Mission impossible
Arab League chief Amr Moussa has embarked on an Iraqi reconciliation mission, but does he have a strategy, asks Salah Hemeid
Shortly before the United States unleashed its war to topple Saddam Hussein in spring 2003, the Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa, who was one of the staunchest opponent of the war, warned that the attack would "open the gates of hell" in a volatile region already boiling with too many crises. At that time, many Iraqis joked. "So, what is wrong with that?'' they wondered. "We want them to be wide open so that we can get out of this hell," they used to say, referring to Saddam's 35 years of brutal rule.
Moussa's rejection to the war was never a secret. As a head of the pan-Arab grouping he was loudly reflecting the position of its member states which believed the war and its consequences were would threaten the security of all Arab countries. Indeed, in several meetings, held before the war, the Arab League authorized Moussa to appeal to the United Nations Security Council and Secretary-General Kofi Annan to urge them to fulfill their legal responsibilities in line with the UN Charter and to prevent any attack arguing that threats would only increase instability in the region.
In the run up to the war, Moussa, an outspoken critic of United States support for Israel and Israel's treatment of Palestinians, launched his own diplomatic battles with the US and did not confine himself to the angry statements. For example, he linked a possible solution to the Iraqi-U.S standoff to resolving the Arab Israeli conflict. "Everyone in the Middle East is angry and frustrated with what is happening in the occupied Palestinian territories. Therefore, a strike against Iraq, I believe, will
lead to serious repercussions in the Middle East and beyond,'' he once was quoted as saying. He continued to air his opinions during speeches, interviews - and rows with foreign envoys.
Moussa, whom Time magazine described at that time as "perhaps the most adored public servant in the Arab world", stemming from his sharp criticism of Israel's treatment of the Palestinians during his 10- year tenure as Egypt's foreign minister, was perhaps building on public sentiment, or the so-called Arab street, which was totally against the looming war. But finding the method in the Arab public diplomacy has always been tricky, as shown again in the recent statement by Saudi foreign minister Saud Al Faisal about Iran's involvement in Iraq. Moussa's style is perhaps a combination of passion and principle, and at that moment of trial he could have only been compared to Hamlet, bewildered but raging against the storm.
In fact, Moussa's worries were not unwarranted. Like most Arabs, he was very much concerned about the possibility that Iraq might break up into small sectarian and ethnical entities once a powerful central government in Baghdad disappears. Arabs were also concerned that a weak post-Saddam Iraq will encourage non Arab neighboring nations, like Iran and Turkey, to
interfere in it's internal affairs. What worried Arabs most is that a strategic imbalance in the region caused by Iraq's defeat will encourage Israeli government led by a hard-line Areil Sharon to change the rules of the game and impose Israel's view point in the Arab Israeli peace process.
Yet viewed by many Iraqis who were desperately looking for a hand that may extend to help them to get rid of Saddam's 35 years of brutal dictatorship, Moussa's opposition-which he made on behalf of all Arabs- was only seen as hostile and an obstacle to their salvage from Saddam. Afterward, Moussa's repeated criticism of the occupation and his contacts with opponents of the new regime in Baghdad has also exacerbated tensions between Baghdad and the Arab League Secretary General. Some Iraqis have criticized him for neglecting their country since the war and for failing to stop Arabs coming to fight in Iraq or Saddam loyalists sending money.
Last week, Moussa traveled to Iraq trying to mend his frayed relations with his Iraqi critics and initiating a tough mission to promote national reconciliation in a country ravaged by violence. Over five days of intensive talks Moussa urged feuding leaders to put the past behind them and look forward to build a new Iraq. Before departure, Moussa expressed satisfaction that his mission will bear fruit and announced that the Iraqi leaders agreed to attend the reconciliation conference he suggested to be hosted by the League on 15 November.
That was the good news. But Moussa arrived at a sensitive time for Iraq, which watched its Saddam trial on Wednesday on charges of crimes against humanity connected to the killing of 148 Shias from the village of Dujail in the 1980s.An October 15 referendum on a constitution backed by Iraq's new Shia and Kurdish leaders and fiercely opposed by Sunnis is expected to pass,raising fears of an intensified campaign of suicide bombings and guerrilla attacks by Sunni insurgents. Hours after Moussa flew back three explosions hit two hotels in Baghdad where foreign journalists and businessmen stay.
Some 20 people were reported killed and many others were injured in the suicide bombings but the message they have sent was much louder.
Therefore, the most pressing question facing Moussa now is what strategy he has, if any, to deal with the daunting task of reconciling Iraqi political, sectarian and ethnical factions which is going to be an uphill climb. Thus far there is no such strategy that takes into account the interests of all sides. For such a strategy or even a blueprint to succeed it must take intoconsiderations the unique social and communal make up of Iraq which makesimperative to start talking about specifics rather than the usual rhetoric about national unity. For that reason any Arab initiative must be neutral and avoid taking side with a particular sectarian or ethnic component of the Iraqi mosaic. Moreover, Arabs should start with some confidence buildingmeasures such as better policing of their border with Iraq to stop infiltration of Arab fighters and make more effort to discourage negative publicity about Iraq in their media.
Moussa has no illusion and he knows that reconciliation of Iraqi feuding factions is a task laden with difficulties but it is certainly not a thankless job and also it can be possible. By visiting Iraq and expressingsolidarity with its people in such a time of need he managed to overcome the damage caused by what many Iraqis perceive as Arabs' lack of support since the downfall of Saddam. An extended Arab hand of support to Iraqis who have suffered so long is badly needed. Moussa's mission needs a full fledged Arab backing if Arabs really think that Iraq is their natural ally.