Widening the war

To 'save Iraqi democracy' Bush will also target Shias, writes M A Muqtedar Khan*

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Two months after the American people expressed overwhelming lack of confidence in President Bush and his war in Iraq by handing over the House and Senate to the Democrats --after 12 years of Republican control -- President Bush finally admitted that strategic mistakes have been made in Iraq.

In a much-awaited speech he acknowledged his own responsibility for the failures in Iraq, and then outlined a new strategy for ensuring the survival of Iraqi democracy. The 20- minute speech was full of rhetoric and staid platitudes about the "burdens of freedom", "the hope of liberty", "the author of liberty", the "decisive ideological struggle", and was very thin on substance. It even had a "Borat moment" when he shared intelligence with the American people that Al-Qaeda planned to establish a radical Islamic empire in the Al-Anbar Province in Iraq.

Indeed, the new strategy outlined by President Bush had much less to offer than had been expected by experts and pundits. There was no clear plan to bring about a political solution to the Shia-Sunni divide. neither was there any firm commitment from the US to provide economic relief to a country where unemployment is reaching 60 per cent in many areas. There was no indication, moreover, of how the US plans to regain the confidence of the Sunni population. who are now resisting both the new Iraqi regime and US occupation.

The plan basically has three new elements. One is a tactical shift in fighting the insurgency. In the past, US troops would clear towns and neighbourhoods and then leave, allowing insurgents to return. Now the president has made a commitment to clear and hold areas thereby preventing insurgents from returning. The additional 21,000 troops to be deployed are necessary for holding cleared areas. Perhaps it has not occurred to planners in the Pentagon that if insurgents and sectarian fighters cannot return to their old neighbourhoods in Baghdad, they may shift their locus of operation to other cities and provinces. According to this plan, by November 2007, nearly all of Iraq's 18 provinces will come under Iraqi supervision, giving fighters many options for new theatres for their activities.

The second element in the new plan is of a strategic nature and is significant. The president has clearly indicated that unlike in the past when the US refrained from disarming Shia militias, the US now intends to act against them. His exact words on this matter were: "In earlier operations, political and sectarian interference prevented Iraqi and American forces from going into neighbourhoods that are home to those fuelling the sectarian violence. This time, Iraqi and American forces will have a green light to enter those neighbourhoods -- and Prime Minister Maliki has pledged that political or sectarian interference will not be tolerated."

The promise is clear; the US intends to go after Shia militias, and Maliki will not protect them. Delivery remains to be seen. Nuri Al-Maliki's government needs the support of the 30 seats in the Iraqi parliament that Shia militant leader Muqtada Al-Sadr controls. If Maliki will not provide political cover for Sadr and his brigands, Sadr will not support Maliki's government, and it could collapse. Nonetheless, it is clear that Washington is serious. A day before President Bush made his speech, Maliki warned Sadr's Mahdi Army to either disarm, or face US and Iraqi forces. The grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani, too, has expressed his support for the disarmament of militias, regardless of their identity. While Sistani's influence on Iraqi politics has receded, his support is significant.

Will the new strategy work? The chances are remote. This is clearly a case of too little too late. It also depends on many contingent factors. For example, will Iraqi forces that are predominantly Shia act decisively against Shia militias? Or will US troops have to face Shia militias on their own? In the short term, one can expect an immediate rise in US casualties. How long will the American public be able to stomach this?

The third element of the plan is a decision to confront Iran. The president has deployed an entire carrier force to threaten Iran, deployed a battery of Patriot missiles to defend moderate allies in the region from Iranian escalation, and has said that US troops will target and destroy Iranian and Syrian networks in Iraq. The most important recommendation of the Baker-Hamilton Iraq Study Group was that US should establish a dialogue with Iran and Syria, and solicit their help in stabilising Iraq. Instead of listening and acting on this wise advice, the Bush administration has once again succumbed to its neoconservative instincts and has decided to initiate a confrontation with Iran and Syria. In a way, this is an escalation and, even, an expansion of the war in Iraq, to now include Iran and Syria as targets of US military operations.

There is a major problem with this new strategy, and I wonder if American policy makers realise it. With this speech, President Bush has practically declared war on the Shias. He has decided to go after Shia militias in Iraq, and Shia regimes in the region. Until now, the US has been fighting only with the Sunnis -- Al-Qaeda and the Iraqi insurgency. But from now on, US troops will be fighting Al-Qaeda, Sunni insurgents, the Mahdi and Badr militias and perhaps even Iranian and Syrian intelligence and commando units.

Apparently, the Bush administration's appetite for war and violence is not sated with Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia; it is seeking to open new fronts with more enemies.

* The writer is an assistant professor at the University of Delaware and a non-resident senior fellow with the Saban Centre at The Brookings Institution.