One defeat too many
Why have the Arabs lost so many wars? Reda Helal* questions the security mindset of authoritarian regimes
With the exception of the 1973 war, in which the Arabs did fine and which was followed by an Egyptian diplomatic effort resulting in the liberation of Sinai from Israeli occupation, modern Arabs have lost many wars, starting with 1948 and 1967 and ending with the Gulf war in 1991 and the Iraq war in 2003. The quick and resounding fall of Saddam's regime in Iraq and the triumphant entry of US invading forces into Baghdad once again pose the question: why do Arabs lose wars?
It is said that the massive disparity in military power, namely the overwhelming superiority of US-UK forces over Iraqi forces, made the outcome of the war a forgone conclusion. But the US military advantage over the Vietnamese did not help the Americans much. Nor did the US military advantage prevent the Serbian army from resisting for over 80 days. It has also been said that "treason" was the reason for Saddam's downfall. But why has treason taken place?
Writings of the orientalist genre have addressed questions concerning Arab military defeats. However, these writings, including The Arab Mind by Raphael Patai and The Closed Circle by David Pryce-Jones, have a racist tinge. Mostly, they are a denunciation of the "Arab personality", as if the latter were a primordial, immutable fact. These writings fail to explain the military victories and conquests of the ancient Arabs.
Stereotypes are often wrong. In the 1930s, the US army embraced the view that the "Japanese national character" was incapable of absorbing technology. Hitler, claiming that "American national character" was an ineffectual hybrid, belittled the importance of US participation in the war. Moshe Dayan, in Story of My Life, admits that he underestimated the ability of the Egyptian army to fight in 1973 because his expectations were based on what happened in 1967.
Setting aside writings tainted with racism, there is a wealth of literature that can explain why Saddam lost the war. In his book History of Warfare, historian John Keegan identifies the central role of culture in war. The term "culture", as he uses it, refers to modes of thinking, behaviour and organisation within a political group.
Arab leaders are now familiar with the name Kenneth M Pollack, the military expert at the Brookings Institute who wrote The Threatening Storm: the Case for Invading Iraq and who predicted the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Pollack obtained a PhD from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1996 with a thesis entitled The Influence of Arab Culture on Arab Military Effectiveness. In his thesis he discusses the performance of Arab armies and air forces from 1945 to 1991 and concludes that the prevalent modes of thinking, behaviour and organisation explain the humble performance of Arab armies.
In The Soldier and the State, Samuel Huntington, better known for The Clash of Civilisations, discusses the role of culture in political and military organisation. He argues that the basis of Arab military and political structure is the family, the clan or the sect. By extension, the army becomes the army of the ruling family, clan or sect -- not a national army or an army for the nation-state. This is why when the family, clan or sect unravels, the army loses heart as well as the war. Is this not exactly what happened when Saddam lost command and communication with his army?
Because the army belongs to the regime more than to the nation-state, real or imaginary fears of threats to the regime, or insurrection against it, deter training and manoeuvres among the various corps within the army (infantry, air force) except in cases of extreme emergency. With these fears, the army becomes a balancing act with each service counterbalancing the other. The ground troops are viewed with suspicion by the air forces and vice versa. This presumably diminishes the chances for coups d'état. The regular army is watched by the republican guards, and the latter are monitored by the special republican guards. The internal security forces watch all of the above. To maintain this delicate balance, the participation of one airplane in drills or combat becomes a serious matter requiring coordination among top army commanders. Sorties by more than one fighter jet would require permission from none other than the head of the regime.
Mirroring the centralisation of the political system, the military system becomes even more centralised, with decisions taken at the highest echelons. Field commanders are not allowed to make decisions or take initiatives. It becomes safer for them to demonstrate their allegiance and obedience, even if this means that errors are made. Commanders with a creative streak are normally seen as a threat to the system.
Centralism and hierarchy play a notorious role. The higher ranks lord it over the lower ranks, all the way down to the foot soldiers, the latter having to put up with practically inhumane treatment. Judging by the miserable condition of the Iraqi soldiers in Kuwait in 1991 and Iraq in 2003, their military performance should come as no surprise.
One significant link between political culture and military performance is that of civilian control over the military, or more specifically the role of the parliament in overseeing military operations as well as defence and security budgets. Had Saddam had a democratically elected parliament, the Iraq-Iran war and the invasion of Kuwait might not have taken place. Had Abdel-Nasser had a democratic parliament, perhaps we would have been spared the woes of 1967. It is no exaggeration to say that the political culture (way of thinking, behaviour and organisation) greatly affects the military performance of any nation.
Arab political culture, which may be called centrist, authoritarian, top-heavy and obsessed with security matters and conspiracy theories, and the absence of initiative and teamwork play a major role in our military losses. Saddam's defeat must be a lesson to us all. The Arabs should change their political culture, introduce democracy, encourage initiative and teamwork and abandon their paranoiac obsession with security.
* The writer is assistant to the editor-in-chief of Al-Ahram.
Al-Ahram Weekly Online : 22 - 28 May 2003 (Issue No. 639)
Located at: http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2003/639/op13.htm