Presidential piccadillo

The political difficulties of saving Darfur have shifted into top gear, writes Gamal Nkrumah

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Ways to end the United States- Sudanese chill have repeatedly failed as visits to the Sudanese capital Khartoum by top-level US officials, usually carrying grim messages, have been unable to break the ice.

In sharp contrast, trips by Chinese officials to Khartoum have further cemented the already strong ties that bind the two countries. "There is flexibility and there is a readiness to demonstrate this flexibility in the talks to come," Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister Zhai Jun told reporters in Khartoum. He was on a trip explicitly intended to mend fences between Khartoum and the international community -- namely the West.

The special envoy of the Chinese government, who spoke in fluent Arabic, said that he has faith in the good intentions of the Sudanese government and stressed Sudanese sovereignty and territorial integrity. "But this flexibility should be demonstrated in mutual consultations and on an equal basis," he said.

Whatever the truth of the matter, one thing is clear, there is more to the Darfur crisis than meets the eye as the Sudanese protagonists recently spent countless hours together attempting to negotiate peace in the Nigerian capital Abuja.

The protagonists, who are fighting to win the hearts and minds of the people of Darfur -- indigenous non-Arab and Arab tribes, have found it difficult to clinch a deal acceptable to all.

The Sudanese government claims that it has shown uncharacteristic restraint in dealing with its opponents in Darfur. However, the tenacious regime has had more than one dust-up recently with armed Darfur opposition groups. In Sudan it has become clear that negotiated settlements, such as the 9 January 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Sudanese government and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), have greased the path to national power faster than any other possible approach to conflict resolution.

Under the terms of the CPA, the SPLA is now the main coalition partner of the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) of President Al-Bashir. The CPA stipulated that the Sudanese authorities incorporate leading members of the SPLA into the cabinet. The Sudanese Vice- President Salva Kiir, is the leader of the SPLA and the President of South Sudan -- which is an autonomous self-governing political entity.

Still, members of the tripartite Sudanese presidency remain suspicious of the political agendas of the other and the relationship between the two parties in power remains strained. Kiir, who is also the leader of the SPLA and Foreign Minister Lam Akol, also a leading SPLA figure and other southerners hold important ministerial portfolios.

However, there are tangible social and political tensions among the large southern population in Khartoum and its environs. There are also palpable ethnic and regional conflicts in various parts of the country including the southern, western and eastern regions.

The Sudan Liberation Army (SLA), not to be confused with the SPLA, and headed by Arkwo Minni Minnawi, wants to cut a deal similar to the CPA with the Sudanese government. However, other Darfur armed opposition groups refuse to sign a peace deal with the Sudanese government until their demands are met.

The two factions of the SLA are secularist -- the political divisions are mainly tribal in nature, rather than ideological. The Islamist Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) -- which is closely aligned to the opposition Popular Congress Party (PCP) of Sudan's leading Islamist ideologue Sheikh Hassan Al-Turabi -- has joined hands with the SLA faction under the command of Abdul-Wahid Mohamed Al-Nour. This courtship or marriage of convenience between the two parties is paying dividends.

The two groups insist on a deal similar to the CPA and nothing less for Darfur. The Sudanese government, or at least the NCP, has flatly turned down the demands of the SLA Al-Nour faction and the JEM. A bitter tug- of-war and battle of wills has ensued. And the resulting hyperbole on both sides is somewhat misplaced.

However, the fears of the Darfur armed opposition groups are not unfounded. Al-Bashir's regime has managed to survive an endless series of blunders and transgressions. The Janjaweed, the pro-government Arabised militiamen, are striking terror in Darfur once again.

There is a wall of silence in the Arab media about the deplorable humanitarian conditions in Darfur. and the grim statistics which accompany these conditions. Making Darfur more hospitable to humanitarian workers, both local and international, has become a paramount necessity.

Contrary to the anticipated Western reaction, the Al-Bashir regime's attitude to Darfur has not shifted dramatically. For the West this is a serious breach of faith.

Al-Bashir's carefully cultivated public image is based on playing the nationalist card for domestic political ends. This, however, can be a dangerous game. He is, nevertheless, a political survivor and for a long time his political future has hung in the balance.

Nor can anyone who values peace fail to be concerned about the occasional bitter exchanges between the Sudanese president and his vice-presidents. He is against the deployment of peace- keeping troops in Darfur other than the African Union (AU) force. But, Al-Bashir does not mind United Nations logistical and financial support for the AU peace-keeping contingency in Darfur. Kiir, in sharp contrast, welcomes the deployment of foreign troops.

In short everything about the current situation in Darfur is ambiguous. What Al-Bashir stands for, Kiir and the armed opposition groups of Darfur stand against. The armed opposition groups of Darfur get their momentum from the Darfurians' fervent desire for justice. The local people of Darfur want more political say, especially in the decision- making process. The road ahead is difficult.