Federal choices needed

At all costs, Iraq's disintegration must be avoided, which means altering the constitution and moving towards effective, not sectarian, federalism, writes Yahia Said*

---

On the brink Before and after Askariya The myth of civil war Living murder "There is ethnic cleansing" The threat of sectarianism Sedition in Iraq

In their recent report on Iraq, the International Crisis Group warns of the threat of civil war and suggests with great caution that the international community start preparing for the eventuality of Iraq's disintegration. This is not the first time that such a projection is made by someone otherwise opposed to it. The exact opposite is necessary. The international community should emphatically rule out support for any project that would lead to the disintegration of Iraq and pressure Iraqi political elites to amend the constitution to allow for a functioning federal arrangement.

The recent destruction of Al-Askari shrine in Samarra and the ongoing wave of sectarian violence that followed lend credibility to the argument that maybe it is time to let Iraq go. The damage to the country's national integrity wrought by decades of repression, wars, sanctions, occupation, terror and uncertainty may be too extensive to be mended. Clearly there is little trust among the communities or at least their political elites for them to be able to come together around a unifying national agenda. Maybe, one is tempted to think, it is better to opt for a peaceful Czechoslovak-type divorce or even Soviet-type disintegration, which after all was much less calamitous than what happened in Yugoslavia. There is a less radical version of this argument that suggests freezing things in a loose confederation as envisaged by the new constitution and hoping that with time wounds would heal and people can come together again.

There are, however, two important arguments against this line of thinking. First accepting this logic would actively contribute to Iraq's disintegration. Going down this line, as was the case in Yugoslavia, means empowering the very sectarian politicians who have brought Iraq to the brink of collapse in the first place. When some analysts suggest working with Sunnis in order to help them better defend their corner in sectarian negotiations they are by definition selecting sectarian interlocutors over those who would argue for a multiethnic state.

The reality of the occupation means that international actors have not been innocent bystanders. They have contributed to sectarianism in many ways including by subscribing to a "realist" narrative that argues that Iraq is an artificial state; that the groups comprising it were only held together by tyranny, and that disintegration is a by- product of liberation from authoritarianism. This narrative, which is antithetical to nation building, has been embraced by sectarian politicians in Iraq and has found its reflection in post-invasion policies including the dissolution of the army and the new constitution.

The international community could have embraced an alternative narrative about how Iraq's communities have actually lived together almost without conflict for centuries, how statehood has very deep roots in these lands. Even if the modern Iraqi state is traced back to its official establishment in 1921 that still makes it one of the oldest in the region. While political elites bemoan the demise of Iraqi identity, professionals, technocrats and ordinary people still nurture great pride in Iraq and its modern state institutions. There are of course weaknesses in this narrative as there are strengths in the alternatives but the problem is that external actors, including exile politicians, have been playing a role in promoting one over the other without fully grasping the consequences.

The second problem with the "realist" approach is that it is impossible for Iraq to disintegrate peacefully. As we have witnessed over the past days, there is no way to disentangle the Shias from Sunnis without tragic consequences. As soon as the international community signals acceptance of partition the low level ethnic cleansing taking place today in Baghdad and other mixed areas will switch into high gear. This unfortunately will not be the end of the story. Kurdish semi-independence after 1991 led to a low level civil war in that region which claimed thousands of lives. The Shia factions are showing every sign of going down the same route once left to their own devices. This is not to mention the regional consequences of Iraq's disintegration, which would be nothing short of catastrophic. If there is one thing everyone should agree on it is that in dealing with Iraqis international and regional actors should never for a second indicate readiness to accept partition. This would be truly irresponsible.

The problem with the second worst option of letting things stand as they are now is that it can very rapidly lead to disintegration. Sectarian and party militias acting on their own or through state and regional institutions as envisioned by the constitution are not compatible with a functioning democratic state.

As things stand today, Baghdad and the non-oil producing regions will be at the mercy of the oil producing ones. Regardless of any potential sub-constitutional legislative arrangement, the constitution allows the governor of Basra or the president of the Kurdistan regional government to stop transferring money to Baghdad and by extension to non-oil producing regions at a whim. This would bring humility to the government in Baghdad, which is the intended design of the drafters of the constitution and is something which is arguably acceptable, but it will also bring humiliation to those living in non-oil producing regions and this is the harbinger of conflict.

It is both possible and desirable for Iraq's international and regional partners to promote a workable federal model that necessitates some meaningful constitutional amendments. This is not a return to the centralised unitary state of the past, which is impossible politically and impractical in every other respect. Functioning federalism will nonetheless hinge on establishing state monopoly on legitimate violence and the abolition of all militias. It also requires equipping the central government with substantial and sustainable sources of revenues as well as allowing it to design, enact and enforce policies throughout the country.

The exact details of a workable federalism in Iraq will need to be worked out in an inclusive and transparent process without preconditions. The national reconciliation conference championed by the Arab League could offer a vehicle for these deliberations.

There are great political obstacles for the introduction of such changes. It would be particularly difficult to pressure Kurdish leaders to give up any element of the autonomy they enjoyed over the past 15 years. However, if all of Iraq's international partners, mindful of the consequences of the alternative, are prepared to pool political resources behind a minimum set of changes necessary to avert disaster it could be done.

* The writer is research fellow at the London School of Economics.