Al-Ahram: A Diwan of contemporary life (491)
Taking the royal oath
The inauguration of new parliaments in Egypt starting from the 1920s normally entailed pomp and circumstance but only once before did the galas include the king taking the constitutional oath. It happened again, though, in 1931 and, as Professor Yunan Labib Rizk* writes, the ramifications of the instance this time were great
On Wednesday, 17 June 1931, Al-Ahram published the schedule of the inauguration of parliament to be held the following Saturday. There would be 19 steps, beginning with the arrival of "the honourable members of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies" at 9.30am and leading up to a committee created specifically to receive the king. The announcement also detailed the appropriate attire for the occasion: formal evening wear for members of parliament, full gala uniform for military officials (other military officers or civil servants were to wear uniforms or suits sporting whatever insignia or rank and medals individuals may have obtained) and frock coat with relevant insignia for Egyptian notables and foreign dignitaries. Ordinary Egyptians attending the ceremony should wear "national dress, regardless of the social sector to which they belong".
All this was the norm for the parliamentary inaugural ceremonies of which there had been four up to then -- 1924, 1925, 1926 and 1930. However, the notable departure came in item 10, which stated: "When His Royal Majesty the King reaches the throne, he will take the constitutional oath as follows: 'I swear by God to respect the constitution and the laws of Egypt, and to safeguard the independence of the nation and its territorial integrity.'" King Fouad had only been obliged to take this oath once before, upon the opening of the 1924 parliament, the first to be inaugurated following the promulgation of the 1923 Constitution.
Al-Ahram reminds us of this fact in a front page editorial. Under the headline, "The Egyptian constitution: a page in the history of parliamentary rule, a reminder for our representatives and a lesson for our people", the writer reviews the development of parliamentary institutional life in Egypt. It had passed through many phases: a legislative body under French occupation, the shura (consultative) councils under Mohamed Ali, the assemblies introduced by the Khedive Ismail and later given greater legislative authority under Tawfiq, the representative bodies created under British occupation and finally the bicameral system of government introduced by the 1923 Constitution.
However, before proceeding to this history the editorial addressed the issue of the royal oath. "It was God's desire to bring good to Egypt at the hands of its devoted king, His Royal Majesty Fouad, long may he live. Thus on 15 May 1924, the Egyptian parliamentary assembly was inaugurated. That memorable day revived an era of happiness and glorious pride in the Nile Valley. At 10.00 His Royal Majesty graced the hall of parliament, arriving in royal procession hailed by the cheers and jubilation of the people, and delivered the oath of loyalty: 'I swear by God to respect the constitution and the laws of Egypt and to safeguard the independence of the nation and its territorial integrity.'"
Imagine, then, readers' surprise when they opened their Al- Ahram the following day to discover that the agenda for the inaugural ceremony, published only the day before, had been modified. Instead of 19 items, it contained 18; item ten and 11 had been combined into one: "When His Royal Majesty the King reaches the royal throne, the speaker of the Senate shall ask the king for permission for the members of parliament to be seated."
The Egyptian political climate during this period was certainly charged, what with the refusal of the Wafd and Liberal Constitutional parties to recognise the recently promulgated 1930 Constitution, their boycott of the elections held under the new constitution and Prime Minister Sidqi's repression of these two parties and clamp down on the opposition press. Not surprisingly, Wafd Party leader Mustafa El-Nahhas seized upon the change in the parliamentary inaugural agenda and delivered a lengthy statement that fired the opening shot in yet another battle between the huge populist party and the palace.
The "Leader of the Nation", as party mouthpieces hailed El- Nahhas, declared that for the king not to take the oath of loyalty would be "a profound and fundamental event, for it would deliver the fatal blow to the new constitution which had been unanimously rejected by all classes of the Egyptian people". El-Nahhas explained that the king was a cornerstone of the Sidqi constitution and that Article 50 of this constitution stipulated that the king must take an oath before parliament could begin exercising its constitutional powers. "However, His Royal Majesty, who pledged in 1924 to respect the constitution of the nation has not adhered to this pledge with regard to the constitution of Sidqi Pasha." The significance of this was not lost on anyone, El-Nahhas continued. "The constitution of the nation is the only valid constitution. I am confident that the people will have their constitution and rights returned and that the current order is a false illusion whose time has come."
