Awaiting Obama

Turning around the legacy of Bush in the Middle East region will be an uphill if necessary struggle for the incoming US president, writes El-Sayed Amin Shalabi*

---

Everyone agrees that the US has an "indispensable" role to play in Middle East peacemaking. Because of its international weight and status and its "special" relationship with the Hebrew state, Palestinians and Arab countries expect it to get involved and pin high hopes on that involvement with every new administration. Unfortunately, the exclusive nature of the US relationship with Israel and Washington's unbounded support for Israeli positions continually hamper the US peacemaking role. Every administration appears to have its hands bound due to the overwhelming support for Israel in American society, whether due to the powerful Jewish lobby, whose influence permeates the highest echelons of the policymaking process and strongly influences presidential and congressional elections, or due to popular perceptions of Israel as sharing the same cultural values or being, for a growing and increasingly influential segment of US society, central to the religious vision of the second coming of Christ, which has generated a close relation between the Christian fundamentalist ultra right and Zionist forces in the US and Israel.

The discrepancy between the need for US involvement in the peacemaking process and the Jewish influence on US policies has persistently obstructed Washington's ability to act as an honest broker and kept US presidents from taking tough but necessary stances on the major negotiating issues. This applies even to those presidents that were the most sympathetic to the Palestinians, such as Jimmy Carter who backed down on his threat to turn to the American people and remained silent in the face of Israel's continued settlement expansion in flagrant violation of the promise Menachem Begin had made at Camp David I. It further seems that Israel has been able to regard every new president as the most supportive. This applied to president Bill Clinton who filled his cabinet with policy experts noted for their pro- Israeli sympathies and even Jewish roots, such as Martin Indyk. Even when Clinton tried to do something to hastily salvage the situation after Camp David II collapsed he would and could not bring pressure to bear on Israel.

However, Bush Jr will certainly go down in history as the president who did the most damage to peacemaking efforts and the American mediating role. He opened his presidency by censuring his predecessor's involvement in the Middle East conflict and declaring a hands-off policy. As his administration came under increasingly severe criticism as the situation in the region deteriorated he proclaimed his commitment to the two-state solution. However, not only did he not do anything tangible to bring this solution into effect, he sapped it of its substance in the form of his letter of guarantees to Sharon in 2004. In this letter he agreed to accept "realities on the ground" and to support Israel's retention of major settlements in the West Bank, pledges that were entirely incompatible with the establishment of a territorially integral and viable Palestinian state.

Aaron Miller, an American political advisor who participated in the peace process under two administrations, cannot be accused of bias. While he is confident that the special relationship between the US and Israel will continue, "For the past 16 years, the United States has allowed that special bond to become exclusive in ways that undermine America's national interests. Coordinating with Israel on matters relating to its security is one thing. Giving Israel a veto over American negotiating tactics and positions, particularly when it comes to bridging gaps between the two sides, is quite another." He further believes that US administrations have been far too indulgent with Israel's transgressions and, for decades, have given it an almost uninterrupted green light to continue settlement activity, confiscate Palestinian land and carve up the occupied Palestinian territories with ring roads.

In a couple of weeks, a new American president will take office. Obama won the elections largely on the strength of his pledge of change, and people in the US and around the world are eager to see whether he will fulfil his pledge. How will this apply to the Middle East? Specifically, will the Obama administration be able to break free of Washington's tradition of blind support for Israel that has long obstructed the realisation of a just solution to the Middle East conflict that will guarantee Israeli security and simultaneously meet the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinian people?

If Obama is to succeed where his predecessors failed he will have to completely revise the way the US sees and behaves towards Israel. In particular, he will have to reconsider what Israeli security means. The US under Obama is certain to remain committed to Israel's security, but does this mean guaranteeing Israel's right to exist as a normal state in the region or does it mean indulging Israel's expansionist policies and denying the fundamental rights of the Palestinian people and overlooking the continued occupation of Arab territories (the Golan Heights included)? Does it mean continuing to support Israel's military superiority over all Arab countries combined? Does it also mean continuing to turn a blind eye to Israel's nuclear arsenal and its refusal to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and to open its facilities for inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency? If Obama is really going to change US policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict he will have to address these questions.

Will he and his administration be strong enough to do this? The most we can do at the moment is to wait for his inaugural address on 20 January and hope for some encouraging signals. Prominent experts on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, such as Zbigniew Brzezinski and Brent Scowcroft, believe that Obama should make it one of the top foreign policy priorities of his administration and that he should issue a framework of principles that should govern the pursuit of a just peace.

The Economist of 18 December, too, voiced this aspiration. It wrote: "Some time before Israelis vote in February, Mr Obama should spell out precisely the sort of peace America envisages: two states sharing Jerusalem, with a border very close to the pre- 1967 armistice line, not one that lets Israel keep its settlement blocks deep in the West Bank. Just as Hamas needs to hear that Israel is not going to disappear, so Israel -- especially if it elects a Likud government -- needs to hear that America will not let it hold those settlements forever... That may require a painful clash with an ally. But there can be no better way to restore America's credibility as a mediator, and woo Palestinians away from Hamas's dark vision of war to the end between Muslim and Jew in Palestine."

I would add that Obama should also appoint a special envoy that has his full backing to convey these messages and hammer out a peace. That envoy should have the experience and credibility to perform the role of an honest broker. Possible candidates might be former president Clinton, who could build on what he began in Camp David II and just fell short of reaching an agreement, former secretary of state Madeleine Albright, former secretary of state James Baker who set the Madrid Conference in motion and who threatened to suspend US aid to Israel if that aid were used to construct settlements, or General Anthony Zinni.

If Obama were to take such steps at the beginning of this presidency he would revive hopes in the resumption of a serious negotiating process that, in turn, would have a positive impact on all other crucial issues in the region, from Iraq and Afghanistan to the Iranian nuclear question.

Still, waiting for Obama is not enough. The Arabs should take the initiative to produce a cohesive Arab vision on the principles that should govern a settlement. Such an action would go a long way to persuading the new administration that it is dealing with an Arab partner with a united stance. In addition it would bolster the Arab drive to end the Palestinian rift, the continuation of which will do little to encourage the Obama administration to exert serious efforts on ending the conflict or bringing to it a fresh approach.

* The writer is executive director of the Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs.