What happened in Baghdad?
Ibrahim Nafie ponders what happened in Baghdad
About two weeks into the American-British campaign against Iraq military analysts predicted the invasion would progress slowly due to the Iraqi people's heroic resistance. They also suggested the resistance would gradually intensify as invading forces progressed north, with the major battle occurring over Baghdad. Iraqi Information Minister Mohamed Said Al- Sahhaf helped feed these predictions at his press conferences, giving an impression of confidence despite the images from the arena of combat showing the invading forces' steady progress and the intensification of the around- the-clock aerial bombardment.
And even though most analyses indicated that invading forces would triumph over Iraqi resistance and come out victorious, they also regarded the battle for Baghdad as the decisive moment for the elite forces -- fedayeen Saddam, Ba'ath Party militias and the principal factions of the Republican Guard. Such analyses seemed reasonable, because it took invading forces 10 days to subdue the tiny city of Umm Qasr and two weeks to enter Basra. Talk of a great battle over Baghdad was logical, since the capital had a population of five million and housed the entire ruling apparatus, its leadership and that of the party and the state and its military elite.
Military analysts and strategic experts maintained that position even after it was confirmed that American forces had entered the international airport in Baghdad. Meanwhile, Al- Sahhaf insisted that the situation was under control and that Iraqi forces and Arab volunteers would quickly eliminate the group of US soldiers that emerged in the Saddam International Airport.
Suddenly, on the morning of Monday 7 April American forces began to appear on the streets of Baghdad. What attracted a great deal attention was the complete absence of Iraqi forces -- military or quasi-military. The Americans had entered the capital without a battle -- in contrast with Umm Qasr, Nasseriya or Basra. It was equally remarkable that American and British forces, once in Baghdad, concerned themselves with removing images of Saddam Hussein. If not for the sniping and suicide bombings undertaken by some of the Arab volunteers in the streets and suburbs of Baghdad, the viewer following the news of the capital's fall would not have guessed that the event was preceded by any conflict at all on land.
These developments raised dozens of questions, not only among the Arab public, but among political and military analysts.
To my mind, what happened in Iraq in the immediate aftermath of Monday 7 April is closer to a mystery novel than a series of real- life events.
A major question relates to the disappearance of Iraqi forces. How did they disappear so suddenly, without a trace, and with them Al-Sahhaf? Compounding the mystery further is the fact that not a single one of them has been found dead or alive. The American list of leading figures includes 55 names, starting with the Iraqi president and ending with party leaders, but includes neither Foreign Minister Naji Sabri nor Al-Sahhaf. The only figure who has since appeared is Amer Al-Saadi, who was scientific adviser to Saddam and has turned himself in to the American forces. Where, then, is Iraq's political leadership? Where is Saddam's government? And where is the man himself?
Some people suggest that Saddam and his two sons were killed in the course of the bombing of a building in the neighbourhood of Al-Mansour on Monday. US and British intelligence reports say they had received information from an agent who was close to Saddam's small circle to the effect that he was in that building in the company of his two sons and members of his government, and that the bombing of the building by a B-52 killed the Iraqi president and all those with him. Is this information correct? And if US and British intelligence have evidence in this respect, why aren't they announcing it?
There are also those who contend that a massacre took place following the defection of a group of leaders who, refusing to condone the continuing destruction of the country, decided to liquidate Saddam, his two sons and several of his inner-circle. Under this scenario, the defectors struck a deal with the Americans and the British by which military forces and the Republican Guard were withdrawn from Baghdad and the surrounding area so as to permit an effortless entrance into the city. In return, the Americans and British facilitated the flight of the political leaders, along with their families; while the military leaders promised to form the kernel of a new army leadership in the immediate post-Saddam period.
While the reasoning remains tentative, there are indications that the killing of members of the media was indeed part of a plan requiring that there should be no witnesses or recording equipment. Evidence for this includes the fact that the aerial bombardment of Baghdad stopped as of Monday evening -- something the Jordanian journalist Tarek Ayyoub pointed out prior to his death, when he said he could not understand the quiet that enveloped the city, asking whether it was the calm before the storm.
