Egyptian-Saudi messages

Wise and judicious leadership is the cornerstone of the Arab order led by Cairo and Riyadh, but it needs to be strengthened by an effective support network, writes Abdel-Moneim Said*

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As an Egyptian, I felt grateful for the letter from King Abdel-Aziz bin Saud to President Hosni Mubarak, praising the Egyptian role during the recent Gaza crisis and offering support for the steps Cairo has taken following the ceasefire. In one respect at least, the letter was opportune. At a time when an anti-Egyptian campaign was at its most vicious lengths, it conveyed an appreciation for the hard work and skill that Egyptian leadership and diplomacy brought to bear to save the Palestinian people and to prevent the collapse of inter-Arab relations. Quite simply, the letter puts things in perspective and gives a clear signal from Saudi Arabia that it is willing to put its weight and influence alongside Egypt in order to attain the same goals. The letter crowned Riyadh's many efforts and the honourable stances taken by the Saudi media and the media associated with it both inside the kingdom and abroad.

Perhaps, on the other side in Saudi Arabia, there were people inspired with a similar sense of gratitude by the letter from President Mubarak to the Saudi monarch. After all, such exchanges are not merely mutual expressions of appreciation from one head of state to another, but rather messages to peoples and governments around the world that the Gaza crisis ultimately worked to further solidify ties and the spirit of collaboration that have been fired in the crucible of decades of gruelling tests in various parts of the Arab and Islamic world, which seems to know no end of crisis and conflict. Leaving aside such sentiments, let us turn to the strategic value inherent in these letters, the problems that might obstruct this value and, finally, the opportunities that could be tapped in this historic relationship.

For four decades, since 1970 to be precise, Egyptian-Saudi relations formed the cornerstone of the entire Arab order. Apart from a brief hiatus of tensions that arose (and that could have been avoided) during the Camp David period and the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, relations between Cairo and Riyadh grew steadily deeper at all levels. There are more than a million Egyptians living and working in Saudi Arabia, and more than 400,000 Saudis with various forms of residence in Egypt. The two countries are major economic partners in terms of both trade and investment; indeed, each is the other's foremost economic partner in the Arab region. When one considers, in addition, the very close security cooperation between the two countries, one can better appreciate the extent to which the exchange of letters between the two heads of state is grounded in close relations at the official and popular levels.

Moreover, even after that short period of inter-Arab tension, mentioned above, King Fahd and King Abdullah after him followed Egypt's suit with initiatives to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict, thereby establishing the Egyptian peace drive and settlement within its Arab regional context. Neither Cairo nor Riyadh acted in any way that jeopardised the realisation of Arab rights. On the contrary, they set the Arab cause on the correct track after the two countries had placed their peoples' lives and their oil resources on the line in order to achieve the first major setback for the Israeli empire that had extended from the Golan Heights to the Suez Canal. But more importantly than their stance against Israeli expansionism was their stance against all other forms of expansionism that threatened security and stability in the Middle East, whether that threat emanated from the exportation of the Iranian Revolution in the 1970s or from the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in the 1990s or the US invasion of Iraq and the repercussions of that invasion in recent years.

The strength of the Egyptian-Saudi bond is shaped by three interrelated factors. The first is the strength of each of its constituents in the sense that, regardless of the nature of their respective regimes, each has the power to dominate its geographical environment and mobilise its popular forces in the direction chosen by its political leadership. The second is the judiciousness of their respective leaderships. Judicious leadership in the Middle East and the Arab region in particular entails the ability to rule and the wisdom to act in a carefully considered way that protects countries and promotes their interests without courting unnecessary dangers. Neither Cairo nor Riyadh displays an inclination to bravado and histrionics. Thirdly, both partners have complete faith in the possibility of realising the legitimate aims of Arabs by engaging positively and constructively with the world, as opposed to cutting themselves off and defying the world. This does not imply that they have forsworn recourse to arms, for both countries have resorted to military force when necessary. Rather, it reflects their awareness that armed force must always be the last recourse and that it is not used merely to score points or produce imaginary victories, but to bring substantial and concrete change to an intolerable situation that can no longer persist.

These three factors, which were faithfully expressed in the exchange of letters, need to be bolstered in the face of newer and tougher challenges to come. For example, the global economic crisis is weighing heavily on the two countries. Rather than leave their economies to crumble until the advent of global (or American) solutions, Cairo and Riyadh can work together to strengthen their domestic economies as well as the regional economy. Fortunately, their respective banking and finance systems have demonstrated their resilience during this crisis and what is needed now are investments in the domestic and regional economies that will strengthen them further against the buffeting winds of global market forces. In this regard, Egypt's entrance, with Saudi Arabia's backing, into the Gulf Customs Federation was an important step in the right direction.

At a higher level, the region faces mounting challenges from Iran and its hot-headed leadership that has chosen Arab theatres in which to stage its confrontationist inclinations against the West, and from the Palestinian problem that has grown even more intractable with the rise of Benyamin Netanyahu and the extreme right to power in Israel. On top of these are the problems of Lebanon, Iraq, Sudan and Somalia in which regional strategic factors interact with the interplay between and across domestic tribal and sectarian alliances and divides, and in which both Egypt and Saudi Arabia have vital interests. Only through deep and extensive strategic understandings will it be possible to meet these various challenges. Fortunately, such understandings already exist at the level of the leaderships, which meet regularly, and also at the level of security and other government agencies that also work together in varying capacities and degrees. It may also exist at the popular level, if we consider that the Egyptian and Saudi peoples can usually surmount their cultural differences with comfort and ease.

Perhaps what is missing is a broader array of channels for examining potential realms for closer cooperation, devising the appropriate means and mechanisms for it within an overall strategic framework, and formulating the various options for contending with extremely intricate and sensitive situations. Imagine NATO, for example, functioning only through summit meetings. Surely it would have fallen apart within months of the collapse of the Warsaw pact. However, there exists a vast network of relations and various forms of interplay between research centres, diverse civil society organisations, the media and, more importantly, the dissemination of knowledge about the bases of the alliance and the internal circumstances of its constituent parts.

Perhaps the comparison with NATO is taking matters a little too far. However, the message, to whom it may concern, is that the Egyptian-Saudi bond needs a support group to give it new horizons and the institutionalised backbone for dealing with challenging and complex realities.

* The writer is director of Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies.