A window on Iraq's 'insurgency'

The latest ICG report reveals Iraq's resistance groups are more confident and less divided than the US military wants us to think

---

"In Iraq, the US fights an enemy it hardly knows." Thus begins the Brussels-based International Crisis Group's (ICG) eye-opening report, In Their Own Words: Reading the Iraqi Insurgency, published 15 February.

This first of its kind report, based on close analysis of the rebels' own discourse, reveals relatively few groups, less divided between nationalists and jihadis than assumed, whose strategy and tactics have evolved and whose confidence in defeating the occupation is "rising."

Failure to sufficiently take into account what the resistance is saying is puzzling and, from Washington's perspective, counter- productive. Abundant material -- both undervalued and underutilised -- is available from resistance websites, internet chat channels (the internet being a preferred and regular means of communication), videos, tapes and leaflets. This report, taking in the organised armed opposition's discourse between mid- 2003 and January 2006, fills an important gap. "And the lessons are sobering," it says.

Textual analysis has its limitations, confesses the report, but the (abundant) available discourse offers a window into the resistance nonetheless. It tells us about themes the armed resistance considers best to mobilise activists or legitimise actions, and gives us information on internal debates and levels of coordination, and about shifts in tactics and strategy.

The most striking revelation of the report is that it exposes US failure in understanding and thus containing these groups. In the words of the report: "For the US to ignore or fail to fully take into account the insurgents' discourse -- at a time when they are paying close attention to what Washington is saying -- is to wage the struggle with one hand tied behind its back."

The ICG's important conclusions are startling. The resistance "increasingly" is dominated by a "few large" groups with sophisticated communications. It is no longer a scattered and chaotic phenomenon. Groups are well organised, produce regular publications, react rapidly to political developments and appear surprisingly centralised.

There has been gradual convergence around more unified practices and discourse, and predominantly Sunni Arab identity. A year ago groups appeared divided over practices and ideology but most debates have been settled through convergence around Sunni Islamic jurisprudence and Sunni Arab grievances. For now virtually all adhere to a blend of Salafism and patriotism, diluting distinctions between foreign jihadis and Iraqi combatants -- though that unity is unlikely to outlast the occupation.

Despite recurring contrary reports, there is little sign of willingness by any significant resistance element to join the political process or negotiate with the US. While cover talks cannot be excluded, the report argues, the publicly accessible discourse remains uniformly and relentlessly hostile to the occupation and its collaborators.

The groups appear acutely aware of public opinion and increasingly mindful of their image. Fearful of a backlash, they systematically and promptly respond to accusations of moral corruption or blind violence, reject accusations of a sectarian campaign and publicise efforts to protect civilians or compensate their losses. Some gruesome and locally controversial practices -- beheading hostages, attacking people going to the polls -- have been abandoned. The groups underscore the enemy's brutality and paint the US and its allies in the worst possible light: waging dirty war in coordination with sectarian militias, engaging in torture, fostering the country's division and being impervious to civilian losses.

But, all is not in order. The resistance has yet to put forward a clear political or long- term vision for Iraq. Focused on operations, they acknowledge this would be premature and potentially divisive. That said, developments have compelled the largest groups to articulate a more coherent position on elections, and the prospect of an earlier US withdrawal than anticipated is gradually leading them to address other political issues.

Meanwhile, the resistance is "increasingly optimistic" about victory. Such self- confidence was not there when the war was conceived as an open-ended jihad against an occupier they believed was determined to stay. Optimism stems from a conviction that the legitimacy of jihad is now beyond doubt, institutions established under the occupation are fragile and irreparably illegitimate, and the war of attrition against US forces is succeeding.

The emergence of this confident and better- organised Sunni resistance movement, says the report, "carries profound implications for policy makers." That it survived, even thrived, despite being vastly outnumbered and outgunned, suggest the limitations of the current counter-insurgency campaign.

Countering the discourse requires taking its discourse seriously, the ICG advises. So is the US not taking it seriously? And why?

The ICG's recommendations to the US-led coalition and its Iraqi allies include control and punishment of the behaviour of security forces and ending the use of sectarian militias as a substitute for regular armed forces; an indication that institutionalised sectarian-based violence is a glaring fact known to the ICG as much as to those in power in Iraq.