Friday,20 October, 2017
Current issue | Issue 1125, 6 - 12 December 2012
Friday,20 October, 2017
Issue 1125, 6 - 12 December 2012

Ahram Weekly

Palestine’s new status

If Abbas thinks his success at the UN gives him political cover to follow old, tired and failed policies, Palestinians have an obligation to prove him wrong, writes Ramzy Baroud

Al-Ahram Weekly

Palestine has become a “non-member state” at the United Nations as of Thursday, 29 November 2012. The draft of the UN resolution beckoning what many perceive as a historic moment passed with an overwhelming majority of General Assembly members: 138 votes in favour, nine against and 41 abstentions.

It was accompanied by a passionate speech delivered by Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas. But decades earlier, a more impressive and animated Palestinian leader, Yasser Arafat, sought international solidarity as well. The occasion then was also termed “historic”.

Empowered by Arab support at the Rabat Arab League summit in October 1974, which bestowed on the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), the ever-opaque title “the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people”, Arafat was invited to speak at the UN General Assembly. Despite the fervour that accompanied the newly found global solidarity, Arafat’s language signalled a departure from what was perceived by Western powers as radical and unrealistic political and territorial ambitions.

In his speech on 13 November, Arafat spoke of the growing PLO’s legitimacy that compelled his actions: “The PLO has earned its legitimacy because of the sacrifice inherent in its pioneering role and also because of its dedicated leadership of the struggle. It has also been granted this legitimacy by the Palestinian masses… The PLO has also gained its legitimacy by representing every faction, union or group as well as every Palestinian talent, either in the National Council or in people’s institutions.” The list went on and, despite some reservations, each had a reasonable degree of merit.

The same, however, can hardly be said of Abbas’s Palestinian Authority (PA), which exists as a result of an ambiguous “peace process” nearly 20 years ago. It has all but completely destroyed the PLO’s once functioning institutions, redefined the Palestinian national project of liberation around a more “pragmatic” — read self-serving — discourse that is largely tailored around self-preservation, absence of financial accountability and a system of political tribalism.

Abbas is no Arafat. But equality important, the Arafat of 1974 was a slightly different version of an earlier Arafat who was the leader of the revolutionary Fatah party. In 1974, Arafat made a statehood proposal that itself represented a departure from Fatah’s own previous commitment to a “democratic state on all Palestine”. Arafat’s revised demands contained the willingness to settle for “establishing an independent national state on all liberated Palestinian territory”. While the difference between both visions may be attributed to a reinterpretation of the Palestinian liberation strategy, history showed that it was much more. Since that date and despite much sabre-rattling by the US and Israel against Arafat’s “terrorism”, the PLO under Arafat’s Fatah leadership underwent a decade-long scrutiny process where the US placed austere demands in exchange for American “engagement” with the Palestinian leadership. This itself was the precondition that yielded Oslo and its abysmal consequences.

Arafat was careful to always sugar coat any of his concessions with a parallel decision that was promoted to Palestinians as a national triumph of some sort. Back then there was no Hamas to stage a major challenge to the PLO’s policies, and leftist groups within the PLO structure were either politically marginalised by Fatah or had no substantial presences among the Palestinian masses. The field was virtually empty of any real opposition, and Arafat’s credibility was rarely questioned. Even some of his opponents found him sincere, despite their protests against his style and distressing concessions.

The rise of the PLO’s acceptability in international arenas was demonstrated in its admission to the United Nations as a “non-state entity” with observer status on 22 November 1974. The Israeli war and subsequent invasion of Lebanon in 1982 had the declared goal of destroying the PLO and was in fact aimed at stifling the growing legitimacy of the PLO regionally and internationally. Without an actual power base, in this case, Lebanon, Israeli leaders calculated that the PLO would either fully collapse or politically capitulate.

