Admitting defeat

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The Winograd Report doesn't concern Israel alone, but also all Arabs. The war Israel launched against Lebanon in summer 2006 was a war of aggression against Arabs. This is why the report is so important, for not only does it uncover the shortcomings in Israel's structure and political and military performance, but it also sheds light on things some Arabs -- especially officials -- prefer to ignore.

First, Israel has admitted, through the official Winograd Commission, that it lost the war. It is true that the commission used the words "we didn't win" as a euphemism, but it also spoke of a post-war feeling of "despondence and disappointment" in Israel. Several Israeli politicians and journalists called the report a "tremor", which is what lost wars do to a defeated nation.

This admission of defeat is Israel's first in 60 years of wars against Arabs. Still, some Arab officials refuse to give the resistance credit for the victory. Some, especially among Lebanese officials, remain adamant that the resistance lost the war, citing the extensive loss of life and property in Lebanon. What these officials ignore is that the victor, just as the vanquished, sustains losses in any war. But the criterion for defeat is not the extent of loss, but rather the political outcome. The defeated party is the one that loses its morale and fails to achieve its aims -- which in this case was Israel.

Second, Israel was the aggressor in the war. The Winograd Commission concludes that Israel -- not the resistance, as some Arab officials claim -- initiated the war. This contradicts the conclusion the Lebanese government came to immediately after the war broke out. As soon as the resistance captured two Israeli soldiers near the Blue Line -- which is not an official international border -- the government of Fouad AL-Siniora hastened to disclaim any responsibility. It then proceeded to accuse the resistance of hijacking the state. Within hours, other Arab governments followed suit, accusing the resistance of engaging in "miscalculated adventure". What would these same Arab officials say now in response to the Winograd admission that Israel went to war on its own initiative?

Third, the Winograd Commission admits that resistance rockets fired into Israel's depth inflicted extensive human, psychological and material damage. For the first time in the history of Arab-Israeli wars, the resistance managed to take the battle into enemy territory, promising to keep firing rockets into Israel until a ceasefire was achieved. Thousands of Israeli families were evacuated from the Galilee. Thousands others had to hide in bunkers until the war was over. This is a fact that was denied or ignored by some Arabs, especially Lebanese officials who kept reminding all of the grave damage inflicted on Lebanon as a result of the acts of the resistance. But the rockets the resistance fired had a great impact on Israel, making it clear that war is a two-way street, thereby forcing Israeli officials to think twice before attacking Lebanon in the future.

Fourth, the Winograd Commission notes that the 2006 war had certain political goals. Criticising the political and military conduct of the war, the commission said the goals of the war were "legitimate" and yet the Israeli government failed to use the war to accelerate or improve the terms of a political settlement. Israel got something it wanted, however. The war, the report states, prompted the UN Security Council to pass Resolution 1701. This tells us that the Olmert government went to war in order to change the political and military situation in South Lebanon. The Winograd Report stops short from defining the goal of the war as one of disarming the Lebanese resistance, but this goes without saying.

Fifth, the resistance stood its ground notwithstanding the immense disparity in firepower between it and Israel. Lebanon is not a match for Israel in economic, military or technological terms, but the resolve and persistence of the resistance tilted the balance of power. The war turned out to be more a battle of wills than a contest of military hardware. The 2006 war proves that popular resistance, if conducted with resolve and skill, and if backed by those Arab governments dedicated to stopping Israel from dominating the region, can sustain direct conflict and even triumph in the end.

When will sceptical Arabs stop denying these glaring facts and learn their lessons?