Issue No.328
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5 - 11 June 1997 Issue No.328 Supplement |
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 | Recommend this page | ||
A watery grave
THE EGYPTIAN naval forces suffered no losses in the June war, because the Israeli Zion plan involved air and ground forces only. The naval forces played a very significant part in the aftermath, however, and in the War of Attrition. Israeli ports were attacked and severely damaged in four operations, an unprecedented occurrence in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Yet the operation which was unequalled in raising the morale of the Egyptians was the bombing of the Eilat -- one of only two Israeli destroyers -- by a small missile carrier boat off the shore of Port Said. The incident had a magical effect in helping to dissipate the myth of Israeli invincibility. Admiral Fouad Zakariya, commander of the naval forces at the time, remembers the incident well.
"As the Israeli destroyer Eilat defiantly cruised our territorial waters off the shores of Port Said, two missile boats launched missiles at it and seconds later returned to headquarters. As the destroyer sent SOS calls to its headquarters in Haifa, the two boats launched more missiles. The Egyptian naval headquarters were on maximum alert, expecting that other Israeli naval units would come to rescue the Eilat. Evidently, though, the Israelis learned a lesson that day, and no Israeli naval unit came near Egyptian territorial waters for six years."
The incident was not only the first in the history of naval battles in which a destroyer is sunk by two missile boats, but also proved on the ground the capacity of non-nuclear launches in modern naval battles.
In January 1968, the Israeli submarine Dakkar sank off the shore of Alexandria, carrying a crew of 69. The causes, which were unknown even to the United States and Israel itself, were first revealed by Al-Ahram Weekly in its 17 October 1996 issue.
The Israelis wanted a submarine which would be the only one of its kind in the Mediterranean, to serve in preventing the Egyptian navy from attacking their forces. Britain was commissioned with the building of the vessel.
As it was on its way to Haifa, the submarine received a coded message to divert its course towards an Egyptian ship which was taking part in a naval demonstration. On the ship were Nasser and a group of high military commanders. The orders were for the submarine to sink the Egyptian ship in retaliation for the Eilat and to kill Nasser. But suddenly, communication between the submarine and headquarters in Haifa were cut off.
For 28 years, nobody knew what had become of the Israeli state-of-the art vessel. Several countries undertook search operations within territorial waters and beyond, but nothing was found. The commander of the submarine operation and several of his colleagues told the story to the Weekly.
Retired Vice-Admiral Mohamed Abdel-Meguid Azab was captain of the mine-sweeper Assiut in January 1968. He had taken some senior students from the Naval Academy on board for training in coastal navigation. One of the cadets sighted an unidentified object in the distance. Azab ordered the ship to move closer and was able to ascertain that it was a submarine periscope. He radioed to shore for orders, meanwhile activating the ship's radar and preparing depth charges to carry out instructions immediately.
Several minutes later, the periscope sank into the water and the submarine moved rapidly downwards, out of range of the radar and sonar devices. It was never traced again.
Retired Vice-Admiral Mohamed Youssri Qandil, who worked in the Naval Inquiries Department, agreed with this version of events. As soon as the submarine was discovered approaching Egyptian territorial waters, it plunged abruptly, he said, disregarding all normal safety measures. Such a dive requires a depth of at least 36 km, but the Dakkar attempted the manoeuvre in only 18 km of water. Water poured in, and the submarine hit bottom -- sunk without a single shot being fired.
After 28 years, it looks as if the mystery is about to be solved: the Dakkar sank because of the Assiut, but was not sunk directly by the Assiut. Whether or not structural faults on the submarine contributed to its loss remains an open question. But, stresses Qandil, although no attack was made on the submarine, the Assiut crew can still take the credit, because in naval tradition an assault need not involve the use of weapons -- confounding the enemy is an equally valid means of attack.
Ironically, confusion also played a major role in the sinking of the Eilat. In his book The Last Battle on the Destroyer Eilat, the ship's captain recounts how the first Egyptian missile launched at the Eilat caused such confusion among the crew that the ship's destruction was made much easier.
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