Bush fails to convince

A "surge" in US occupation troops is likely to make matters worse, according to most informed US observers, Khaled Dawoud writes from New York

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Bush

Poor George W. His long-awaited plan to "change the course" and achieve "victory" in Iraq was met with widespread scepticism -- if not a roar of criticism -- both by his opponents and, worse, by influential members of his Republican Party who are eyeing the 2008 presidential elections and who recognise that the Iraq war has become a liability.

The new reality of Congress, with both the Senate and House under control of the Democrats following the victory they scored in November's mid-term elections, clearly surfaced in the harsh scrutiny of Bush's new plan.This is mainly based on sending 21,000 more US troops to quell violence in Baghdad and help build an Iraqi government that can rule independently.

Veteran Democratic Senator Edward Kennedy, who opposed the Iraq war in the first place, introduced a non- binding resolution officially declaring that the Senate did not back Bush's latest plan that will inevitably lead to new fighting and deeper US involvement in the Iraq quagmire. Yet, it remains unclear whether the prime targets of the additional troops will be radical Shias led by Muqtada Al-Sadr, the Sunni insurgency, or both.

Democratic leaders are divided over calls by some party members to forestall the implementation of Bush's new plan by cutting the required funding needed to send additional troops. The so-called influential "centrist" Democratic leaders, such as New York senator and presidential hopeful Hillary Clinton, fear they would be charged with failing to "support the troops" at a time of war if they were seen curtailing funds. More radical Democrats see no option but to immediately start a gradual withdrawal of US troops, declare mission accomplished and cut America's losses, and let Iraqis face their own destiny and settle their differences.

The largest hurdle the Bush administration faces is mistrust. After nearly four years of involvement in the war, along with broken promises and despite repeated statements by Bush assuring "victory" and praising "progress", the lingering question reflected in opinion polls and among politicians is: Why should we trust Bush this time?

Despite lengthy testimony given by US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in front of the Senate and House last week in hope of selling the new Iraq plan, she was harshly grilled, and even faced personal attacks. She was indirectly reminded that as a single woman she had no children to lose in the costly war compared to the families of more than 3,000 Americans who died in Iraq so far. Rice reportedly left, embittered, to the Middle East region, hoping to find a better audience among traditional allies and gain their backing for the Bush plan.

Diplomatic phrases expressing an initial welcome of the Bush plan were spoken in front of the cameras during the stops Rice made in key Arab capitals. Yet hardly anyone seems impressed by Bush's new way forward, pointing out that it contains many flows, ignores the depth of sectarian grievances only made worse by bad policies approved by Bush, and disregards key recommendations tabled by the Iraq Study Group, headed by former US Secretary of State James Baker.

While the trusted adviser of the Bush family and veteran politician Baker called upon the US president to "engage" Iran and Syria, Bush had nothing by harsh warnings for Iran during his 20-minute televised address last week. He announced the deployment of additional aircraft carriers to the Middle East, and the stationing of Patriot anti-missile batteries in the countries neighbouring Iran. Newly- appointed Secretary of Defense Robert Gates refused to totally exclude the possibility of a military confrontation with Iran, but said it would be the "last resort". Officials indicated that the tough words Bush reiterated in his address aimed at sending a clear message to Tehran that it would be wrong to think that the US was weakened by its imbroglio in Iraq, and that it should not seek to undermine the US's present attempt to restore stability there.

Meanwhile, critics of the Bush plan pointed out that one major flow was that it relied heavily on the efficiency of Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki, despite doubts among senior administration officials that he was the suitable leader to achieve common goals. According to US military commanders in Iraq, even Maliki did not welcome the plan to send US more troops. The leader of the Shia Daawa Party, who many assumed played a central role in crafting Bush's new plan, wanted US troops to pull out of Baghdad, deploy on the outskirts, and hand over security to the Iraqi army alone. This led to suspicions among US commanders that Maliki was actually seeking to implement a sectarian agenda, considering the infiltration of the Iraqi army by Shia militias, and the alleged complicity in attacks on Sunni neighbourhoods.

The manner in which the Maliki government handled the execution of former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, and later that of his top aides, Barzan Al-Tikriti and Awad Al-Bandar, on Monday, only added to the growing mistrust within the US administration regarding the ability of the Iraqi premier to implement the newly declared plan. While Saddam was humiliated at his execution by witnesses who chanted Shia prayers, matters got worse for the doomed Bush administration, as Iraqi officials announced that Saddam's half brother and former Iraqi intelligence chief, Barzan was decapitated during his execution.

In his testimony to the Congress, Secretary Gates implied that Maliki could be replaced if he did not meet his promises to provide more Iraqi troops, form an inclusive government that would include Sunnis, agree on a new law to fairly distribute oil wealth in Iraq, and loosen the de-Baathification laws first declared by US occupation authorities. The latter led to the alienation and isolation of Sunnis in Iraq, allegedly because they were the core supporters of the former Baath government led by Saddam.

Few believe that Maliki can deliver, and the majority doubt that, even in the most optimistic of scenarios, Bush can restore order to a country that he has practically ruined, given the relatively short time he has left before he exits the White House in Fall 2008. Bush's attempt to patch things up through heavier involvement in the war, which several US analysts and commentators described as a repetition of the Vietnam scenario when it took years for US leaders to realise that "continuing to fight in order not to lose" cannot be an effective strategy. It may well be the last line in a legacy that historians will surely judge harshly.