Democratic strategies

Hassan Nafaa* navigates the possible passages to democracy in Egypt

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Egyptian civil society has entered a new phase in its development, one in which it is maturing in such a way as to hopefully enable it to take control of the unstoppable wheel of change. Each day the papers report yet more new groups have been formed, each determined to help find a path to change and freedom. Some of them -- Kifaya and the National Coalition for Democratisation, for example -- adopt an agenda that includes the reform of the entire political system while others -- and here we can include professional groups and syndicates -- raise slogans and adopt demands that are more limited in scope but which nonetheless add to the general clamour for comprehensive change. Among the latter are groups demanding the independence of the universities and judiciary. Such a flurry of activity occurs only when society is in a transitional phase, a phase that heralds major transformations, and when there is a palpable desire for progress.

Egyptian civil society is currently undergoing a difficult labour and before it gives birth to a new order it must first do away with an old regime that has lost its legitimacy, any justification for its existence and even its agents of continuity. Nor can anyone determine the final shape of the new dispensation that will emerge and that is already knocking at the door, insisting it should enter or else force its way in. No one knows what zero hour will bring, whether it will be a normal birth or whether there will be complications that endanger both mother and child.

The highest goal of all effective and vital forces in Egyptian society is to establish a wholly democratic regime. Sometimes it appears as if this goal is being deliberately withheld yet the conditions for democratisation in Egypt have been met and peaceful transformation to a democratic society is within the reach of us all.

Until recently there was a persistent belief that the process of democratisation would occur, in theory at least, through one of three possible scenarios.

The first posited transformation from above. It assumed that President Hosni Mubarak, after 24 years of continuous rule, would become convinced that the best choice for him in terms of security, and of securing his place in history, would be to lead a process of real democratisation and make his fifth term, or part of it, a transitional stage during which he would undertake the following measures: renounce the presidency of the National Democratic Party and separate state functions from those of the party; remove restrictions on all political and intellectual currents to allow them to organise freely and publicise their platforms in the state-owned media; conduct free and fair legislative elections under judicial supervision; form a government that reflects the actual results of those elections, including the appointment of a prime minister from the party that wins the most seats in parliament; form a committee to write a new constitution and, lastly, announce early presidential elections within a year of the issue of the constitution.

This is the fast track scenario in terms of democratisation, as well as the safest. Unfortunately the conditions necessary for it do not exist and it is unlikely to play out. This scenario, in the light of the way in which Article 76 of the constitution was amended, now seems no more than a confused dream.

The second scenario is based on a series of random developments and assumes that parties to the political process will continue to play the game according to the old rules. They will do so out of a belief that conditions will allow for gains and advantages through a continuation of the status quo, thus minimising the potential costs of change. The ruling National Democratic Party (NDP), aware that circumstances are changing and that the winds are shifting, believes -- given the weakness of the internal opposition and the lack of seriousness in external pressures -- that it can bend with the wind and ride out the storm.

The NDP is well acquainted with the official opposition parties and knows their internal flaws and points of weakness like the back of its own hand. It is banking on them soon abandoning their resolve and is confident that when the time is ripe it will be able to throw them a few crumbs and they will be content, knowing that, in the end, they have no viable alternatives.

The NDP is also familiar with those forces that operate outside any legal framework -- most important among them the Muslim Brotherhood -- and continues to believe the carrot and stick approach it has long adopted towards them remains valid. It will ratchet up its campaign against them a notch, and then placate them by allowing the Brotherhood to win a few parliamentary seats by standing as independents, though too few to alter the political balance.

The ruling party has also had long and successful experience in handling external pressure. It is fully aware that whatever Washington says about the spread of democracy its real positions are determined by its interests. All the rhetoric about democracy is for international consumption, an attempt to cover its botched Iraq campaign and justify its presence there. The NDP believes the US needs it as much as it needs the US -- perhaps more. Washington blackmails the NDP in order to gain political concessions in Iraq and Palestine that the party is happy to make, while the NDP returns the favour by blackmailing the US with the spectre of Islamic fundamentalism and the seething hatred of a population outraged by its pro-Israeli bias.

Opposition forces, of whatever shade, believe the current regime is dying, and is fighting a last-pitched battle surrounded on all sides. Yet the various factions differ in their positions -- some want to see the regime buried for good, others want to negotiate with it to secure the greatest gains. The problem seems twofold: those who are betting on the regime's collapse have no alternative to offer the people while those who are exploiting the moment to make personal gains are playing the regime's own game which, in the end, will only serve the interests of the regime.

This second scenario can lead to nothing but chaos. The ruling party appears as if it is fighting a losing battle because it has grown old, is jaded with power and may have ambitions to bequeath that power without a shred of legitimacy. The opposition forces seem as though they are fighting a war of attrition without being prepared to occupy positions on the ground. It also appears that the US is betting on chaos in the hope that it will create a vacuum that will allow it to promote whoever it chooses.

The third scenario posits controlled transformation from below. It assumes that the Egyptian society will rapidly gain the degree of maturity necessary to allow it to absorb the givens of the current bewildering moment, its opportunities and perils, and devise an effective and creative strategy for bringing democratisation safely to harbour. This scenario presumes the following: that civil society will be encouraged to mobilise and organise forces demanding change, especially those within elites such as the universities, the judiciary, the lawyers and journalists' syndicates, and welcome on board any newly formed groups demanding change; that the right of each group to develop its own form of protest will be respected; that the movements and groups will coordinate to consolidate shared ground and contain differences; that a general conference of all movements and groups will be able to secure agreement on the composition of a popular committee that would be charged with preparing a new constitution that will meet the requirements of all forces within civil society demanding change.

The first step towards democratisation is to realise that no single group holds the solution, that it is a collective endeavour. The questions we currently face are not about specific policies we should like to see implemented but about what the rules of the political game should be. Determining those rules is a difficult task, and civil society must prove it is capable of undertaking it. If we all realise the NDP does not want to lead the task of democratisation given it is the primary beneficiary of the status quo, then we must ask if it is possible for others to agree on truly democratic rules for the political game? This is a pressing question and must be answered sincerely. If it is not, then Egyptian society will have shown itself neither worthy of, nor ready for, democracy.

* The writer is professor of political science at Cairo University.