Even if we assume that Saddam and his inner circle were killed, we would still have to answer the question of where the rest of the leadership might be. The killing of the head of a regime or a large number of officials would normally drive the remaining leaders to take control and prevent collapse. What occurred in Baghdad was the simultaneous disappearance of all political leaders and even the leaders of the various intelligence agencies.
Events in Mosul and Tikrit after the US entered Baghdad suggest that the invaders had struck a deal with remaining Iraqi political figures that allowed them to flee upon handing over Baghdad.
The mystery is unlikely to be solved in the near future. As Arabs, what we must do, in the meantime, is to confront head on the situation facing Iraqi people and the negative repercussions of the war for collaborative Arab work.
Relevant at this juncture is an article that occupied this space following the Al-Ahram trip to Washington from 28 January to 10 February 2003. In that article I made a number of points that, properly heeded, might have enabled us to avoid a good portion of what has happened. The American administration had resolved to attack Iraq, but even so, war could have been averted by a major initiative on the part of the Iraqi regime -- who could have relinquished power, thus depriving Washington's extreme right of the chance to attack. And when President Mubarak called for an extraordinary summit and some Arab states refused to respond, I highlighted the necessity of a major, collective Arab initiative, noting that given time constraints, such a step was urgently needed. And even after the war started, it was clear that our priority should be preserving Iraq's infrastructure and using the war as justification for urging for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction throughout the entire region.
Nonetheless, some Arab leaders persisted in their tendency to accuse others and thus wash their hands of the issue, saying they had done everything in their power. To those who insisted on outbidding Al-Ahram's position, following our trip to Washington, I can only repeat what I wrote back then. "At a time when regional and international powers are working to provide a window of opportunity for diplomatic efforts, the Iraqi regime is squandering opportunity after opportunity by persisting in making grandiloquent statements that have no basis in reality and are not backed by rational calculations...
"Iraq's failure to cooperate has given some parties, like Israel, the chance to weave tales about the transfer of components of weapons of mass destruction to other Arab countries, like Syria, in an obvious attempt to provoke discord between Washington and Damascus while carrying out its own agenda for the region."
Interviews with members of the American administration yielded similar conclusions: the Americans planned to impose a siege on Baghdad during which the regime would eventually collapse. Towards the end of the article in question, I called clearly for an Arab initiative to confirm the unity and integrity of Iraq.
A week later, President Mubarak's call for an extraordinary summit was the subject of another article in which I insisted that the proposition arose out of a conviction that Washington would go ahead with war plans, and that it could not be stopped without the complete and unconditional cooperation of the Iraqi regime. Another way of influencing Washington's position would be coordinating with international forces opposed to war.
Subsequently, it became clear that Iraqi leadership would not cooperate. The same leadership had led Iraq and its people straight into numerous disasters, dragging the entire region into one crisis after another. It was clear that its management of the present crisis was no different from previous ones. The only new development is international sympathy for the Iraqi people, who were to be the military operation's first victims.
The Egyptian position has been that this is Iraq's own business, with President Mubarak declaring that it was up to the Iraqi president to decide what is best for his country and his people, and that Egypt would not intervene. In that last article I also highlighted the stagnation in addressing the Palestinian question in light of the Iraqi crisis, pointing out that Sharon might exploit the situation to intensify his aggression against Palestinians. That had indeed happened, most notably in the Gaza Strip. All the evidence suggested that Washington would attack Iraq, and our questions centred on who it would target next. And despite American denial that a list of targets existed and would be pursued, it is not difficult to read between the lines, recognising a long-term American vision for the Middle East. If the vainglorious heroes had taken the time to read Al-Ahram's analysis they might have sought more effective ways of preventing the war or at least dealing with its consequences.
Even now a series of intractable tasks await the Arabs -- concerning the immediate repercussions of the American war on Iraq and the stage to come. Arab officials and intellectuals must work out the lessons to be learned from recent events and make a concerted effort to confront the challenges and dangers to come. Will the message be received this time? Will those who call others traitors listen, rather than leaving the Arab nation prey to major and even to minor powers?
Al-Ahram Weekly Online : 17 - 23 April 2003 (Issue No. 634)
Located at: http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2003/634/op1.htm