Street politics

Ayman El-Amir* detects a subtle shift of power towards the people, but it has a long way to go

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"Power," former US Secretary of State Henry A Kissinger famously remarked, "is the greatest aphrodisiac." However unorthodox this description of power, it is not far-fetched. For political power is intoxicating and seductive, especially when exercised beyond democratic controls. The long procession of dictators and despots across history, and up to the present- day, attests to the fact that dictatorial power is second nature to man and has, more often than not, been exercised in abusive ways. The absolute power once exercised as a "divine right" by mediaeval monarchs has been challenged during times of historical change such as the Cromwell's revolution in the mid-17th century, and the American and French revolutions of the 18th century. These laid the groundwork for Western liberal democracies, just as the latter-day national liberation struggles for independence in the Third World spawned disreputable autocracies. However, political, economic, demographic and technological developments in the last quarter of the 20th century have led to mounting disenchantment with both systems. As a result, power is gradually devolving from the centre of government to the street, where it originates in the first place.

There have been a few telling signs in recent weeks. In the US some 11 million illegal immigrants marched through more than 100 cities, demanding the right to become naturalised US citizens. By definition "illegal" immigrants should remain in hiding for fear of deportation, but these immigrants felt they were a significant enough part of the workforce to demonstrate in public and demand recognition. This left both the country and Congress divided. Congress is in a therapeutic two-week recess and, when it comes back, it will be facing the challenge of campaigning for new elections in November. For the time being the street is exercising power, both directly through physical presence and indirectly through Congressional lobbyists.

In France the combination of students and labour unions forced the centre-left government of President Jacques Chirac, and presidential aspirant Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin, to withdraw its labour law for youth that gave employers a three-year grace period during which they could lay off young employees. Three weeks of nationwide protests represented a test of will between the president, an adamant prime minister and the National Assembly on the one hand, and the raw force of students and labour unions on the other. It was reminiscent of the 1968 student uprising which began as a protest against school curricula but widened to include all social and political grievances when the labour movement joined. The famous slogan " Metro, boulot, dodo " (we take the underground, go to our petty work and then go back to sleep) encapsulated the exasperated national mood.

On the other side of the spectrum, in the impoverished Himalayan kingdom of Nepal, protestors demanding the ouster of King Gyanendra have defied curfews, police brutality and the embattled king's vague promises of democratic reform. After one month of demonstrations the king succumbed to street pressure and decided to call back parliament into session. The street declared victory. As in the case of France, the protestors, who include Maoist rebels, will settle for nothing less than an end to the monarchy.

Old-style liberal democratic elections in Italy, Hungary and Peru in recent weeks resulted in a close call in Italy and a runoff in Peru -- both reflecting deep divisions and popular misgivings over the political process.

In times of political and economic distress power in Third World countries has often shifted from the monarch or the dictator back to the street only to be recouped by another dictator. In the absence of democratic institutions capable of handling extreme change the military usually took the lead, either peacefully or violently. But the military, having either no stomach for the subtleties of the political process or finding power too intoxicating to relinquish, all too often replaced the old autocracy with a new one. To shore up their defences the new oligarchies created their own class of beneficiaries and interest groups. The street retreated, more in frustration than in elation.

The power of the street has always remained vigilant, patient but ready to regain the initiative in extremis. This is what happened in Iran and in the Philippines, leading to the ouster of the Shah in 1979 and Ferdinand Marcos in 1986. It was street power, led by the pro-Khomeini mullahs in Iran, not the military establishment loyal to the Shah, that led the million-man rebellion to overthrow the throne and welcome the return of their exiled spiritual leader. The Catholic Church in the Philippines, not the military establishment, organised the anti-Marcos marches and strikes that forced him to flee the country with his family. And it was a popular uprising against Slobodan Milosevic of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia that threw him out of power, following his loss of the elections in 2000 and his indictment for war crimes the previous year.

In the so-called emerging democracies of Eastern Europe the street played a critical role in redressing electoral fraud, as was the case in the Ukraine, when Soviet-era autocracy re-emerged in Kyrgystan, and when state government needed to be revamped, as happened in Georgia in 2004. In Belarus mass protests against the electoral irregularities that saw President Alyaksandr Lyukashenko returned to power in March provoked a strong response within the European Union, with EU foreign ministers implementing a series of punitive measures, including a travel ban on the president himself.

The Arab world, though, is a case that defies definition. It consists mostly of repackaged medieval monarchies and feudal republics, not one of which is in transition or about to embrace meaningful democratic change. Although some regimes acquired their legitimacy through revolutionary change they quickly manipulated circumstances to ensure themselves autocratic, self-perpetuating rule. They govern by everlasting emergency laws, declared or undeclared, and sustain themselves through sham political institutions. And they are willing to play along with domestic and foreign demands for reform only as long as it leaves the status quo intact.

In this ancient region the street has yet to test itself against the state in any significant way. In Egypt, during the multi-party parliamentary elections earlier this year, the street did pit itself against the overwhelming state security machine that supported the ruling National Democratic Party, but only to a limited extent and with controlled results. The episode left both sides with lessons to ponder.

But power in the Arab world seems slowly to be shifting. Elections of sorts in several Arab countries have encouraged grass-root organisations to entertain hopes of grabbing the initiative and seeking genuine democratic change. The biggest hurdle, though, is the absence of a democratic culture capable of envisioning, let alone accepting, the liberal concept of the rotation of power. For the region's monarchies, where half-hearted reforms are being introduced, a Cromwellian revolution that could create constitutional monarchy and curb the runaway power of absolute sovereigns is still a distant dream.

* The writer is former corespondent for Al-Ahram in Washington, DC, and ex-director of United Nations Radio and Television in New York.