Commenting on these developments, Al-Ahram observed that the government had consulted a number of legal experts who concluded that the king should not take the constitutional oath. The principle which was followed everywhere, they said, was that a monarch should take a pledge of allegiance to the nation only once in his reign. King Fouad had taken such a pledge in 1924, "which is to say upon assuming his constitutional rule, ever since which he has served in his constitutional capacity uninterrupted".
Yet the constitution, to which the king had sworn allegiance, was precisely the constitution Sidqi had campaigned to change, with the palace's blessing moreover. In a lengthy memorandum published shortly after forming a cabinet, the Sidqi government claimed that the 1923 Constitution represented a complete break with the past. Apart from preserving the system of indirect elections, this constitution had no connection to the Legislative Assembly or the parliamentary assemblies that preceded it. Furthermore, this constitution had been modelled on the Belgian constitution which like other European constitutions had not matured into its final form overnight. "Each country creates its constitution in accordance with its circumstances," the memorandum argued. "Economic and social changes, once fully realised, then have an impact on the changes in the constitution."
Egyptians were not alone in recognising the implications of the alteration of the parliamentary inaugural ceremony. Al- Ahram cites a French newspaper that echoed El-Nahhas's opinion on the invalidity of the 1930 Constitution almost word for word. "The old constitution is the one that still stands," the newspaper proclaimed.
This was not the opinion of Sidqi who told the same French newspaper that the whole incident was a mistake. The Senate secretary had without thinking copied the inaugural agenda for 1924, he said, adding, "An Egyptian king only has to take the oath once in his reign, which is when he first assumes constitutional rule. Article 50 of the constitution only applies to new kings." Sidqi was overoptimistic in imagining that his constitution would live to see another king.
The following day, Sidqi released a lengthy statement to the press, appearing in Al-Ahram under the headline: "Why His Majesty did not take the constitutional oath". Sidqi maintained that the fuss over whether or not the king had sworn allegiance to the 1930 Constitution was absurd and that the opposition only raised the issue in the hope of fulfilling its dream of returning to power. "The old constitution was the opposition's means to power, just as it finds the new constitution a formidable obstacle towards that end," he said. "And now it suggests that in His Majesty's not taking the oath of office is proof that the old constitution is still standing and must be respected, contrary to logic and reality."
Sidqi was clever enough to realise that the story he told the French newspaper about the Senate secretary's slip would not wash with the Egyptian public. His statement, therefore, discussed at length the opinions of legal and constitutional scholars whom he said were the ultimate judges on this issue. These experts noted that Article 50 of the constitution stated that the king must take the oath of allegiance to the constitution "before he could exercise his constitutional authorities". The experts emphasised that the provision should be considered in two parts and that the second part applied to King Fouad who was already exercising his constitutional authorities, whereas the first part, pertaining to the oath, applied to all future kings.
As though he felt his audience would not be content with this explanation, Sidqi offered a second argument. Suddenly, it seems, Sidqi decided to retract his criticisms of the old constitution and suggest that his constitution was, in effect, a continuation of the old, which was why the king did not have to take the oath again. Then, as though to preempt the objection that Article One of the royal decree promulgating the 1931 Constitution abrogated the former constitution, he said that this was a purely legalistic formula which enabled the revised document to be presented in one go rather than piecemeal. In corroboration of this claim, Sidqi reminded people of his speech to the throne in which he said, "If the new constitution differs in any way from its predecessor, the difference does not reside in the rules and principles of government or in public freedoms. Rather, it is in the modifications of the new constitution which aim at securing a balance between the authorities, which is the essence of the parliamentary order, and preparing the means to promote the political education of the public in which the system of government finds its source of nourishment and strength." Sidqi went on to argue that such refinements did not create a new constitutional entity, distinct in character and standing from the document that had been rectified. Thus, "the pledge His Royal Majesty had taken to respect the constitution still stands and remains valid for the constitution in its new form."
