Trimming the fat

The lumbering, bureaucratic structures of Arab diplomacy must be overhauled if the Arab world is to become a viable player on the internatinal stage, writes Abdallah El-Ashaal*

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When Dr Boutros Ghali wrote a book in the wake of the 1967 defeat about the crisis of Arab diplomacy, there was still a diplomacy worth mentioning. The priorities of this diplomacy, however, became confused because Egypt, the most influential Arab nation, had been affected by the war. When talk these days turns to the Arab League and its secretary-general, the debate focusses on the progressive versus the reactionary; Arab nationalism versus the denial of Arabism. Taking this debate a step further, should the Arab League, like the concept of an Arab regional order, be considered a lost cause, or revived to create a new Arab order? The debate then extends to the current secretary-general, who had been a successful foreign minister, managing to present the Arab public with a pleasing image of themselves. This success -- primarily based on the media -- captivated many, including several writers and poets, such as the renowned poet Farouk Shousha, who dedicated a poem to the secretary-general nominee one month before he assumed his post, on 15 April, 2001:

You, who are coming like the Messiah
To bring life back to the shrouded corpse.
You, who shall redeem the promise,
Realising the traces of the dream that still remain.

I am concerned about the fragility of the poet's dream, and I still maintain, as do many others, that the type of debate, as described above, is mere sophistry and a waste of time. The Arab League and Arab governments should be more concerned with creating a proactive, lean diplomacy. By lean diplomacy, I mean one that has rid itself of excess weight, both in body and mind. We all agree that the Arab world is currently involved in a major crisis, perhaps its worst in modern history, and Arab diplomacy is glad to be still breathing. However, to continue along this type of diplomatic path will simply reinforce painful realities, the most poignant of which is the increasing disintegration of the Arab world and society. Even the average citizen is wracked by feelings of impotence and oppression. Our enemies' stars are on the rise while our rights are eroded and anything 'Arab' becomes the object of scorn, indeed to such an extent that simply belonging to this region is enough to raise eyebrows or make one suspect.

There is also no doubt that Arab diplomacy is too bureaucratic, bloated, short-sighted, short-winded, and completely hopeless. It is content to be served mere crumbs, and is incapable of making the distinction between what is in our interests and what is detrimental to them. It rejoices in false victories and greedily fights over power, buries the truly qualified and abuses regional and national security to maintain the security of its own position. Indeed, real qualifications have become the true enemy, a direct threat to the status quo. The external enemy pales in comparison to this lumbering beast.

Immediate reform and a complete overhaul is required. The Arab League must act immediately instead of waiting for spontaneous change. It should make use of the vast pool of wasted Arab talent to create a refined, cultured Arab diplomacy to act effectively in Arab interests.

This diplomacy should play a role not only in government circles, but also at the popular and social level. It can be employed in numerous ways, but I would like to focus on media, political, and cultural initiatives related to the US and Israel. This new diplomacy would prove more effective than the traditional structure, which has not been developed within a culture of initiative.

Initiatives tend to reflect the personality of the figure who proposes them. This, however, is against accepted practice, which infers that all individuals are subordinates in relation to the highest official in the department. This official is never to be challenged by others, no matter how qualified, innovative or capable. Initiatives are seen as too academic or trivial, unworthy of the attention of the boss, as well as an impolite and unacceptable attempt to show off. This is a major issue within the region, the reform of which must be dealt with courageously and with complete impartiality.

The diplomatic initiatives that could be used in relation to Israel are too numerous to count, but first and foremost, they must reform the manner in which Arabs deal with Israel. For example, the Israeli government repeatedly rejected the roadmap, though it undoubtedly had a hand in creating it, or was, at the very least, close to the circles in Washington that formulated it.

The roadmap was put before the members of the international Quartet Committee, none of whom dared to either oppose America's proposals, improve upon them for the sake of peace, revise the proposals or insert their own. Israel managed to slow down the roadmap on two occasions: first, during the committee discussion of the roadmap, and second, before the plan's public release. Israel then declared that merely unveiling the roadmap encouraged Palestinians to make further inroads against Israel, even while Israeli troops were systematically mowing down prominent resistance figures. Indeed, Israel has only one map for Palestine and the region, and it insists on implementing it.

