Still an earthquake

Rasha Saad reviews what are still reactions of astonishment following Hamas's shocking victory

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More than a week after the Palestinian parliamentary elections, Arab pundits are still weighing the repercussions of Hamas's surprising overwhelming victory.

In "Hamas's surprise," Abdel-Rahman Al-Rashed wrote in the London-based Asharq Al-Awsat that everyone was shocked by Hamas's overwhelming victory including the movement itself. Al-Rashed argues that the surprise made the movement unsure of its next step and "completely confused".

He predicts that the movement will most likely be split "similar to Fatah that witnessed frequent turmoil in comparable circumstances".

He believes that the movement will be divided into two main groups. The first will be pragmatic and will base its actions on the fact that it has a historical opportunity to take a leading role in Palestinian affairs, thus showing that the government of Hamas will differ from the movement of Hamas. The other group will consider any alteration in the movement's stances as a failure for its supporters and a relapse in its agenda.

This state of internal division may oddly enough ensure a solution for all. "The possible splitting of Hamas will represent a comfortable solution, as it will enable the movement's opposition to continue on its course and allow a chance for pragmatic members to run the government. Furthermore, Fatah will then believe that it can defeat Hamas in the next elections."

For Ghida Fakhri, the rise to power of Hamas illustrates the fact that since the 1993 Oslo Agreement, the Palestinians living under occupation have been deceived. Also in Asharq Al-Awsat Fakhri said the Palestinian Authority, produced at Oslo and marketed as the precursor of a sovereign Palestinian state, has proven its inability to lead the Palestinian people, in administering resources entrusted to it, and above all, in compelling Israel to negotiate in good faith.

Fakhri also laments the double standards of the West following Hamas's victory. She explained that since Oslo, Israel elected as its prime minister a man found "personally responsible" by the Kahane Commission of Enquiry set up by the Israeli Knesset for the Sabra and Shatila butchery that left 3,500 people dead. "His [Sharon's] election, contrary to Hamas's electoral victory, did not stir vivid international reaction."

In a way, the election of Hamas could signify the desire of the majority of the Palestinians living under Israeli occupation to renew the pre-Oslo political platform, the national liberation of their homeland. For that, they have voted for a political force that, in many respects, remains a national liberation movement akin to so many before it, one that believes in political negotiations in tandem with an armed struggle. That was also the platform of the PLO prior to the 1993 Oslo accords.

Fakhri argues that it was the US and Israeli policies that allowed the rise of Hamas. She explained that Oslo offered Palestinians, including Yasser Arafat, the obligations of a sovereign state, its appearances, symbols and trappings -- but without the authority and powers of a sovereign state. Thus, argues Fakhri, the Palestinians had a president, a government, an elected legislature, a police force, etc. In many respects, this situation made it easy for Israel and the United States, and some Arab governments, to exert undue pressures on the PA to produce miracles without the real means to deliver. According to Fakhri, it allowed for the humiliation of Arafat, the siege of the presidency and his political neutralisation and political clout amid, in the end, very little international protest. The semblance of statehood also confused international public opinion and weakened its support for the Palestinian cause. In the end, this situation politically killed Arafat, the man who embodied the struggle for Palestinian nationhood. Ultimately, it led to the death of the chairman whose body could not even be laid to rest where he and his people had wanted, in "Al-Quds". "By shunning Arafat, the US administration and the Israeli government brought about the political rise of Hamas, a movement that grew out of the humiliation and desperation of a new generation of Palestinians," Fakhri concludes.

In the London-based Al-Hayat newspaper, Ghassan Charbel focussed on the dual crisis that Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas faces "in the Hamas era".

"Now Abbas finds himself caught between two crises: his Fatah Party crisis, due to its defeat, and the Hamas crisis, due to its ringing victory. Between the two movements, and the two crises, stands Abbas."

According to Charbel, the easier option for Abbas would be to gather his papers and make an exit, leaving Hamas to deal with its victory alone, a task that could weaken it considerably. However, Charbel explains, Abbas's responsibility towards the entire national project robs him of the luxury of taking such a decision. "After Hamas's victory, perhaps Abbas has become more of a necessity in order to avoid complete isolation or complete collapse. He can be the umbrella for the victory, until Hamas can co-exist with the realities of today's Palestinian-Israeli interconnections, and the price that must be paid to facilitate the rise of a Palestinian state."

Charbel also points out that Hamas can no longer behave as if it's still in the opposition. After the victory, he explains, the movement must now answer the daily questions related to salaries, security, negotiations, and international relations, not to mention those connected to society, pluralism and freedoms. "Even if Hamas opts to form a government of technocrats, with acceptable faces, and gives the PLO responsibility for negotiating, its ability to escape the trap set by its victory depends greatly on its ability to provide what Abbas needs to save the national project from collapsing," Charbel wrote.

Abdel-Wahab Badrakhan described the European position against the election of Hamas as "considerable arrogance. If not, what does this insistence on cutting off aid mean?"

In "Siege and starvation" also published in Al-Hayat, Badrakhan supports observers who see the threats as part of premeditated agendas. "They [the Europeans] wanted to announce to the Palestinian people that they will pay the price for voting for Hamas by inflicting on them starvation. In other words, the West is not only striving to be on a par with Israeli war criminals but hoping to outperform them," concludes Badrakhan.