5 - 11 June 1997 Issue No.328 Supplement	Current issue Site map
Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875		Recommend this page

The Yemen trap

Retired Major-General Abdel-Moneim Khalil took part in the Arab-Israeli wars of 1948, 1956, 1967, was commander of the Egyptian Second Army during the War of Attrition (1968-70) and played an important part in the planning and preparations for the 1973 October War. Thirty years after the June war, he sees the four Arab-Israeli wars and the Egyptian military expedition in Yemen are one continuous chain, which, in his view, should not be considered as independent armed conflicts. Imperialist Europe, having succeeded in implanting Israel in the Arab world and having recognised the state on 15 May 1948, also colluded in securing the defeat of the Arab armies. The sale of defective weapons was as great a moral as it was a physical blow to the Egyptian armies, a debacle which paved the way for the 23 July Revolution which put an end to British occupation. In 1956, however, the Tripartite Aggression was ample revenge for the nationalisation of the Suez Canal and the end of the occupation.

General Khalil argues that the Tripartite Aggression was a war which Egypt won politically, but which the aggressors won on the battlefield. The war marked an important turning point in the Middle East, and required the intervention of the two superpowers. He highlights the performance of the Egyptian forces in the battles of the Mitla Pass and Umm Qatf which, according to Moshe Dayan, were the "Egyptian forces' best performance and the Israelis' worst".

When the revolution broke out in Yemen on 26 September 1962, Egypt immediately allied itself with Yemen. While Egypt's stand, according to Khalil, was directly responsible for the success of the Yemeni revolution and the evacuation of the colonialist forces from the south, it was also one of the factors which led to Egypt's defeat in the June 1967 war. Support for the Yemeni revolution stoked conflicts among the Arab countries, as well as the conflicts within both Egypt and Yemen.

In Yemen, Egyptian forces and weaponry, structured and trained for conventional warfare, had to face different conditions on the ground, a different type of terrain, climate and military command in addition to a different type of enemy. The Egyptians disembarked in Yemen with no notion of what awaited them. Economic and social conditions were often difficult.

"The defeat of the Egyptian forces on 5 June 1967, the loss of Sinai, the threat to the Suez Canal and its closure to international shipping, the debilitation of the armed forces, the loss of thousands of lives and, above all, the people's loss of confidence in the military, were the logical consequences of the war in Yemen.

"Confidence, however, was gradually rebuilt after the battle of Ras El-Esh in July 1967, and the dogfight in which the Egyptian air force surpassed itself. The Egyptian navy also sank the Israeli warship Eilat on 21 October 1967. Finally, the exchange of fire across the Suez Canal, the raid on embankments and fortified lines, sniper operations, and the capture of Israeli prisoners by Egyptian guerrillas during the war of attrition all helped raise the morale of the forces.

"As commander of the second field army during the War of Attrition (1968-1970), I can say with confidence that the men's morale and physical ability improved during these operations. The men were determined to fight and we, the commanders, learned how to lead our men to victory.

"The forces were all on alert, intelligence was continuously supplying information to guide the decision to fight. On 6 October 1973, the decision was taken and the Egyptian and Syrian armies astonished the world and took the enemy by surprise, rapidly crossing the Canal and advancing into the heart of Sinai, levelling the fortified lines. But the US intervention on 12 October enabled the enemy to make a thrust across the Canal and to establish itself between the Egyptian second and third armies in the gap on the West Bank."

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