Post-Arafat syndrome
Broad fissures are appearing between the Palestinian Authority, Fatah and the PLO as to who exactly is in command, writes Khaled Amayreh in the West Bank
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An Israeli soldier blocks the way for a protester from the left-wing Israeli Women in Black movement during a demonstration against Israeli occupation at the Kalandia checkpoint near the West Bank city of Ramallah on 16 August
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Fatah, the de facto ruling party of the Palestinian Authority (PA) and mainstream faction of the PLO, continues to experience and suffer from what many observers term the "post-Arafat syndrome". Yasser Arafat, the charismatic Palestinian leader who died in November after a brief illness, acted as adhesive glue that kept the movement intact and prevented its dissolution into chaos. Since Arafat's death, many problems that had been kept dormant during his reign resurfaced.
Fatah did succeed in overcoming, or more correctly containing, the immediate aftermath of Arafat's death when it unanimously nominated Mahmoud Abbas -- aka Abu Mazen -- as its sole candidate for president of the PA. However, it has become unmistakably clear that the nomination and subsequent election of Abbas in January was a "compromise arrangement", mainly to avert a serious crisis, rather than an expression of any true unity among the various strands of the movement.
Indeed, it can be safely said that many of the problems facing Fatah now stem from the vagueness and inclusiveness of the compromises reached hastily following Arafat's death. Then it was agreed that Farouk Qaddumi, head of the PLO Political Department, be appointed head of Fatah's Central Committee, the highest decision- making body in the movement. Qaddumi, a co-founder of Fatah residing in Tunis, interpreted the decision as implying a division of power between "the inside" and the "Diaspora", whereby he would stand at the helm of Fatah, and therefore the PLO, while Abbas stood at the helm of the PA.
This is more than just a matter of terminology. The PA is supposed to be subservient and answerable to the PLO, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, and the PLO chief, whoever he is, is supposed to be "president of Palestine". Indeed, Qaddumi argues forcefully that Arafat assumed the title of "president of Palestine" by virtue of being "chief of the PLO" not "president of the PA".
Earlier this month, the Fatah Executive Committee met in Gaza in an emergency session to discuss the internal crisis facing the movement. The committee decided that Qaddumi was not "Fatah's chief" or "Fatah's president", arguing that there were no titles as such pursuant Fatah's Basic Law. The decision was taken a few days after Qaddumi ordered the dismissal from Fatah of all operatives and officials of the Preventive Security Force (PSF) in Gaza, including the agency's chief, Rashid Abu Ishbak.
Qaddumi reportedly embarked on this feat after PSF agents, acting on instructions of PA Security Minister Nasser Youssef, stormed his office in downtown Gaza and arrested Suleiman Al-Farra, one of his prominent loyalists. Qaddumi viewed the storming of his office as a serious attempt by the PA leadership to undercut him personally as well as the entire Palestinian leadership abroad.
Reacting to the raid, some armed elements believed to be sympathetic with Qaddumi, kidnapped a French photojournalist of Algerian origin, holding him hostage for several days, ostensibly to exert pressure on the PA to release Al-Farra. Eventually, the journalist was released, reportedly after the PA authorities promised to free Al-Farra.
Qaddumi has also been protesting against the "encroachment" on his authority by the PA Foreign Minister Nasser Al-Qidwa. Last month, Al-Qidwa convened a meeting of Palestinian ambassadors from around the world during which new ambassadors were appointed and others were relieved of their duties. Qaddumi argued forcefully that he was "the foreign minister of Palestine" and that Al-Qidwa had no right to act the way he did without consulting him beforehand.
The PA quietly ignored Qaddumi's protests, with one PA official calling Qaddumi "detached from reality" and "not realising that the Palestinian centre of gravity had long moved from Tunis to the West Bank".
Qaddumi has indicated his desire to move to Gaza after the completion of the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. However, it is far from certain if such a step would heal the internal friction within Fatah or simply reinforce and reassert the "war of the camps" within the movement.
Qaddumi, 72, opposed the Oslo accords and refused to move to the West Bank arguing that he, unlike PA leaders, was at least free from Israeli pressures and bullying tactics.
Last month, Qaddumi signalled his intention to create a "popular army" of a hundred thousand soldiers that he said would be entrusted with protecting the "national enterprise". The idea was rejected by the PA leadership, which argued that there ought to be just "one authority" and "one weapon".
Divisions within Fatah, which were the main reason behind the postponement of the Palestinian legislative elections slated for 17 July, are expected to dominate Fatah's General Congress, expected to take place before the end of this year. Indeed, if the movement fails to put its house in order, it will suffer immensely at the ballot box on 27 January 2006, the new designated date for the elections.
In any case, Hamas, Fatah's main rival and competitor, will be closely watching Fatah's behaviour in this crucial period leading up to the poll.