What does Hamas want?

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Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, commenting on Hamas's rejection of Egypt's draft paper for reconciliation, said the movement was promoting "a regional agenda". The cryptic reference is tantalising, begging questions of why the inter-Palestinian dialogue keeps failing.

After months of talks about talks, why did Hamas pull out?

There may be many reasons -- political, ideological, cultural and strategic -- why inter-Palestinian dialogue is difficult yet combined they are insufficient to explain why a compromise solution cannot be found. What is the problem in agreeing on national aspirations and a common strategy? Why does inter-Palestinian dialogue run into one obstacle after another? Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Yemen have all tried to mediate to no avail.

One reason is that Hamas is trying to upstage, if not dismantle, the PLO. Hamas, to be blunt, doesn't want the PLO to lead. It is attempting to create a new organisational, ideological, and political frame of reference for the Palestinian people. Hamas is seeking to remake the PLO in its own image. It is trying to turn the PLO into an Islamic liberation movement.

Hamas is hoping to gather all Palestinian Islamic movements into a new version of the PLO, complete with a new charter that echoes Hamas's own position. Hamas is talking from both sides of its mouth. It claims to have accepted the prisoners' document, the document of national reconciliation and the Yemeni initiative. It participated in the elections, which imply it has accepted the Oslo Accords, and yet it claims to not have done so.

Hamas recently approved the draft paper Egypt prepared for inter-Palestinian dialogue. Like other groups it has proposed amendments and offered remarks. Then suddenly it pulled out of the talks, citing prisoners detained by the Palestinian Authority as its reason.

Hamas has long wanted to replace Fatah as the key force within the PLO or, should this prove impossible, to wreck the PLO altogether. At times Hamas tried to create a rival organisation to replace the PLO, at others it has refused to join the PLO, preferring to stand on the sidelines and question the rules of the game.

Hamas remains incapable of joining the PLO and changing it from within, as Yasser Arafat once did. Yet should it try to create an Islamic liberation movement to rival the PLO it will attract no Palestinian, Arab, or international support. Hamas has therefore decided to dwell outside the PLO, constantly questioning Fatah's legitimacy and mandate. What the group really wants is to dismantle the PLO and undermine its authority.

In documents, agreements and talks Hamas and other Islamic movements have long been urged to participate in the PLO. Indeed, many have considered such participation necessary to any revitalisation of the PLO. Hamas has preferred to remain an outsider.

Hamas has an Islamist agenda that it considers sacred. When Hamas controlled Gaza and Egypt negotiated an agreement between the movement and Israel, Hamas denounced the violators with a vehemence that recalled earlier Palestinian Authority utterances. Now Hamas has pulled out of the dialogue because it doesn't want to shoulder the responsibilities that come with it. It is playing for time, waiting for the day when it can edge its opponents out of the way.