We watch and worry

A senior official and an informed report cast doubt over the prospects of Arab security and cooperation in 2008. Dina Ezzat reports

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"The Arab regime is situated in a complex regional set-up consumed by conflicts and competition and dominated by the presence of leading regional players with major interests to watch over and key alliances to protect." This is how the annual Arab Strategic Report qualifies the status quo of the Arab world towards the end of 2007 and into the New Year.

According to the report, issued by the Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies as last year was drawing to a close, the dominant regional powers with projects for the future are mainly Israel, Turkey, Iran and Ethiopia. Throughout its many sections, the report attempts to shed light on how these powers, especially Iran and Israel, seem set to impose their regional scenarios which often compete with one another often at the expense of Arab interests. The scenarios are certainly not in line with the interests of the Arab regime, if such a collective unity is still to be seriously considered despite the many divisions that befell the political, and indeed security agendas of the 22 member states of the Arab League.

The report offers a vision of a de facto nuclear Israel and a nuclear ambitious Iran that dominate a region while Turkey is seeking a difficult accession into the European Union, away from the hassle of the Middle East, and where Ethiopia is trying to be the leading African force, especially in the east of the continent, even when it comes to the supposedly strict Arab interests of Sudan and Somalia, both members of the admittedly weakened Arab League.

"Under such circumstances, it was to be expected that the [collective] Arab regime would attempt to minimise its internal differences and maximise its cooperative dynamics to balance the dynamics of such regional powers," the report suggests. However, on the contrary, as the editors of the report argued, Arab countries have failed to live up to the challenges of non-Arab regional dominance which also includes the increasingly visible and probably continuous presence of the US and NATO. This failure is attributed primarily to the "unconsolidated status of the Arab regime institution."

The Arab regime, the report states, fails to firmly express its collective interests "as a result of the unilateral tendencies of most of its member states to the point that it has become difficult to speak of a [coordinated] Arab foreign policy or Arab interests."

What is in play now across the Arab world, the report notes, are the singular interests of this or that Arab nation. The case is especially so in view of the disappearance of what used to be common and many times perceived interests and threats. Israel, the report notes, is no longer the [uncontested] "enemy" of Arab interests. If anything, some Arab countries have more in common with Israel than with other Arab states.

The relationship with Israel, the alliances with the US -- especially in connection with the declared war on terror -- and the dislike and apprehension of Iran, as the report notes, are currently the main factors that prompt foreign policy decisions of each individual Arab country.

It is perhaps this state of divided, and at times conflicting interests that have hampered any progress on the resolution of any crucial Arab problem, chronic or otherwise. According to Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa, 2007 has been "a failure for collective Arab diplomacy" to resolve any of the pressing Arab problems, whether the long-stalled Arab-Israeli settlement or the vacancy of the presidency in Lebanon. Iraq, Sudan, Somalia and other conflict areas remain too resolute for an agreement despite the appearances of reduced tension at times, as Moussa said.

Judging by the statements made by Moussa earlier this week, more of the same should be expected for 2008: the projected Annapolis peace-making framework will be seriously challenged if not entirely defied by Israel's intransigence, especially in relation to its refusal to halt the construction of illegal Jewish colonies in the occupied Palestinian territories; the objective of national reconciliation in Iraq is still rejected by the ethnic divisions that are enhanced, willingly or otherwise, by foreign powers; reconciliation in Sudan might progress but will not necessarily be fully achieved; Somalia will experience further hardships; Lebanon is likely to elect a president but will not overcome divisions over its national political choices; Syria, supposedly the next host of the Arab summit, may come out of the cold but only a little; and the inter-Palestinian dispute may be contained but is not beyond re- emerging.

Consequently, Arab countries seem to be watching rather than anything else. Arabs are waiting for the visit by US President George W Bush later this month to see whether he will exercise enough influence to curtail Israeli settlement plans. "The Annapolis [framework] gave the US the role of the arbitrator and mover of a [serious] Palestinian-Israeli negotiations process with the objective of reaching a conclusion in 2008," Moussa said. They will also need to see how the Iran- US dialogue can influence the choice and ability of the Lebanese opposition to reach an agreement and to encourage Syria and Hamas to be more open on the potential of dialogue with US allies Israel and the Palestinian Authority. In short, Arabs do not seem to be in a position to forge, or for that matter opt for any collective security strategy.

The choice as seemingly proposed by the report and indeed by Arab diplomats is to follow the US and Israel -- the choice of moderation -- or to support Iran against these two, the choice of extremism, as described by Western foreign policy jargon.

As indicated by the report and by Arab officials, there might be a new choice that could arise next year if dialogue between Iran and the West succeeds: an all-inclusive security arrangement that would somehow bring together Arab states, Iran, Turkey, Israel, Ethiopia and even Pakistan and Afghanistan. This new alliance would become possible if the US, encouraged by the European Union, successfully administers its dialogue with Iran.