Israel expressed dozens of reservations about the plan, which were eventually reduced to 14, on which it was unwilling to comprise. Washington continually hopped from one side of the fence to the other, first stating the plan was not subject to revision, then saying it would not pressure Israel into accepting or implementing the roadmap, or promising even to provide a guarantee that Israel would honour its obligations.

When the roadmap was put before the Israeli cabinet, it was portrayed as a painful concession for peace. The cabinet was split over the proposal, with 12 voting in favour and seven against, and four members abstaining. In other words, the proposal was passed with difficulty, and only after ministers from the Shinui Party joined the Likud majority. Both Washington and Israel portrayed Israeli acceptance of the roadmap as a colossal feat in itself; virtually Israel's sole obligation within the process. As for implementing the roadmap, this is another matter entirely. Washington, after all, fully understands Israel's misgivings.

And what was the Arab and Palestinian response to all this?

All Arab nations boldly accepted the roadmap, each for its own reasons. Some perhaps accepted just for the sake of going along with any proposal -- no matter how ambiguous or incapable of implementation -- others because the roadmap mentioned a provisional, and later permanent, Palestinian state.

Perhaps some accepted because rejecting the roadmap is tantamount to insulting Washington. Any nation rejecting the proposal might find itself accused of being anti-peace and pro- terrorism, and listed as a future American military target. It would also be the subject of a global Zionist media campaign, which would hound and oppose its interests at every turn. The Palestinians accepted the roadmap without reservation perhaps because they are in their weakest position ever, or perhaps because they wanted to prove to Washington that it is they alone who really want peace.

They might also wish to show their gratitude for Washington's attentions at a time when Iraq is now the world's, and America's, prime concern. Maybe they imagined that they could turn the tables on Israel, by putting it, with its rejectionist stance, in the difficult position of challenging the US.

Let us imagine an alternative scenario. What if the Arab world had split over the roadmap, expressed frank criticisms, rejected it outright, or perhaps even suggested their own proposals for improvement? What if the same thing had happened in the Palestinian ranks? Could the Arab world bear the consequences of such a stance? It is my opinion that Israel will not grant concessions unless it receives something in return, or is forced to act in order to avoid a more difficult situation or to reap long-term benefits.

While this was going on, the Israeli minister of religion wrote an article for the press in which he maintained that Islam was on the path to extinction and that Muslims were being routed. He went on to sling insults at Islam and Muslims, saying that the world's happiness depended on the disappearance of Islam and the degradation of Muslims. One can imagine the response from European and US quarters if the sheikh of Al-Azhar or the minister of Awqaf (religious endowments), for instance, took a similar stance on Judaism or Jews. We need only remember the global campaign against the sheikh of Al-Azhar after he described the attack on Muslims as a "crusade", using the US president's own words. He was condemned by those who see themselves as building bridges between religions. But what did these same people say to the Israeli minister of religion?

When I talk of immediate diplomacy, I am referring to a diplomacy that would respond and lodge an official complaint against the Israeli government with the UN, as well as a response from intellectuals, writers and secularists who may agree with the need to condemn bigoted statements of this nature. Responses of this type are heard frequently from Israel, and have an impact on global public opinion and international policy.

A lean diplomacy would attempt to influence policies and laws during the formulation stage, Resolution 1435 on the future of Iraq, passed on 22 May, being a case in point. This resolution is tantamount to an international conspiracy by the UN and the Security Council, and Arab governments have even giving it their blessing.

To guarantee the success of this proactive, lean diplomacy, all Arab governments must realise they are part of the sum of Arab action. Their role at first may seem difficult, but will be much lighter at critical moments if the burden is distributed equally.

The Arab League has no excuse for not embarking on this sort of diplomacy, and the same applies to the many Arab institutions currently on the regional stage. New institutions, like the Institute for Arab Thought, should also stand by the league.

A cultured Arab diplomacy, which trims the fat off the current system and which takes pride in Arab interests and defends them in the face of the new imperialism must be created within the framework of a revival of Arab nationalism and pride. As an Arab poet once said, the situation is critical and fate is fickle. This is an appeal for the Arab soul to take that fate seriously, so that Baghdad does not become the Cordoba of the modern age.

* The writer is assistant to the Egyptian minister of foreign affairs.

Al-Ahram Weekly Online : 5 -11 June 2003 (Issue No. 641)
Located at: http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2003/641/op15.htm