National interest first

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Palestinian Authority chairman Mahmoud Abbas's visit to Cairo this week should have been about reconciliation, how to advance it and remove the hurdles impeding it. Instead he attacked Hamas, blamed it for the deadlock, and threatened -- once again - to hold general and presidential elections in Jaunary 2010.

His argument is as follows: if Hamas does not sign the reconciliation agreement -drafted by Egyptian intelligence after months of negotiations - by 25 October he will resort to the constitution and hold the elections next January. The problem is that constitutionally Abbas's term as elected chairman of the PA ended in January 2009. And while it is true that the Arab League's Council approved the extension it is far from clear that the Palestinian constitution condones such a move. The Palestinian people did not vote for his extension, either in a referendum or any other representative form. To ask on what constitutional basis is Abbas making his threats is a perfectly legitimate question.

Fatah signed the Egyptian agreement because it gives its leader, PA chairman Abbas, control over the security apparatus, thus empowering Fatah's security elements over Hamas's. In its current form, the agreement also criminalises any armed group outside the "legitimate" framework of the would- be Abbas-controlled security apparatus. Although the wording does not explicitly rule out the right to resist Israeli occupation, the provision above does.

The Islamic resistance movement Hamas may have put its armed struggle on hold, committing to an Egyptian-brokered tahedea (temporary ceasefire) with Israel (which nonetheless launched its 22 day war on the Gaza), but it has not given up on resistance as a strategic option. Which feeds into Hamas's current existential crisis: how can it combine the liberation of Palestine, with Jerusalem as its capital, and the return of 5 million Palestinian refugees with its 2006 decision to contest elections that were a product of the Oslo agreement, an agreement that Hamas had rejected throughout?

Cairo has been critical of Hamas's refusal to sign after it had earlier agreed to the clauses included in the Egyptian deal. Yet while the negotiating process prior to the release of the Egyptian reconciliation document remains opaque, what is clear is that Hamas demonstrated a great deal of flexibility prior to the PA's decision to postpone the vote on the UN Human Rights Council's Goldstone report on Israeli war crimes in Gaza. It was the PA's decision that turned public opinion against Abbas, who personally ordered a delay which saves Israel from the legal and political repercussions of its endorsement by a UN body. At which point Hamas seized the moment to emphasise its objections -- old and new - to the agreement.

Any close examination of Hamas's reservations appears to justify its position. Hamas is not willing to criminalize the right to resist Israel's occupation of Palestinian territory. It also wants to ensure Abbas does not unilaterally commit to final status agreements or negotiations with Israel ahead of the June 2010 elections.

Who, in good faith, can object to such legitimate reservations, even if Hamas appeared at one time ready to compromise these same rights? The only benchmark here should be the interests of the Palestinians. It is imperative for all parties to focus on Palestine first, the only acceptable option.