Commentary: A 'guide' to change
The dynamics of Iranian politics revolve around the new approach of Washington, observes
Mustafa El-Labbad
The exchange of positive signals between Washington and Tehran shows a remarkable change in the tenor of relations between the two countries since Barack Obama came to power. Iran had been wagering on his electoral victory, which is why for nearly a year it had worked to prevent the Bush administration from achieving any successes in its designs for the region. Tehran had courted the considerable risk of a US military strike against its nuclear facilities and infrastructure, but it won its bet.
Now that Obama has taken office, Tehran is wagering that his administration will be forced to enter into negotiations with it in order to sort out the mess Bush's neoconservative administration had created in Afghanistan and Iraq and then, at a later stage, establish the boundaries of the US and Iranian roles in the Middle East as a whole.
Tehran seems to have placed its bets well this time, too. The US-Iran relationship is the topic of the moment. Among the Obama administration's most clever moves recently was the invitation it extended to Iran to attend an international conference on Afghanistan. Clearly intended to dispel the clouds of animosity, the overture recognises Iran as a regional party with rights concerning Afghanistan than can be addressed in a multilateral conference and paves the way in a practical manner for bilateral negotiations by providing the opportunity for the two parties to sit together in a multilateral framework first. Simultaneously, by choosing a conference on Afghanistan as an occasion to send an invitation to Iran, Washington aims to reassure its allies in the region that the US-Iranian rapprochement will not come at their expense.
Tehran is fully aware that the prospect of negotiations with Washington is a double-edged weapon. On the one hand, it opens a window of opportunity to crown its long-sustained drive to win a recognised role as regional leader with success. On the other hand, failure carries enormous risks, for in that event Tehran will emerge as an ideological opponent set upon obstruction merely for the sake of obstruction, rather than to attain national objectives in a region characterised by a complex web of interplay and distorted balances of power.
The challenge compels Tehran to order its cards and set the domestic stage for the most important juncture in the history of the Islamic Republic. It will have to create a new configuration of internal balances conducive to the start and possible success of negotiations and this will entail the elimination of ideological and institutional obstacles.
Evidently the process is already in the works, as is indicated by Sheikh Hashemi Rafsanjani's appointment a few days ago as head of the Assembly of Experts. The occupant of this post holds some powerful keys to shaping the Iranian power structure. The Assembly of Experts elects the supreme guide, the highest office in the country, and it is entitled to dismiss a supreme guide as well.
Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani has taken at least one turn in all the key positions in the Iranian government apart from one: the supreme guide. He served as speaker of parliament twice (between 1980 and 1989) and as president of the republic twice (between 1989 and 1997). In addition to presiding over the Assembly of Experts, he continues to hold the post of chairman of the Expediency Discernment Council as well as membership in the Council of Guardians. Rafsanjani has thus become the second most important official in Iran after Supreme Guide Ali Khamenei.
The system of government in Iran is unique in the world for its blend of theocracy and constitutional democracy. The former trait is embodied in the supreme guide, the office with the most extensive powers, the Assembly of Experts, which elects or dismisses the supreme guide and which consists of 36 Islamic jurists. Then there is the Council of Guardians which consists of 12 members, half of whom are clergymen, and which has the power to override parliamentary decisions that they deem to conflict with Islamic law.
The civil side of the equation, the constitutional democracy, on the other hand, is embodied in constitutional provision for a president of the republic who is elected by direct popular vote in multi-candidate elections and who serves a maximum of two four-year terms. The democratic element is also to be found in the parliament, whose members are elected in direct popular polls, and in the Expediency Discernment Council which resolves legislative conflicts between parliament and the Council of Guardians. The political system in Iran is, therefore, a form of compromise between the "rule of the theologian" established by the Imam Ruhollah Al-Khomeini in accordance with the precepts of Shia jurisprudence and the requirements of modernism and democracy.
The primary difference between the Iranian political camps over negotiations with Washington revolves around timing. Pragmatic conservatives led by Rafsanjani believe that the time has come to pluck the fruits of Iran's obstruction to the Bush administration's enterprises over recent years. Fundamentalist conservatives, notably President Ahmadinejad, feel that regional circumstances favour the expansion of Iranian influence without having to enter into understandings with Washington at present.
The supreme guide will most likely step in to act as a rudder in this debate, a function that best suits his role and authority. Khamenei is not as archly conservative as some imagine. He had generally been inclined to the conservative-reform compromise that had prevailed under President Khatami, then after the reformists disappeared from the Iranian power structure he came to act as the pivot between the conservative pragmatists led by Rafsanjani and the fundamentalists led by Ahmadinejad.
However, with the scale shifting heavily towards the latter's camp since the 2005 elections, the supreme guide has taken this historic moment to allow Rafsanjani to rise to the second most powerful position in the regime, giving new impetus to the political forces opposed to Ahmadinejad and the Revolutionary Guards. Rafsanjani's elevation assumes even greater significance when we recall that he and his party had lost against the current presidential incumbent in the 2005 elections.
In this year's elections, the reformist candidates have made a strong showing. Notable among them are reformist Prime Minister Mir Hussein Musawi and former speaker of parliament Mehdi Karubb. The list of conservative candidates is not yet known, since leading conservative figures have not yet declared their desire to be nominated. Perhaps of all the major players in Iran, parliamentary speaker Ali Larijani is the closest in outlook to the supreme guide. Plus he has acquired considerable negotiating expertise through his handling of the Iranian nuclear issue at intensive and formidable international levels.
Larijani, therefore, would certainly be one of the strongest candidates in view of his ability to handle negotiations with Obama. However, his access to the presidency depends on more than the supreme guide's approval. There would also have to be a shift in the balance within the conservative camp in order to secure him the nomination and the necessary backing. The supreme guide's decision on the candidate he favours will depend on whether that candidate meets an essential condition, which is to strike the required balance between the political camps in Iran.
For this reason, Rafsanjani will not field himself in the forthcoming presidential elections as he has done on three previous occasions. But he, like the supreme guide, will certainly act as "king-maker" which is to say that he will contribute to shaping the domestic balance in a way that renders victory to that candidate who can best act as a keel. It is precisely here where the Iranian dialectic between the domestic and external dynamics is at its clearest -- and most complex.
Opposition leader Andry Rajoelina parades through the narrow streets of Antananarivo, Madagascar Tuesday (photos: AFP)