Criminalising Hamas

Islamist leaders in Gaza are convinced that moves are being made to hold it alone responsible for Palestinian national strife, writes Saleh Al-Naami

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Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas prays with members of his government during a PLO Executive Committee meeting in Ramallah

Following the recent meeting of Arab foreign ministers in Cairo, lights stayed on until dawn in the office of dismissed Palestinian premier Ismail Haniyeh, located on Ahmed Zaydiyeh Street in the western Al-Nasr neighbourhood of Gaza City. Ghazi Hamed, responsible for coordinating relations between the dismissed government and the Arab world, was contacting officials in a number of Arab capitals trying to learn of the decisions the Arab League Foreign Ministers Council would make with regard to resolving the Palestinian domestic rift, connecting Haniyeh to Arab foreign ministers whose countries sympathise with Hamas on certain positions. Hamed told Al-Ahram Weekly that it was clear to the dismissed government and Hamas leaders from the very beginning that certain Palestinian circles and Arab parties intended to criminalise Hamas and hold it responsible for the continuing inter-Palestinian rift.

Hamed considers the final declaration of the ministers meeting as replete with problems, including its mention of national legitimacy being represented by President Mahmoud Abbas. Hamed wonders why the Arab ministers have ignored other legitimate Palestinian bodies, including the government led by Haniyeh that was formed following democratic elections. The Arab ministers' reference to respecting the national institutions affiliated with the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) is particularly provocative for Hamed. "What legitimacy does the PLO have?" he asks. "It died long ago and became a club for groups and organisations that have lost their popular representation. What kind of legitimacy does this organisation have that has not produced any institutions through election and disregards the Palestinian Legislative Council that was selected through elections everyone witnessed as fair?"

Yet there is reason for Hamed and Haniyeh to be optimistic. Hamed points out that Arab foreign ministers have agreed that Egypt will continue its communications with Palestinian factions with the goal of forming a picture of how to resolve the Palestinian domestic rift and present this to the Arab League for adoption. Hamed is optimistic because Arab foreign ministers have agreed on the formation of a six- member committee to review the Egyptian vision before presenting it to the Arab League. According to Hamas, this committee will consist of the foreign ministers of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Qatar, Lebanon and Syria. Hamed considers the committee balanced, meaning that it's unlikely that Hamas will be confronted with any decisions incompatible with its positions. "Sifting" the Egyptian vision through the six-member committee is seen by Hamed as an achievement for Hamas and the fruit of diplomacy prior to and during the meeting.

As for Hamas leaders, they don't feel the need to wait until Egypt completes its consultations with Palestinian factions to know the general lines of the Egyptian vision. With the exception of Hamas and the Islamic Jihad, all the factions that have gone to Cairo have recommended the formation of a technocratic government, which constitutes a means of removing Hamas from power in Gaza. They have also recommended bringing forward the date for legislative elections, entailing dissolving the current Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC). Making matters even more complicated is the fact that on 9 January Abbas's term as president of the Palestinian Authority expires. Hamas has announced that Abbas has two options: organise new presidential elections or submit his resignation.

Fatah spokesperson Fahmi Al-Zaarir holds that Arab states should retain distance from Hamas's position, accusing it of "planning to embroil the Palestinian people in a constitutional battle that will complete the overthrow that took place in the Gaza Strip". In statements to the Weekly, Al-Zaarir said that the formation of a technocratic government and the holding of early elections would "guarantee the return of unity to the Palestinian political system". Al-Zaarir added that Abbas was the first to show his readiness for bringing forward legislative and presidential elections -- this step a requirement for reunifying the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Al-Zaarir says that if an agreement is not reached on holding early elections, legislative and presidential elections will have to be held at the same time, implying an automatic extension of President Abbas's term until January 2010.

Al-Zaarir holds that the issue of presidential elections will be indirectly addressed in discussions of a national accord government and the holding of early elections. The question is how Arab regimes will deal with Abbas following 9 January. No one in the Hamas leadership has any doubt that most of these regimes will continue to treat Abbas as though he were the legitimate president of the Palestinian Authority. The Hamas leadership, in turn, will exploit the end of his term to stress that he has usurped the concept of legitimacy.

Prominent Hamas leader Mahmoud Al-Zahhar says that Hamas's position on national dialogue focuses on four primary, unbending principles: respect for the legitimacy of all Palestinian factions; respect for the outcomes of legislative elections; respect for Palestinian basic law; and reforming the PLO. In statements made to the Weekly, Al-Zahhar said that Hamas refuses to form a technocratic government and hold early elections because that would mean strengthening "the steps towards overthrow" that Abbas has taken. Al-Zahhar added that the schedule for elections cannot be brought forward without coordinating with Hamas, which controls the Gaza Strip, or creating conditions that would allow for elections in the West Bank, including ending the Fayyad government's oppression of Hamas leaders.

Al-Zahhar also has doubts about the objectivity of the positions taken by PLO factions that have visited Cairo, adding that their representation on the Palestinian street is extremely limited. Al-Zahhar stresses that the Arab League, and particularly Egypt, must be in touch with reality and understand the political sensitivities involved in the Palestinian political arena.

Jamil Al-Majdalawi, who is a politburo member of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), is optimistic about Arab intervention. He denies claims that his organisation is adopting Abbas's positions, yet a close look at Al-Majdalawi's stance shows that it is in conformity with that of Abbas. In statements made to the Weekly, Al-Majdalawi spoke of "national accord" rather than a "technocratic" government, and stressed that there is Palestinian consensus on forming a national accord government, reconfiguring the Palestinian security agencies on a new basis, and rebuilding the PLO and its institutions as stated in the Cairo agreement and the national dialogue paper. He said that the national accord government must be responsible for supervising the reunification of Palestinian Authority institutions and preparing for elections.

Yehia Al-Daabseh, head of the PLC's monitoring committee, holds that the positions of the PFLP and other PLO factions are reproductions of Abbas's position. He says that the Palestinian left failed in tests of neutrality long ago when it adopted Abbas's stance that the Fayyad government is the legitimate government even though it does not have the confidence of the PLC. Yet Al-Daabseh is more concerned with encouraging Arab leaders to not aid Abbas in going against Palestinian basic law. He considers this a test of the Arab integrity in mediating between Fatah and Hamas.

Al-Daabseh underlines that Hamas will insist on the holding of elections, including the holding of presidential elections on schedule. He rejects calls made by a number of Palestinian Authority and Arab leaders for postponing presidential elections until the legislative elections in January 2010, considering such a move an "overthrow of the law and the constitution". Al-Daabseh says that Abbas has previously committed "massacres against the constitution by withdrawing power from the tenth government formed following the victory of Hamas and the national unity government formed following the Mecca agreement, as well as by issuing decrees that aim to hinder the government's work in a way that reveals his true intentions."

Al-Daabseh also believes that Abbas thinks and acts in accordance with US policy and considers him an American stooge. He warns Arabs against presenting a solution in favour of Abbas as that would constitute indirect support for the interests of Israel and the US.

There is a deep sense among Hamas leaders that Abbas, and with him the leftist factions and some Arab regimes, wants the Arab League to issue a resolution condemning Hamas and holding it responsible for the domestic rift. As such, Hamas is working to recruit what it considers "counter forces" in the Arab world to thwart this plan. According to Hamas leaders, there is optimism that the power balance within the Arab League will make it difficult for Abbas and his Arab allies to follow through on their intentions.

Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas prays with members of his government during a PLO Executive Committee meeting in Ramallah (above); Palestinian Muslim worshippers pray in Al-Aqsa Mosque, Jerusalem on the second Friday of Ramadan (photos: AFP)