Smooth transition

If some of the factors in each case are different, the Arab world could learn much from the Spanish transition to democracy, writes Gamil Matar*

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Like many members of my generation I was profoundly affected by the 20th century experiences of many nations with which Egypt has political, cultural and historical ties. The ramifications and repercussions of the Ataturk revolution in Turkey, the fate of the Weimar Republic in Germany, the post-war reconstruction experiences of Germany and Japan, and the many convolutions of that forever restless nation, France, have contributed to shaping our political and social awareness. So too did the Spanish Civil War in the 1930s and the Franco dictatorship, although I must admit that my interest in Spain had subsided some time ago. Suddenly, however, Spain has forced itself again on my consciousness and I find myself riveted by the miracle of the Spanish revival. Miracle is not too strong a term to use here in view of the breakthroughs Spain has made in record time, compared with the time it took Germany, France and even Italy to accomplish the same things.

I have recently had the opportunity to study, first hand, the Spanish transition from dictatorship and one party rule to freedom, the democratic rotation of authority, plurality of participation in the political process and cultural openness and vibrancy. I believe Arab politicians and political analysts have much to gain from a closer examination of the Spanish experience. This experience tells us that rapid democratisation does not necessarily cause a country to fall apart or degrade the status and prestige of the country's head of state. Indeed, in Spain we find an model of a country whose chief of state enjoys greater respect because of the democratic foundations of his legitimacy, of a country that was able to achieve economic growth while simultaneously righting itself through democratic processes, of a country whose respect for a dynamic and effective opposition worked to marginalise the forces of violence and extremism. It is little wonder that Spain has been able to resume its leadership of the Spanish-speaking world and to garner worldwide recognition of this status.

There are many similarities between pre-reform Spain at the threshold of the 1970s and parts of the Arab world today. Both experienced massive rural to urban migration, a growing middle class, a steady increase in the ratio of industrial and service sector labour to agrarian labour, a decline in the influence of rural landowning classes and the emergence or re-emergence of many civil society organisations. Both, too, witnessed the increasing politicisation of public opinion and a sweeping desire for change combined with the openness to a new political culture opposed to "change by revolution."

There are also several areas where parallels between pre-reform Spain and many Arab countries are in the making. Take, for example, certain developments that occurred in Spain at the time, developments that some maintain are indispensable for the transition from autocratic to democratic rule and others hold that, if not indispensable, at least they seem to catalyse a smooth, relatively peaceable and systematic transition. Prime among these "catalysts" is a fissure in the ranks of the ruling party, or ruling elite, giving rise to two distinct and opposing camps: reformists and conservatives. Personally, I do not believe a peaceful transition to democracy is possible unless the majority of the ruling elite comes to subscribe to the need for political reform.

A second propellant for change arises when ruling authorities find themselves increasingly alone in their approach to handling domestic and foreign affairs. If, for example, the outlook of the authorities remains rooted in the past and blind to the changes and rising expectations of their societies, as a result, perhaps, of greater exposure to outside influences, they will not be able to rise to the greater complexities of solving their country's problems. Therefore, in order to perpetuate their rule, they will resort to more severe forms of repression, which, in turn, generates popular discontent of increasing degrees of intensity and a growing tide for change.

A related catalyst is the exposure of the ruling party as incapable of, or incompetent at, managing the affairs of state and society. In this instance, the refusal of party leaders and establishment figures to acknowledge the failings of their party, its inability to motivate the public and the stagnation of society under their leadership, in general, leads to growing corruption, increased repression, declining economic growth and the spread of poverty and unemployment. The more it is realised that these conditions were generated or aggravated by the irresponsibility and negligence of the ruling elite the higher the likelihood of the emergence of a reformist trend within the ruling party or a grassroots opposition movement outside it.

