Iraq and the inspectors
Looking back at the UN inspection process in Iraq, Fawzi H Hammad, former president of Egypt's Atomic Energy Authority, assesses the cooperation balance sheet
Cooperation by Saddam Hussein's regime with UN weapons inspectors was a top story in the media throughout the team's search for weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Sadly, past experience, namely, Iraq's unconstructive attitude towards the process in 1991-1998, seems to have coloured perceptions of the process this winter, when the Gulf country was actually quite cooperative with Hans Blix's team.
From the outset of the inspectors' mission on 27 November 2002 to its untimely conclusion on 17 March 2003, people around the world were glued to TV sets in anticipation of an announcement that a nuclear bomb or some other WMD had been discovered. In spite of the end to inspectors' task the matter of Iraq's cooperation comes up with a startling frequency.
Jack Straw, British foreign minister, recently said a lack of cooperation with inspectors was one of the reasons for the joint US-British military attack against Iraq. And audiences around the world heard US President George W Bush address the UN General Assembly, warning that Saddam would have a nuclear bomb in a year.
In the end, though, inspectors did not find any WMD. Nonetheless, Iraq is under a major military attack, kicked off by "Shock and Awe" in the aftermath of the collapse of the inspections mission.
Towards setting the record straight on the extent of Iraq's cooperation, a closer look is required at how the inspection process actually proceeded and inspectors' findings.
Security Council Resolution (SCR) 1441, issued 8 November 2002, set up an enhanced inspection regime with the aim of bringing to full and verified completion the disarmament process established by SCR 687 -- issued in 1991 -- and related resolutions.
Paragraphs four and nine of 1441 called on Iraq to cooperate immediately and unconditionally with the United Nations Monitoring and Verification Inspection Committee (UNMOVIC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
SCR1441 provided for an impressive presence by inspectors. The very presence of the team, its ability to move around the country and conduct inspections at disparate locations indicates a measure of cooperation by Iraq.
Armed with a UN mandate, 115 inspectors -- 60 of them Americans -- headed for Iraq. The team worked from two offices -- headquarters in Baghdad and another in Mosul -- while a third was being set up in Basra when the mission was terminated.
To convey them around the country, inspectors had at their disposal a more extensive air transport capabilities than in the 1990s. The team was shuttled between Baghdad and Larnaca by a Hercules L-100 aircraft. Eight highly-equipped helicopters and several aircraft capable of flying at high- altitudes, namely, an American 1 J-2 and French Mirage-4 were used by Blix's team. More support was on the way in the form of German Drones when the mission wrapped up.
The process carried out by Blix's team was the most intensive, intrusive, continuous on-site-inspection system ever implemented. Inspection campaigns numbered approximately 780 at some 460 sites -- an average of seven a day. Some important sites were inspected more than once during a single day with the aim of discovering any attempts at concealment.
Such an extensive and complex operation could not have been managed without Iraqi help, cooperation and support.
Reports submitted to the Security Council by Blix and IAEA head, Mohamed El-Baradei included sections on Iraqi cooperation. Blix's reports gave greater attention to this matter.
In his first report, dated 27 December 2002, Blix found that Iraq had, on the whole, cooperated rather well, had helped set up the offices in Baghdad and Mosul. Transportation arrangements were fine and access to all sites, with the exception of one, had been provided promptly.
Cooperation with respect to process, wrote Blix, had been good.
With respect to substantive cooperation, Blix's assessment was less affirmative. This sort of cooperation refers to Iraq's declaration of all its programmes and WMD, and either their presentation for elimination or provision of evidence that nothing remained of them.
In his last report, dated 7 March, Blix explicitly outlined Iraqi cooperation with respect to process. After a period of somewhat reluctant cooperation, Blix wrote that since late January, Iraq had increased its initiatives for cooperation.
A mechanism was developed to resolve issues of concern that might develop during the complex process, and a series of meetings between Iraqi officials and inspectors were held, most notably on 20 January and 8-9 February. Blix wrote that many issues were resolved as a result of those meetings.
For instance, Iraq established two committees to search for additional documents and look for missing items. Its officials encouraged scientists to meet in private with inspectors, and five interviews were conducted. Mechanisms were established to look into chemical and biological weapons left over from the Iran-Iraq war and the 1991 Gulf War. Aerial surveying, too, was stepped up. Then, on 14 February, Iraq issued legislation banning WMD and materials used in them in response to requests by Blix and El-Baradei.
These measures, which must surely be considered instances of cooperation, were implemented by Iraq alongside the continuation of the already intensive and extensive inspection process and in spite of an increase in air attacks on the no-fly zones, the military build-up along its borders and the dissemination of millions of leaflets on political matters throughout the country.
Within the framework of this cooperation, inspections were conducted for over three months and concluded that there were no indications that Iraq had revived any nuclear, chemical or biological programmes. Additionally, Iraq destroyed its Sumoud-2 missiles, which had a range of 183 kilometres and thus exceeded limits set by SCR 687 -- even though it would have been possible to modify this hardware to comply with the permitted range.
An important conclusion was the IAEA's decisive dismissal of all allegations that Iraq had tried to start a uranium enrichment programme, because it tried to buy aluminium tubes, magnets and uranium from Niger.
Inspectors, in what was to be their final report, had asked for a few more months to conduct their task. This request received wide support from Security Council members. Even so, the US's unilateral decision to withdraw its inspectors led to the collapse of the inspection regime in violation to SCR 1441. It is worth mentioning here that North Korea, too, had taken unilateral action with respect to weapons inspections when it kicked out inspectors earlier this year.
But, as we know, the inspection regime has not been the only target of destruction. Iraq is now under massive military attack by US and United Kingdom forces. Under the pretext of rooting out WMD, this military campaign seeks to dismantle Saddam's regime and restructure the Middle East. Hence, it seems to me that SCR 1441 was not really about inspecting or cooperation, but merely a step in a much bigger plan by Bush which is now in full swing.
Al-Ahram Weekly Online : 27 March - 2 April 2003 (Issue No. 631)
Located at: http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2003/631/op56.htm