Shifting sands

Growing tensions between Cairo and Tehran are a result of Iran seeking to wear the mantle Cairo once claimed as its own, writes Mustafa El-Labbad*

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Egyptian-Iranian relations took a turn for the worse following last week's demonstrations in front of the Egyptian Embassy in Tehran protesting against the Israeli blockade of Gaza. The protesters alleged that Egypt was complicit in the blockade and chanted slogans against the Egyptian leadership. Cairo responded forcefully, both through the media and diplomatic channels.

The foreign minister announced that Egypt would "join international efforts to prevent Iran from possessing nuclear weapons", a statement that while it does not contradict Egypt's long held stance that Iran has the right to possess nuclear technology for peaceful purposes was read in Tehran as a shift in Cairo's official position.

Demonstrations are, of course, a legitimate channel for the public to express its opinion. Yet, however democratic Iran may be compared to other countries in the region Tehran is far from being London, Paris or Geneva. Demonstrations mounted by the political opposition are immediately suppressed. The protests that passed before the premises of the Egyptian diplomatic mission in Tehran, therefore, clearly had the government's blessing if they were not actually organised by the government. There was nothing innocent about the route or the timing, both calculated to turn up the heat on Cairo while projecting Tehran as the Palestinians' champion in contrast to Arab capitals which have abandoned their cause.

Egypt and Iran seem destined to play antithetical roles. A thousand years ago, under the Fatimids, Egypt became the first and sole Shia power in the predominantly Sunni region. When Salaheddin Al-Ayoubi (Saladin) came to power in the 12th century, Egypt converted to Sunni Islam, to which it continues to subscribe. Iran followed an opposite trajectory, converting from Sunni to Shia Islam in the 16th century under the Safavid dynasty. When, in the 1950s and 1960s, Egypt championed the Non-Aligned Movement Iran threw itself wholeheartedly into the CENTO alliance and pro-Washington camp. Following the revolution in 1979 Tehran swung to the opposite pole, severing relations with Washington and identifying the US as its greatest foe. Today Iran claims to champion resistance to the American project in the region to which it says major Arab powers, including Egypt, have acquiesced. The Egyptian-Iranian relationship reminds one of the fleeting meetings between two people who pass each other as one ascends and the other descends on adjoining escalators.

Cairo has always been keen to maintain cordial relations with all countries of the region, convinced that this will allow for optimum returns on its foreign policies. Yet it remains the only Arab country that does not maintain relations with Tehran at an ambassadorial level and from last week's developments this is unlikely to change any time soon.

If and when current strains between the two capitals subside each will face a different price for resuming relations. Tehran's will be internal, Egypt's external. It is obvious which is more affordable. It is not hard to see domestic parties in Iran coming to an accommodation over the restoration of relations with Egypt. Egypt, on the other hand, will be obliged to pay out of the assets of its regional and international alliances. The sacrifice, from the Egyptian perspective, would outweigh the prospective returns to be gained from restoring relations with Tehran. This conclusion has important bearings on relations between the two countries.

The demonstrations last week were part of Tehran's drive to assume the role vacated by Cairo and which Iran wants to fill without paying even a fraction of the price Egypt paid in the defence of Palestine and the Palestinian cause. The cynicism with which Iran pursues this ambition becomes glaring if we examine issues close to its borders. It is sufficient, here, to note Tehran's support of the occupation governments in Iraq and Afghanistan and of Armenia over the Azerbaijanis even though the latter are religiously close to Iran. Iran wants to neutralise any threat to its immediate borders. It is consummately pragmatic when it comes to matters that affect it directly and staunchly radical when the risks are a thousand miles away.

The key to Tehran's strategy to augment its regional role is to play upon the one issue, the Palestinian cause, guaranteed to win over hearts and minds. It is the central Arab cause, one moderate Arab states have dismally failed to resolve through diplomatic channels because of Washington's wholehearted backing of Israeli intransigence. It is the failure of the so- called peace process that has smoothed Iran's path to regional leadership.

We must also acknowledge that as deftly as Iran has played the regional game it would never have scored the gains it has were it not for the gaping power vacuum created following Cairo's resignation of its regional roles. Iran may have the right to ask the Arabs to support its acquisition of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes or to ask Arab intellectuals to help it in the face of sectarian invective aimed at fostering Sunni-Shia conflict. It does not have the right to capitalise on the tragedy of the courageous people of Gaza without doing anything substantial to break the blockade. Nor does it have the right to hurl invective at Cairo when Tehran is busy signing deals with the occupation forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. Such hypocrisy casts into relief the dividing line between what is acceptable and what is not in Iranian regional policy.

* The writer is director of the Eastern Centre for Regional and Strategic Studies, Cairo (ECRSS).