If some Egyptians were impressed by this convoluted argument, the opposition press was not. Representative of this body of opinion was Al-Diaa, the most influential of the Wafd Party organs, which unleashed a vehement attack against the Sidqi government. Under the headline "The constitutional oath not taken by the king" Al-Diaa set about undermining Sidqi's cleverly devised reasoning. Contrary to Sidqi's claim that the first article of the 1930 Constitution was no more than a formality, the Wafd newspaper observed that the article was "juridical constitutional proof" of the abrogation of the former constitution. This proof was "irrefutable regardless of the claims of lawmakers and arguments of supporters". The newspaper continued "If we add to Article One the provision of Article 50 of the constitution that overthrew the old, to the effect that before assuming his constitutional powers the king must take the oath to respect the constitution before the joint houses of parliament, the claims of those legal experts who have attempted to portray the truth as something it is not become a cry in the wilderness."
Al-Diaa went on to say that while it accepted the view that a king should only deliver the oath of allegiance to the constitution once in his reign, this principle was contingent upon the continued validity of the constitution on the basis of which the king made his pledge. However, it was another matter entirely when "the government replaces that constitution with a new one, in which the modifications made depart radically from the most explicit provisions of the old. This is logic. This is thinking that does not deviate from the straightened path."
In another statement, Sidqi had tried to press home his point that the 1923 and 1930 constitutions were essentially one and the same. He said, "Any constitution is amendable with the exception of those provisions that explicitly state otherwise, and any pledge to honour the constitution constitutes an oath to respect any amendments made to it."
In response, Al-Diaa accused Sidqi of pulling the wool over the public's eyes. Sidqi would have been more accurate, it said, had he concluded his statement by saying: "Constitutional customs have it that the oath does not become void upon the amendment of the constitution on condition that the amendment is made in accordance with the provisions of the self-same constitution." At the same time, the newspaper was quick to assert that "people everywhere hold that the king should reign, not govern, and that his ministers are responsible for every action, large or small, that they undertake. Thus, the king is not responsible. And, what confirms our belief in this is that, in not taking the oath, His Royal Majesty has put the blame on his ministers alone for the injury they inflicted on the constitution of the nation."
It was not until British confidential archives were released that Egyptians were to discover the real reasons for cancellation of item 10 on the agenda of the inauguration of parliament. According to these records, the British high commissioner intervened at the last minute to refresh Sidqi's memory with regard to certain communications that had taken place between them the previous year. At that time, the high commissioner reminded him, the prime minister had agreed not to alter the constitution in a manner that would augment the powers of the king and that he would consult with former Prime Minister Mohamed Mahmoud over any amendments he intended to introduce that might work to that effect. The high commissioner also said that, on another occasion, Sidqi had attested to the fact that the new constitution would safeguard the fundamental principles of the 1923 Constitution. Although the venerable prime minister may have thought he could renege on pledges he made to the Egyptian people, he would never dare to do the same to the representative of the British crown, with all its might and which still held many of the strings in Egyptian politics.
The ramifications of the change in the inaugural ceremony dictated the first item on the agenda. In the Senate, members discussed the prime minister's speech to the throne, paying special attention to his assertion regarding the relationship between the old and new constitutions. Abdel-Halim El-Baili, a leader in Sidqi's party, reiterated his chief's position that the old and new constitutions were one and the same. "It is the same constitution but now it contains a few amendments, and these amendments have not departed from the essence of the constitution or affected in any way its form or substance. Our government is still a parliamentary system and our principles of freedom and equality remain unchanged and unaffected."
Mahmoud Abul-Nasr, speaking on behalf of a committee formed to rebut the speech to the throne, took issue with El- Baili. Egypt does have a new order, distinct from the old, he maintained. As proof, he cited the following passage from the memorandum the Sidqi government submitted to the king before promulgating the new constitution. "No alternative remains but to erase the past, with all its good and bad, and to issue a new constitution that will open a new page in the history of modern Egypt." Abul-Nasr added that even if the tenets of the constitution remained the same, changing their intent created something new.
