1967 syndrome

We sensationalise our defeats without learning the hard lessons from them, writes Amin Howeidi*

---

Every year, the June 1967 defeat is remembered in the Egyptian, Arab and international press with flourish and a bit of sensationalism. The defeat was undeniably harsh. It changed the region and the way we do things. Egypt was at the time leading the pan-Arab movement and therefore sensitive about such things. And Syria, which had a joint defence agreement with Egypt, was under threat by Israel. Egypt had to do something about it. The rest is history. The defeat was a defeat for all Arabs. We lost the Golan, the West Bank, and Sinai.

There is nothing odd about the annual commemoration of the war. This was an earth-shaking event and we must always remember it, the way France always remembered its loss of the Alsace and Lorraine to German armies. A certain amount of zeal is justified. But why are we commemorating the war? Is it out of self-flagellation, we being the defeated party? Or is it out of a desire to get things right in the future? Have we learnt our lessons? Have we learnt enough not to repeat past mistakes?

My opinion is that we still cover up much of our errors. Many of our officials still think that they are doing the country a favour by hiding the truth. We punish people who spy for the enemy. And yet we don't punish those who conceal reality. We don't punish people who make it harder for us to avoid repeating our mistakes. Only the enemy can benefit from such a situation. Spying is far less harmful than hiding facts. And yet some of our officials have collected published material from bookstores to keep the truth hidden. They don't want the public to know the facts. They want the cover-up to continue.

I am bringing this up because I've seen it all happen before. Before the 1967 War, the nation was kept in the dark about anything pertaining to the military. Worse than that, we had a "yes sir" squad that gave our officials an unrealistic impression of our military capabilities. No one within the army spoke out when the political situation flared up. Had they said something, the political leadership may have reconsidered and a catastrophe may have been averted.

Such are the matters we should be discussing whenever 1967 comes up. We should rise to meet our responsibilities, for this country belongs to all of us. Much can be learned from 1967, and yet the media is still covering the event in the same old manner. Journalists still ask the same old questions, and publish the same old answers. It's all sensationalism and no content. And that's why I find it utterly demoralising.

Supposedly knowledgeable people keep bringing up questions that have been settled long ago. One such question is the right of the political leadership to interfere in the running of military operations. Some still fault the 1967 political leadership for ordering the generals to defend Arish. But we must remember that war is a political move. War begins and ends with a political decision. This is why the political leadership has the right to tell the military what to do. And the military command has to seek the approval of the political leadership before implementing its plans. A military commander may accept or refuse to do a certain task. But once he agrees, he alone should take all the responsibility. These are not my words, but those of Napoleon Bonaparte.

A certain amount of sensationalism, even self-flagellation, is to be expected. But we must learn the lessons. We must uncover the facts. And we mustn't pretend that our defeats were less serious than they were. Look at Israel. Look at how the Israelis formed a committee to investigate their military performance in 1973 and again in 2006. Israel uses transparency to give its army strength and keep it on the right track. But in Egypt, some people are still sweeping things under the carpet, thereby weakening us further. We have to learn from our mistakes, before we repeat them.

* The writer is former defence minister and chief of General Intelligence.