Door of hope

Mustafa El-Labbad looks at the possibility of a significant change in relations between Washington and Tehran

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The inauguration of the newly elected US President Barack Obama was a unique event in American history, not only because he is the first African American to occupy the Oval Office but also because of his declared intention to effect a total reversal in US foreign policy with the aim of defusing tensions around the world and reverting to the use of "soft power" in contrast to the Bush administration's preference for military muscle.

Iran had set stock in the victory of the Democratic nominee, which it believed would open the doors to a US- Iranian dialogue that would ultimately lead to a US seal on an Iranian regional role. Therefore, Iran feinted and sparred with its adversary Bush during the last year of his term, even though the many points it had scored in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon were sufficient to settle the match in its favour. Eventually, the window of opportunity for military action passed -- Bush had sounded the threat so often that it lost credibility -- at which point Iran and its allies swung around to deliver a final stinging blow to the Bush administration, this time in the Gaza arena in its continued support to Hamas.

Iran is conscious of the fact that its historical ambition to play a regional role will only receive international recognition if it finds a place at the negotiation table with Washington. The skill and acumen which with it played its cards in the region over the past five years was what it took to compel Washington to come to the table, which may well happen very soon.

The countdown to US-Iranian negotiations has begun. Obama's declaration that he was ready to begin talking with Tehran marked the beginning of the task of generating an appropriately conducive climate. With its powerful media apparatus and control over international institutions, the US has the ability to orchestrate the international climate, and since the Cold War if not before this has been one of Washington's most important means of influencing other countries' politics. Therefore, as skilful a player as Iran has been, if it wants to polish up its international image and be accepted as a suitable negotiating partner for Obama there will have to be a change in the international climate.

But Israel stands behind the international media barricades, persistently attempting to drive home the point that Iran seeks weapons of mass destruction, namely nuclear arms. This campaign would be difficult for any US president to edge his way around. Just because Tel Aviv failed to pressure the US into launching a military strike against Iran's nuclear facilities or giving it the green light to do so does not mean that Israel's influence in Washington has diminished but merely that the Bush administration did not feel that a strike would accomplish its political objectives. Nor, for that matter, has Bush's departure for the White House entirely eliminated the option of a military strike. Rather, with Obama's election and foreign policy reorientation the option has simply been significantly deprioritised.

In view of the foregoing, one could not help but to be struck by Washington's frequent references last week to the "Iranian dilemma". That the expression was repeated so often by different officials suggested that a new terminology manual had been distributed. A semiotic reading seems required, therefore, and my reading is that the new administration is determined to keep up the diplomatic, economic and intelligence pressures on Iran until it obtains at least most of what it wants before talks begin. If Bush virtually handed Iran its points, this time Tehran will sweat.

The Obama administration is riding a tide of enormous political capital, in contrast with the total political bankruptcy of the outgoing administration. Also, dealing with the Obama administration will require an entirely new Iranian discourse, one that has much more substance than Ahmadinejad's superficial rhetoric that ironically matched that coming out of the Bush White House -- both leaders drew from the hackneyed lexicon of smug self-righteousness and religious zealotry and poured their formulas into trite political moulds.

A glance at the individuals that President Obama has selected for key positions in his new administration helps identify the contours of his strategic vision, in general, and his plans towards Iran in particular. The choice of Dennis Ross as responsible for the Iranian track is particularly telling. When serving as a chief architect of the Middle East peace process under the Clinton administration, Ross failed to conceal his strong pro-Israeli bias and clashed on numerous occasions with the late president Yasser Arafat.

Because of Ross's long history of excellent relations with Tel Aviv, Obama's appointment of him sends out two messages at once. The first is to Israel telling it not to worry because any negotiations that take place with its Iranian adversary will not benefit Tehran to the detriment of Tel Aviv, which effectively will be an indirect partner in the negotiations. The second message is to Tehran informing it that the intent of the negotiations is to reach an understanding far deeper than it had expected until now. The two messages together indicate that Obama has set a very high goal for the negotiations from the outset, which is to reach a US-Iranian-Israeli agreement and not just a US-Iranian one.

That high negotiating threshold will place considerable pressure on Iran which has historically excelled at separating its relations with the US from its relations with Israel and accomplished its objectives through its manoeuvres in the hypothetical space in between. It should not be surprising that this tactic dates from the era of the Shah, since Iran's geopolitical interests remain constant regardless of the ruling regime.

As confident as Obama might be in his selection of Ross, Iran's consummate negotiating acumen will remain the hardest aspect his administration will have to face in dealing with this "dilemma". At the same time, there is no doubt that the Ross appointment, given his well- known sympathies and connections, has poured some cold water on Iran's fervent expectations, reminding us of the Iranian song that goes, "My wishes stand at the door of hope, neither leaving me or coming true."