Looks like Vietnam

The US presence in Iraq resembled America's involvement in another bitterly divisive war, writes Rasha Saad

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In "Washington's options", Maher Othman wrote in the daily London-based Al-Hayat that there is much in common between gambling and the military involvement in far away foreign countries whose people reject occupation and partition.

According to Othman, gamblers hope to make a profit. Otherwise, they throw more of their money into the gambling incinerator, hoping to make up for these losses and to begin making the profits they had hoped for.

Drawing a similarity, Othman wrote that in Vietnam in the early 1960s, the Americans began sending military experts to train the South Vietnamese army. They then intensified their involvement by sending combat troops that swelled in numbers until they reached tens of thousands. As the battles became more intense, US losses began to increase.

The Americans did not achieve victory; they sustained a painful defeat, the last scenes of which were the escape from Saigon and from the US Embassy there.

In Iraq, likewise, Othman says that despite the losses suffered by the Republican Party in the US mid-term elections and the Democratic Party's success in controlling a majority in the House of Representatives and the Senate, President George Bush continues to declare his determination to achieve victory.

Suggesting an exit strategy for the US from Iraq, Othman underlines the need to cooperate in the months or may be years to come to resolve both the problems of Iraq and the Arab-Israeli conflict, of common interest to the US and Iraq's neighbours.

"In reality, this cooperation is Washington's only option for a way out of its current deadlock with the least possible losses," Othman wrote. He said it was the only alternative that guaranteed future relations based on common interests with the peoples and governments of the Middle East.

"Certainly, pouring more troops into the Iraqi quagmire is not the best solution for the Americans, who must not forget their painful experience in Vietnam. The least costly option is to confer with key regional parties and work hard to find a peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict based on decisions of international legitimacy."

Mustafa Zein, also in Al-Hayat, pointed out that both the Vietnam and Iraq wars are similar in terms of falsifying the justifications, the catastrophes, and their courses.

Zein wrote that the pretext for the Vietnam war was that the North Vietnamese had launched an attack on the destroyer, the USS Maddox, in the Gulf of Tonkin, but the real reason was that the war was aimed at confronting the Communist expansion in East Asia, following France's defeat there.

Likewise, Zein explained, the pretext for the war on Iraq was to divest Saddam Hussein of his weapons of mass destruction. The lie, according to Zein, was very clear. Saddam possessed no weapons of mass destruction, and his regime never posed a threat to the Middle East, especially after a 12-year-long siege and tough international surveillance. The real reason was to control the oil in the Gulf and protect Israel from any potential danger. The driving force in this war was the arms and oil companies. For Zein the war on Iraq thus was "driven by a rancor against the Arabs as a replacement of the hatred towards communism".

While the White House has tried, since the beginning of the invasion in 2003, to avoid any comparisons with Vietnam, the course of the Iraqi invasion has corroborated the comparison for many Arab writers.

Zein, like many Arab writers, believes the Americans will pull out of Baghdad, as they did from Saigon. However, he adds there is a significant difference between the two cases: the Vietcong were united and managed to build a strong country that has forced the US president to pay a recent visit to it so as to become acquainted with the progress it is making. The Iraqi resistance, however, is in a state of disarray. "Resistance factions are embroiled in a civil war and are seeking to divide the country on ethnic and sectarian bases."

This point in particular made Amir Taheri doubt the rationality and integrity of a cut-and-run policy in Iraq. In the London-based Asharq Al-Awsat Taheri said such a policy was easier in Vietnam than in Iraq.

In Vietnam, he said the Americans had a negotiating partner in the shape of the Communist regime in Hanoi. They knew who to give the keys to, so to speak. In Iraq, there is no such negotiating partner. Even if Saddam were brought back, he no longer has the murderous machine he would need to provide the Americans with cover while they flee. Handing the keys to Al-Qaeda, according to Taheri, would be equally problematic if only because the self-styled Jihadists, although able to kill defenceless civilians, do not have the clout to fight the Americans.

Taheri acknowledges that some [in the US] may not be interested in such complications. They might want to throw the keys in the midst of the melee, much like a bone to fighting dogs, and let the various armed groups in Iraq fight over it.

However, Taheri said the struggle in Iraq was part of the broader war against global terrorism. He underlined that a majority of Iraqis do not support the terrorist groups operating there. And, thus, "it would be treacherous to abandon them before they can defend themselves."

He reminds US officials who support a pullout from Iraq that the US-led coalition did not enter Iraq to picnic. It went there to fight to dismantle one of the most vicious regimes in recent history and to replace it with a regime chosen by the Iraqi people. Those objectives, according to Taheri, have been achieved but are challenged. "The message to those in search of 'elegant solutions [in Iraq]' is simple: this is a war, stupid! And what are the options in a war? One can fight to win. One can surrender to the enemy. One can panic and run away. These are the options in Iraq. So, let the debate begin," concludes Taheri.