Strength in numbers
The Iraqi Shi'a majority's claims to equal political rights may well prove to be a cohesive factor in the chaos that will face post-war Iraq. Sayed Ali Al-Ridha* writes
Like the Ottoman imperialists, segments of the political and intellectual elite of the Arab world are today striving to ensure that their fellow Arab Shi'a Muslims remain conveniently excluded from the stagnant corridors of power in Baghdad. Last month's historic Shi'a Conference, held in Tehran, aroused many inside the covered halls of sectarianism. Those who uncontrollably spoke out against the convening of the conference, labelling it "disturbing behavior" on behalf of the Shi'a of Iraq, have indeed stayed true to the "wisdom" of narrow- minded sectarianism.
In reality, the Shi'a Conference was an attempt to bring Iraq's religious majority -- the Shi'a -- to adopt a more receptive approach towards ensuring the rights of the country's religious minorities. As such, the conference was inclusive, representing the Shi'a of Iraq from all walks of life and religious inclinations. Amongst the diverse group of attendees were distinguished secular democrats, such as Ahmed Chalabi, leader of the Iraqi National Congress, and respected men of religion and jurisprudence, such as Ayatollah Mohamed Baqir Al-Hakim of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq. More than 250 delegates assembled to discuss the immediate concerns and interests of Iraq's Shi'a.
Critics of the conference conveniently prefaced their accusations by a token expression of sympathy towards the plight of the oppressed Arab Shi'a of Iraq. While none dared deny the indisputable fact that the Shi'a of Iraq have been wronged, brutally oppressed and deceitfully denied their rightful role in politics and government, all proposed measures bordering inaction.
None of the those opposed to this historic meeting discussed the proceedings of the Shi'a Conference. Rather, they preferred to argue on several intellectually and politically bankrupt fronts. Their first and foremost claim -- that the conference sought to divide rather than unite the besieged people of Iraq -- is typical of paranoid and suspicious minds and shows their failure to comprehend the basic fact that the Shi'a are a distinct entity within the larger Islamic community or Ummah.
As such, if the Shi'a choose to discuss issues and concerns amongst themselves, this should not be a cause of paranoid concern, since, after all, numerous other Islamic communities assemble periodically throughout the Islamic world. Based on their logic, the Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC) should view the Arab League (AL) as an instrument of division -- one that represents Arab ethnocentricity rather than the genuine Arab desire of contributing positively. Further, the Arab League should in turn view the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) similarly. Their line of reasoning implies that the Arab League should have non-Arab states as members and the GCC should have non-Gulf Arab states represented as well.
Unfortunately, critics of the Shi'a Conference made no effort at understanding the need for such a conference. The issue here is much bigger than just the notion of an exclusively Shi'a gathering. The issue is the very existence of the Shi'a. Historically, the Sunnis have perceived the Shi'a as those who challenged the political unity of Islam, thereby causing an irreparable division. Instead of attempting to engage the Shi'a, the Sunnis labeled them as blasphemers and apostates and pursued policies of rule by oppression and exclusion.
In a classic textbook example of sectarianism, the Abbassid kings long ago brought in an army of Seljuk Turks to serve their royal Arab wishes and oppress the Arab and Shi'a people. History is a witness to the subsequent decline of Arab power after the widening of this sectarian rift, in which one section of the Arab world chose to share power with a foreign people rather than their fellow Shi'a Arabs. The resulting instability brought a premature end to the blossoming Arab empire, and marked the passing of the Islamic torch to non-Arab peoples.
It comes as no surprise that those who opposed the Shi'a Conference also express the belief that there can either be a "just ruler" or a "Shi'a ruler", clearly implying that no Shi'ite can ever be a just ruler. Further, they have failed to extend to the Shi'a of Iraq the political recognition and legitimacy they deserve by virtue of being the clear religious majority of Iraq. As such, it is argued that Iraq's majority must remain without competent leadership, structure and a cohesive stance and that they must remain politically handicapped when attempting to perform their role in the realm of political leadership. Any attempt by the religious majority of Iraq to formulate plans and procedures in such a capacity, at a time when the future of their country is being decided, is quickly perceived as an attempt to divide and exploit.
This current of flawed political thought runs contrary to the established fact that minority rights are best guaranteed by the zeal and determination of a united majority. Unless the Shi'a of Iraq are united and determined in their efforts to establish and guarantee the proportionally legitimate rights of the Sunni Arab minority in Iraq, no power on Earth can make it happen. If such a unity and consensus is not reached by the Shi'a at this time, as the future of Iraq is about to be decided, the result will be catastrophic for all. The alternative is a dramatic increase in sectarian political polarisation and an accompanying political turmoil, for the Shi'a of Iraq are no longer willing to go through another lengthy episode of political marginalisation.
The Shi'a Conference must be viewed as an expression of concern on the part of the religious majority of Iraq for the irrevocable rights of the various minorities of Iraq. An objective study of the formal declaration, released at the end of the Shi'a Conference, would testify strongly to the fact.
* The writer is a member of the Iraqi National Congress and a signatory of the landmark "Declaration of the Iraqi Shi'a."
Al-Ahram Weekly Online : 10 -16 April 2003 (Issue No. 633)
Located at: http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2003/633/sc11.htm