Ceasefire revisited

It's been 10 years since the Egyptian Al-Gamaa Al-Islamiya announced its ceasefire initiative. Sounding out the experts, Jailan Halawi seeks the lessons of the interim

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Ten years ago today there occurred a historic moment when leaders of Egypt's worst security nightmare, Al-Gamaa Al-Islamiya issued a brief statement renouncing violence and declaring the end of armed operations. Since assassinating president Anwar El-Sadat, they had taken to referring to the former president as a "martyr"; and having killed civilians as well as tourists and police, they now apologised for their actions. Public perception saw some sort of clandestine deal with the regime, but the change equally reflected doctrinal changes within the group itself. By 1997, a major clampdown on the part of the security apparatus had doubtless crippled the group's infrastructure, leaving those of its leaders who were not behind bars on the run, in exile or dead. Incarcerated since Sadat's death in 1981, the group's historic leaders now issued this statement out of their prison cells. Armed operations had claimed some 1,000 lives, not only police officers, tourists and militants, but Copts, public figures and secular intellectuals.

Shortly after the statement, elements affiliated with the group carried out the worst attack to date, slaughtering 58 tourists and four Egyptians at a temple in Luxor. This was to be the only breach of the ceasefire, but it took the authorities years to endorse the initiative and eventually even provide Al-Gamaa with a forum to spread their thought and convene. Following the end of armed operations, the group's highest legislative body, its shura council, produced four revisionist books delineating the doctrinal bases of the shift in perspective; and the authorities permitted Al-Gamaa leaders to tour prisons in a bid to win more followers; lectures were organised and publicised, allowing the initiative to reach as many of the group's members as possible. Since then thousands of Al-Gamaa members have been released from jail, including those leaders who issued the 1997 statements; last month, indeed, the groups detention files were closed. For 10 years the anti-violence initiative has been closely watched, not only by the authorities but by a public whose social, political and, notably, economic interests had been undermined by violence. Yet even now many a question remains about the future of Islamic militancy, notably the Al-Gamaa's sister group Jihad, the intentions of Al-Gamaa leaders and the point of the concessions they have made, and whether or not their Jihadi brothers may comply with them.

Was the statement genuine or a tactical manoeuvre to get out of prison? The more important question would seem to be about the state's own plans: will Al-Gamaa leaders be allowed to participate in political life or will they rest content with being out of jail? Such questions were the subject of a one-day Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies seminar which focussed on what to make of the original revisions and how to capitalise on them for the future. How far can Al-Gamaa set an example for other militant groups in Egypt and across the region? This, despite the fact that concerns over whether or not Al-Gamaa's renunciation of violence is permanent: for one thing, are there plans to integrate its leaders into the political process? "Most likely not," political analyst Amr Elchoubaky told Al-Ahram Weekly after the seminar, "at least not in the near future. The leaders' release means they are back in life, not in political life. And while the state might allow them to undertake the daawa [preach], their involvement in politics is a bit far-fetched at the moment." But the benefits of Al-Gamaa halting violence, he added, cannot be overestimated: Islamic groups generally act within the framework of fatwas ultimately rooted in Sharia (Muslim law). "Now," he explained, "we have some of the general movements' most obvious symbols prohibiting the use of violence along exactly such lines. And that is what we must capitalise on in relation to other movements and the future."

Political analyst Diaa Rashwan agreed, insisting that the revisions should be respectfully endorsed at the widest level: a long delayed move, as he described it. Rashwan took issue with questioning the sincerity of the initiative and expressed his appreciation of the fact that Al-Gamaa has upheld their stance despite turbulence and unlike many of its counterparts in the region: already the initiative has had positive resonance in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Morocco and Algeria, where some of the group's publications are being taught: "this should be considered a regional success story, since one of the initiative's main objectives was to find a way out of the crisis between the Islamic movements and governments throughout the region." For Hazem Kandil, an expert on Islamic socio-political movements, however, the 10-year ceasefire is already over; the work civil society should be embarking on, rather, is to focus on the root causes of violence itself. There is, Kandil says, a need to go "beyond the blatantly obvious" and move onto the business of reintegrating militants who have lived in isolation and, more importantly, preventing the appeal of violence from taking hold of young people (hence, he implied, improving socio- economic conditions). Already the ceasefire has improved the prospects of investment and economic growth. "But such stability has been the case for 10 years, and I don't believe that those people ever drifted into violence based solely on ideological belief. Initiative or not, until the state provides them with a quality of life fit for human beings, violence is likely to happen again. The bottom line is that it's the responsibility of the state, not individuals. We should be aware of the possibility that, by failing to live up to the minimal expectations of people, we may very well go back 10 years."

Voicing the same opinion, at the seminar, was political analyst Wahid Abdel-Meguid: "while it is extremely difficult to predict the fate of such groups in the light of the current, ambiguous political situation, it is well to note that violence remains a possibility for as long as the factors capable of generating it persist." But will those groups be part of political life? Abdel-Meguid did not dismiss the possibility, but he too said it would not be in the near future. Speculations remain rife as to the direction in which political restrictions will be driving Jihad, since, as one political analyst speaking on condition of anonymity pointed out, the one condition the regime has imposed on Islami militants in return for their freedom -- to keep out of political life -- is something Jihad will never stomach.