Also indicative of societies on the verge of transition from authoritarian to democratic rule is the emergence of new dynamic and charismatic figures who have the autonomous ability to pose themselves as alternatives to the status quo or, at least, as forces capable of breaking the hold of the ruling elite over the key posts of government as well as over the intellectual and cultural establishment. The very fact that individuals could acquire widespread popular support merely by virtue of their opposition to authoritarian rule is incontrovertible testimony to the deteriorating hold of the old order. No longer can the ruling elite conceal its failings, continue to pretend that society is not ready for democratic transition and, more importantly, mask the gaping fissures in the erstwhile absolute loyalty to the leader and his clique.

The regime's virtually knee-jerk response to such exposure is to scramble to restore a semblance of constitutional legitimacy, an effort which generally takes the form of referendums and cosmetic reforms. This reaction is, in itself, tantamount to an admission that the ruling order is teetering on the brink of crisis, which, in turn, inspires opposition political forces to enter into alliances and intensify their push for substantial reform.

Most of the foregoing developments which facilitated the transition in Spain from authoritarian to democratic rule and then to economic boom and a new social harmony are unfolding in some Arab countries. In other words, these Arab countries are sufficiently equipped and poised for democratic reform. However, there are other important factors that propelled Spain towards democratisation, but are not yet sufficiently present here. Prime among these factors is sustained outside pressure. Although there have certainly been pressures on the Arab world to reform, these pressures have been intermittent and, more importantly, cynically wielded to serve ulterior motives, which, in turn, worked counter to their ostensible goal.

In addition, Spain was geographically located in a democratic environment. Following World War II, all the countries of Western Europe with the exception of Greece and Portugal were democracies and it was not long before these two countries democratised, leaving Spain an isolated island of dictatorship. The Arab world is radically different. The region is not only predominantly non-democratic it is anti- democratic.

At the same time, Spain was encouraged by a powerful lure. In 1962 it began to dream of joining the European Community, but it was told that this dream could never be realised as long as it retained a closed authoritarian regime. As pressure for reform began to build inside Spain, especially from within the business community, European countries collectively and individually augmented pressures on Madrid from the outside. Germany, for one, allocated huge sums of money to support the development of civil society organisations and to promote democratic journalistic institutions in Spain. Simultaneously, even though Spain was not yet a member, the European Community continually monitored the situation in that country and issued periodic reports on the government's acts of repression and violations of human rights.

Again, our situation is entirely different. We do not have a regional organisation that requires its members to have democratic governments and that monitors the violations of democratic principles and human rights perpetrated by its member nations and other nations in the region. Thus, Arab countries are under very little pressure from outside to democratise at both the regional and international levels. Clearly, this runs counter to the general impression that Arab countries are under immense pressure from abroad. The fact is that this pressure does not hold a candle to the concerted drive that the Franco regime encountered. In addition, it is interesting to note, the US was not among the nations to pressure Franco for the simple reason that Washington at the time needed its military bases in Spain.

Franco's Spain and our situation here diverge in yet another way. At that time, prevalent opinion in the West was that Catholicism was an impediment to democratisation. Eventually, however, the Vatican Council of 1963-1965 issued a proclamation declaring that Catholicism was compatible with democracy and supporting the push for democratisation. Islam, of course, does not have the equivalent of a Vatican and some might maintain that it does not have a unified clerical hierarchy. However, there are certainly persons around who are trying to turn the authority of religion against democratic transition.

There remains a final observation that I believe is extremely important. In Spain, I came across no one who refuted the debt the country owed to its king for ensuring the peaceful transition from tyranny to democracy. King Carlos, almost single-handedly, engineered the dismantlement of the authoritarian system. He reinstituted political parties and succeeded in persuading these parties that constitutional monarchy and democracy were not at odds. He simultaneously succeeded in subordinating the instruments of authoritarian rule, notably the military, to civilian government and in using these instruments to safeguard the peaceful transition to democracy. In short, the case of Spain belies the claim that transition to democracy must pass through chaos and violence.

* The writer is director of the Arab Centre for Development and Futuristic Research.