Unable to remain silent in the debate between the supporters and opponents of Sidqi, Al-Ahram engaged a legal expert, Ahmed Wafiq, to provide an independent opinion on the issue. The result was two articles appearing under the headline, "Why did the king not deliver the constitutional oath?"
In his first article, Wafiq held that there were three categories of constitutions, "concessionary", "contractual" and "popular". The first type, he said, was a gift from the king, but "as it is promulgated by law it can only be amended by law in accordance with the procedures stipulated under the constitution". A contractual constitution was that formulated by the king or parliament and recognised by both the legislative and executive authorities by virtue of an oath to honour and abide by it. He adds, "Since this type of constitution is contractual, it follows that there must exist a balance or parity between the powers of the executive and legislative authorities, for an imbalance would be inconsistent with its contractual nature." The last, a popular constitution, was that created by a constitutional assembly consisting of delegates elected by the people for this purpose.
The latter was clearly not the type of constitution that existed in Egypt. However, the 1923 Constitution, in Wafiq's opinion, was initially concessionary, as was evident in its preamble, but once the king took the oath to honour the constitution, it became contractual. The Sidqi constitution, on the other hand, represented a type of "overthrow" because "it changed the balance of powers between the executive and legislative authorities". In other words, "it overturned the system of government in one of its aspects -- indeed, in many of its aspects -- and as a result the 1923 Constitution has lost all its legal force."
Wafiq goes on to ask on what possible basis Sidqi rests his claim that parliamentary life in Egypt had remained constant now that the fundamental condition for the continuity of parliamentary government had been violated. This condition required the election of parliamentary representatives empowered with the sovereignty of the people, should the people be entitled to relinquish that sovereignty. That the new constitution did not meet this condition was evident from the fact that it failed to furnish three important guarantees for parliamentary life: effective cooperation between the legislative and executive authorities, a balance, at least in theory, between their areas of jurisdiction and superiority in the power of the legislative authority over that of the executive -- and that, too, at least on paper.
Wafiq continues: "That these guarantees no longer exist has created a hiatus in parliamentary life, a hiatus that still persists so long as government is not responsible before parliament. Can there be more palpable evidence of this than the fact that the majority approved a law which did not go into effect due to the opposition of the government, which nevertheless has remained in power?"
After citing articles in French law to corroborate his views, Wafiq concludes, "Parliamentary life has ceased upon the promulgation of the new constitution. Thus, Sidqi's justification of the abstention of His Royal Majesty's from taking the constitutional oath on the grounds that parliamentary life is still ongoing does not stand. His Majesty was legally obliged to take this oath unless the situation had remained normal since the constitution went into effect in 1924."
In his second article, appearing on 24 June 1931, Wafiq refers to a series of articles published in Al-Ahram at an earlier date. In one of these, he had argued that although the 1923 Constitution had become of the contractual variety, subsequent developments reversed that character. That at the behest of the king, the constitution could be suspended twice, once for two years (1924-26) and again for a year (1928- 1929), indicated that all its provisions were "no more than ink on paper".
Nevertheless, Wafiq lays a portion of the blame for this on the Wafd Party. After the constitution was reinstated in 1926, the Wafd did nothing to halt or diminish the right of the executive -- an oblique reference to the king -- to promulgate laws whenever it wished. Consequently, "it became possible to replace the constitution with another without having to resort to the relevant provisions for amendment or to the appropriate means for promulgating ordinary laws." Nothing could better testify to that reality than the appearance of the new 1931 Constitution.
Given the constraints the press was suffering under the Sidqi government one can only admire Al-Ahram for its courage in opposing the prime minister, even if it had approved many of his other actions.
C a p t i o n : His Royal Majesty Fouad
* The author is a professor of history and head of Al-Ahram History Studies Centre.
Al-Ahram Weekly Online : 24 - 30 April 2003 (Issue No. 635)
Located at: http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2003/635/chrncls.htm