Issue No.328
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5 - 11 June 1997 Issue No.328 Supplement |
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 | Recommend this page | ||
'Nothing more could be said'
Lieutenant-General Safiyeddin Abu Shneif, commander-in-chief of the Egyptian armed forces and former director of the Intelligence Service, recalls one incident which illustrates the confusion and chaos rampant in the Egyptian forces, and remembers his encounter with Moshe Dayan, Israel's late minister of defence.
"Under the burning May sun in 1967, a major from the eastern military command zone stood on one of the roads leading to Sinai watching the vehicles, the tanks and the weaponry speed eastwards in an interminable file. He was waiting for a brigade of the fourth armoured division which would carry him across the Suez Canal and into the heart of Sinai, to the post which had been assigned to him. The officer introduced himself to the major-general of the division, and joined the soldiers in the track vehicles. But the men -- who were determined to accomplish whatever task was entrusted to them -- were not informed of what, where or how they would accomplish their task without air cover.
"One morning the officer brought a letter sealed with red wax to the commander of an infantry division. The division had just been moved from the western bank of the Canal to El-Gisna in track vehicles. The officer presented himself to the commander of the division and handed him the letter. On reading the letter, the commander said nothing, but an expression of astonishment and sorrow crossed his face. He handed the letter to the commander of operations of the division, Colonel Ahmed Badawi, who later became the minister of the defence and led the seventh infantry division (the first to cross the Canal in the October war).
"No sooner had Colonel Badawi set his eyes on the letter than he flew into a rage, and demanded bitterly: 'How can the division be moved again across another 160 kilometres on wheeled or track vehicles, on a rugged road, to a station in an open desert with no air cover? Why weren't we given the chance to explore the region, study its terrain and see how our defences would be established?'
"After a while, he asked the commander of the division, 'What about air defence, who will provide it?' But he soon understood that nothing more could be said. The seventh infantry division took to the road again, the men insistently inquiring about their destination.
"There were several thousand men, poorly-trained, ill-equipped, with no notion of their task, lost in the heart of Sinai, with no air defence against the enemy. Even before the battle had started, the defeat was a fait accompli.
"The seventh division suffered heavy losses, and the survivors and their colonel returned, weak and broken-hearted, choking on their bitterness and their shame."
Lieutenant General Abu Shneif said that, while he would not venture to compare June 1967 with October 1973, he attributes the victory of 1973 to the lessons learned from 1967.
"In 1973, the approach was totally different. It was the victory of the scientific approach to the art of war. Planning, strategy, control, discipline and accountability at every level and coordination between the different forces and their wings were the elements which made victory possible. In 1973, tasks were clearly defined, the goal was one, morale was high and confidence in victory was absolute.
"After the peace treaty with Israel, a joint Arab-Israeli committee was established to recover a part of Sinai which extended until the El-Arish-Ras Mohamed line. I was the head of the Egyptian delegation, and my rank at the time was brigadier. One evening, after supper, I was told by the Israeli major who was at the head of the Israeli delegation that General Moshe Dayan was in the region and that he wished to see me. I was very keen to meet the man who, although greatly weakened by illness and by the October victory, had had a brilliant career in the wars of 1956 and 1967. I thought that the man we regarded as our archenemy had now probably softened on the question of war and the Arab-Israeli conflict. I could not wait to hear his reaction to the October War and its consequences.
"I said to him: 'With your knowledge and experience in warfare and your military record, I would like to hear your opinion plainly and frankly about the October War.' After thanking me for my 'courageous compliments as an Egyptian officer' he said: 'I will tell you my opinion frankly, but do not get upset.. We believe in realistic planning, based on clear and accurate information. We believe in clear goals and easy and feasible methods of execution, we study our enemy thoroughly, we assess his resources, capabilities, and intentions. For example, if we compare our strengths, we can say that our air force is superior to your air force, our land forces, tanks, armoured vehicles and track artillery are qualitatively superior and we possess sophisticated and advanced weaponry. We had qualitative and quantitative information about your weapons. No sane person would have launched an offensive with such a capability as yours, but you went against all logic and indulged in war.'
"'War in the desert depends primarily on the air force to secure the battlefield, furnish the forces with the latest information about the enemy and inspire much-needed confidence in the troops. Your airforce did not have the capability for this task. In a desert war, the air force's function is to provide protection to the forces on the ground. Your air defence force was unable to defend your forces against our planes, particularly when your forces went eastward, yet you took your chances and succeeded to some extent.'
"'We constructed the Bar-Lev line on the eastern bank of the Canal as a fortified line, structured at an angle which renders it impossible to climb. The fortified posts were equipped with a complete defence system which enables a longer duration of combat and resistance to any kind of missile. Mines were planted throughout in the region so that any attempt to cross the line would be virtually impossible. We planned that, if you would consider an offensive action, you would certainly resort to the Canal to set up bridgeheads for your forces to cross. But instead, you crossed the Canal in dinghies and climbed the eastern sand barrier by rope ladders which we had not seen since the Middle Ages. You attacked our fortifications heedless of the losses and succeeded.'
"'We had expected that endeavours to cross the Canal would be undertaken by the infantry to secure the bridges, and that the tanks would not appear until at least six hours later. I am sorry to say that in the past, whenever our tanks appeared, your infantry soldiers either fled or were crushed by our tanks. But in 1973, we found an infantry that fought fiercely, resisting the tanks with their own bodies and with anti-tank "suitcase missiles" carried by single infantrymen. This also seemed contrary to common sense and to what we had been used to from the Egyptian forces. Any army preparing for war would necessarily have a strategic reserve of equipment and ammunition or would be supported by an ally to supply its needs, but you had no strong ally since the West was not on your side, and you had expelled the Russians from your country before the war. Worse still, you did not have a single factory to supply you with even one tank, one plane or one armoured vehicle, yet you fought and won.'"
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