Unipolarity, multipolarity...and the impending war
As the Iraqi crisis reaches its most critical stage, Mohamed Sid-Ahmed asks: can war still be averted?
An argument that is being increasingly heard these days is that war is going to break out whether we like it or not and that it is pointless to waste our energy in a futile attempt to avert the inevitable. Would it not make more sense, then, to support the war option, thereby earning America's gratitude and the material rewards it is certain to bestow on us? This was a central question at the Sharm El-Sheikh summit last Saturday.
For there is no doubt that the Bush administration is determined to wage war on Iraq. Nor is there any doubt that the real reasons it is pushing ahead with its war plans in the face of widespread international disapproval have little to do with its proclaimed reasons. The issue is not that of weapons of mass destruction, as borne out by the fact that Israel, which is not merely suspected but known to possess a nuclear arsenal, has never been called to account for its clear violation of international laws and treaties. But then, of course, Israel is not part of the axis of evil, which the Bush administration appears to believe justifies its blatant application of double standards to the question of weapons of mass destruction.
The fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, which symbolised the end of the Cold War, the bipolar world order and the equation of mutual deterrence between the two superpowers, ushered in a unipolar world order in which the United States emerged as the unchallenged leader. The military, technological and economic superiority of the sole remaining superpower had no precedent in history and, without the balance of terror to deter it, America was free to embark on any military adventure without fear of reprisal. Showing its utter disdain for the principle put forward in the aftermath of the Cold War, which holds that all conflicts must be resolved by peaceful means, the Bush administration adopted the doctrine of preemptive war as one of the main pillars on which its geopolitical strategy rests. This doctrine, and Washington's belief that it can play the war card with impunity, is being tested in the Iraq crisis.
Meanwhile, the obvious contradiction between the two conflict-resolution approaches, peaceful versus military solutions of crisis situations, is creating tensions within the global community and presenting the United States with the most serious challenge yet to its status as guardian of the new world order. It is becoming increasingly clear that not everyone is willing to accept unipolarity as the only possible alternative to the bipolarity which characterised the world system before the collapse of the Soviet Union. The first signs of an incipient multipolar world order came from a number of European states, namely, France, Germany and Belgium. The present split in Western ranks over whether the Iraqi problem should be resolved militarily or peacefully is in essence a difference over whether the US alone should have the final say in determining which approach is to be used to resolve the crisis or whether the final say should reflect a compromise between the positions of various parties. In other words, are decisions of global import to be taken in the context of a unipolar
or a multipolar world order? This is an issue that goes far beyond the Iraq crisis and involves the world at large.
The problem is that although its military, technological and economic superiority is universally acknowledged, America is not content to rest on its laurels. To maintain its status, it must ensure its continued control over the main source of energy worldwide. Given that until an alternative source is discovered, which is unlikely in any foreseeable future, oil will remain the principal source of energy in the world, acquiring unhindered access to Iraq's oil reserves, which are second only to Saudi Arabia's, is of vital importance for America.
Still, America can continue to retain its superiority without going to war against Iraq. Nor is a war necessary to disarm Iraq, which is far from being the only country suspected of developing weapons of mass destruction. Thus if America goes to war, it will be by choice, not necessity, and the world remains unconvinced by Washington's contention that war is unavoidable. But it is clear that war will benefit America considerably. Its insistence on the war option cannot be explained in terms of America's declared intentions alone. That is why a rational dialogue over justification to go to war would not take us very far.
For example, there is the American argument that war is necessary to prevent states described as belonging to the 'axis of evil' (this includes Iraq) from providing terrorist networks (including Al-Qa'eda) with weapons of mass destruction. This argument might have been convincing if Iraq was the only state in the world suspected of harbouring proscribed weapons. But that is not the case. Israel is allowed to do so without fear of disciplinary measures. North Korea has openly declared that it is reactivating its nuclear programme in defiance of UN resolutions and America is not threatening to launch a military attack against it. Nor did it threaten India and Pakistan with war when they exploded their nuclear devices. As to Baghdad's supposed links with Al-Qa'eda, there is absolutely no evidence that any such links exist.
The war option makes it clear that world conflicts have reached a critical stage of intractability. This finds its clearest expression in the insistence of the great powers to resort to their veto rights. At a given time in the post-bipolar world order, it was presumed that resorting to the veto was no longer necessary and that key decisions could be reached by consensus. But Russia has recently threatened to use its veto to stop the outbreak of war. France is said to have also made a similar threat. The US has actually resorted to its veto prerogative to block passage of a resolution adopted by the other members of the Security Council condemning Israel's use of excessive force in Jenin, and its killing of three UN personnel. Clearly, the veto is still very much part of the global political game.
Is the post-bipolar world order, which for years seemed to be unipolar, now evolving into a multipolar order? Are alliances and confrontations acquiring new characteristics? Instead of being one single pole, is the European Union being transformed into an arena for confrontation with one group of states toeing the American line and another standing up to it? Is it that which stands behind Bush's determination to go to war against Saddam, while a group of European states stand against such a war?
This does not mean that the alliances and confrontations between the United States on one side and this or that group of European states on the other side are of a permanent character. The situation is very fluid. Today there is a clear polarisation in Europe, with France, Germany and Belgium opposing Washington's policies and Britain, Spain and Italy supporting these policies; tomorrow the situation can change. The permanent structures of the Cold War era are a thing of the past.
What applies to the European Union applies to one degree or another to the Arab states. There are states in which American and British troops are stationed and which will have a role to play if war breaks out, and there are states which openly express hostility to war while avoiding all-out enmity with the US. The new characteristic of the situation is the disparity of the stands even within one group of states. Does this make war more likely or the opposite?
In a way, the Arab summit held last Saturday in Sharm El-Sheikh implicitly answers that question. No Arab state, or group of Arab states, has unreservedly adopted the US line on the question of war against Iraq. That is a mark of a multipolar, not a unipolar, world order. At the same time, not one single Arab party has a stand identical to that of Iraq. The crisis over the Samoud-2 Iraqi missiles, which Iraq announced it was ready to dismantle even though it contested the fact that their range exceeds the tolerated range of 150 kilometres when loaded, proved that whenever Baghdad takes a step in the direction of genuine disarmament, it creates for itself a better chance to reinforce the position of the world forces opposed to war and calling for a peaceful settlement of the conflict.
If Washington succeeds in launching war, whether in application of a Security Council resolution or without that coverage, this will be evidence that unipolarity is prevailing and that America has succeeded in establishing its hegemony over the world system. If, on the contrary, war is averted, this will mean that multipolarity has scored a success and that the mass popular demonstrations have proved effective.
Al-Ahram Weekly Online : 6 - 12 March 2003 (Issue No. 628)
Located at: http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2003/628/op3.htm