Weakened, but not obliterated, the post-Lebanon war PLO was a different entity than the one that existed prior to 1982. Armed resistance was no longer on the table, at least not in any practical terms. Such a change suited some Arab countries just fine. A few years later, Arafat and Fatah were assessing the new reality from headquarters in Tunis.

The political landscape in Palestine was vastly changing. A popular uprising (Intifada) erupted in 1987 and quite spontaneously a local leadership was being formed throughout the occupied territories. New names of Palestinian intellectuals were emerging. They were community leaders and freedom fighters that mostly organised around a new discourse that was created out of local universities, Israeli prisons and Palestinian streets. It was then that the legend of the Intifada was born with characters such as children with slingshots, mothers battling soldiers, and a massive reservoir of a new type of Palestinian fighter along with fresh language and discourse. Equally important, new movements were appearing from outside the traditional PLO confines. One such movement was Hamas, which has grown in numbers and political relevance in ways once thought impossible.

That reality proved alarming to the US, Israel and of course the traditional PLO leadership. There were enough vested interests to reach a “compromise”. This naturally meant more concessions by the Palestinian leadership in exchange for some symbolic recompense by the Americans. The latter happily floated Israel’s trial balloons so that the Israeli leadership didn’t appear weak or compromising. Two major events defined that stage of politics in 1988: on 15 November, the PLO’s Palestinian National Council (PNC) proclaimed a Palestinian state in exile from Algiers and merely two weeks later, US Ambassador to Tunisia Robert H Pelletreau Jr was designated as the sole American liaison whose mission was to establish contacts with the PLO. Despite the US’s declared objection to Arafat’s move, the US was in fact pleased to see that the symbolic declaration was accompanied by major political concessions. The PNC stipulated the establishment of an independent state on Palestinian “national soil” and called for the institution of “arrangements for security and peace of all states in the region” through a negotiated settlement at an international peace conference on the basis of UN resolutions 242 and 338 and Palestinian national rights.

Although Arafat was repeatedly confronted with even more American demands (that truly never ceased until his alleged murder by poison in Ramallah in 2004), the deceleration was the real preamble of the Oslo Accords some few years later. Since then, Palestinians have gained little aside from symbolic victories starting in 1988 when the UNGA “acknowledged” the Algiers proclamation. It then voted to replace the reference to the “Palestine Liberation Organisation” with that of “Palestine”. Since then, it has been one symbolic victory after another, exemplified in an officially acknowledged Palestinian flag, postage stamps, a national anthem and the like. On the ground, the reality was starkly and disturbingly different: fledgling illegal Jewish settlements became fortified cities and a relatively small settler population now morphed to number over half a million settlers; Jerusalem is completely besieged by settlements and cut off from the rest of the occupied territories; the Palestinian Authority established in 1994 to guide Palestinians towards independence became a permanent fixture of a Palestinian leadership that existed as long as Israel would permit it to exist; polarisation caused by the corruption of the PA and its security coordination with Israel led to civil strife that divided the Palestinian national project between factional and self-serving agendas.

The support that “Palestine” has received at the United Nations must be heartening, to say the least, for most Palestinians. The overwhelming support, especially by Palestine’s traditional supporters (most of humanity with few exceptions) indicates that US hegemony, arm-twisting and Israeli-US propaganda was of little use after all. However, that should not be misidentified as a real change of course in the behaviour of the Palestinian Authority that still lacks legal, political and especially moral legitimacy among Palestinians who are seeking a tangible drive towards freedom, not mere symbolic victories.

If Abbas thinks that obtaining a new wording for Palestine’s status at the UN will provide the needed political theatre to justify another 20 years of utter failures, then the time is now to prove him wrong. If the new status, however, is used as a platform for a radically different strategy that would revitalise a haggard political discourse with the sole aim of unifying the ranks of all Palestinians around a new proud national project, then there is something worth discussing. Indeed, it is not the new status that truly matters, but rather how it is interpreted and employed. While history is not exactly promising, the future will have the last word.

The writer is editor of PalestineChronicle.com.

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