale we're yet to witness. In our case, the past is haunting us. It keeps coming back, either gradually or through a process of violence and counter-revolution. For all their rhetoric, our key officials are not in a revolutionary mood. Most of our top politicians prefer a "Swiss cheese" type of reform, a reform that is full of holes, one that would let the past breathe, one that would keep the status quo functioning.

The tremors that have taken place brought about changes, some of which were positive, but others were seriously flawed. Certain loyalties have shifted with the minor change of faces that took place in the Arab ruling class. A complete break with the past hasn't yet come about, but the writing is already on the wall, illegibly perhaps. We haven't yet reached the point where certain individuals, currents or parties are ready to take the bull by the horns. We haven't yet reached the point where the coterie begins to jump ship, but they have enough to worry about already.

The Arab political class, whether in government or hovering in the wings, seems to suspect -- or even know -- that Washington is an "integral" part of the domestic equation. Key politicians seem certain that Washington is a major force, just as the government or the opposition are. Many people who are active in politics, business or civil society are planning their future on the assumption that America is a key player. People have clearly given great thought to it and are not apologetic about it. America, many would argue, is already in touch with everyone. To one degree or another, everyone wants America on their side when push comes to shove.

Arab capital, I notice, is fleeing some Arab countries to others. Capital doesn't act on a whim. It moves out of places where the state of external support for change is ambiguous. It moves out of places where the clash between a strong central government and deep-rooted social and religious forces is unresolved. In such cases, and with the Americans sending mixed signals to all involved parties, the future of change is hard to guess. The continued disturbance in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the US inability to do anything about it, adds to the uncertainty. More significantly, it reinforces the impression that US "knowledge" about the Arabs, Islam and the East is minimal.

Capital flees those countries where US interventions, as well as the actions of pro- modernisation and anti-modernisation opposition, offer little hope for stability in the near future. Capital flees when investors are unsure about the course of political events. Even the democracy the US is propagating comes across as puzzling, even contradictory. Henry Kissinger, godfather of Washington's ruling neo-conservatives, seems to agree with such an assessment. The US, he recently wrote, has not yet defined the meaning of democratisation as a long-term process that reflects the people's aspirations. Capital runs from where accounts differ on the approach to democracy, and it goes to places where all parties -- external and internal -- agree on a clear economic and political agenda.

US foreign policy, I would argue, could sustain damage in the course of the campaign for reform in the Arab world. It is true that the US maintains an unprecedented presence in the region's domestic politics. This presence may be beneficial for US national security and for US imperial ambitions, but it also, despite being courted by all sides, makes it hated.

Every single government in the region is dependent on US support while outraged at the support it provides to the forces of change or opposition. The same is true for the opposition forces and much of the public in Arab countries, for they believe -- rightly sometimes -- that the US support for Arab governments is holding back change and modernisation, raising the human cost and widening the gap between the rich and poor. Every group suspects the US of backing others at its own expense. Everyone accuses everyone else of being dependent on America. Everyone competes with everyone else in showing hostility to US policy. As a result of this unique situation, Arab public opinion is filled with wrath against America and against the Arab political class.

Does this mean that the Arab region will remain outside the stream of change that runs from central Europe all the way to central Asia? Or does it mean that change, inevitable as it is, would be of a different kind?

Some Arab reformists wonder whether US support to Islam Karimov's government in Uzbekistan has impeded reform. Others wonder whether US tolerance of Karimov's brutal tactics would encourage other governments to act similarly when challenged by extremists. I, for one, wonder what exactly prompted the armed forces to intervene in the power struggle in Uzbekistan. No such thing happened in central and eastern Europe, in Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, nor so far in the Arab world.

Arab statesmen pretend that the call for reform and the current protests and uprisings are but a storm in a teacup. But deep inside they know that the status quo is under threat and are ready to fight to the wire.

* The writer is the director of the Arab Centre for Development and Futuristic reseach.