Talibanising Pakistan?
Turmoil is erupting over President Musharraf's broadened powers and the Shari'a bill, Iffat Idris reports from Islamabad
A political crisis that has been brewing in Pakistan for months now appears to be coming to a head. The focus of the crisis is the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), but the implications are national.
In tracing the origins of this crisis, one has to go back to military rule under General Pervez Musharraf. He introduced a number of constitutional amendments in a package called the Legal Framework Order (LFO). The LFO was the basis for last year's referendum, which made Musharraf president for five years and gives him the power to dismiss the National Assembly. The LFO also establishes a new National Security Council (NSC) to oversee the functioning of Parliament; the NSC includes all armed forces chiefs.
Opposition to the LFO is centred around two issues: the first being that all amendments to the constitution must be passed by a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly. This renders the LFO and all reforms introduced under it illegal. The second is that the LFO effectively legalises and institutionalises military control over civilian governments.
Elections were held for the National Assembly and four provincial assemblies in October 2002. Though the political parties agreed to participate in those elections, they rejected the LFO. They insist that the LFO must be passed by a vote in the Assembly. They also claim that Musharraf cannot be both president and chief of army staff; he must relinquish one of these two positions.
For the past eight months there has been a stand-off between the government of Prime Minister Jamali -- which is allied to President Musharraf -- and the opposition parties, and talks between the two sides have failed to resolve the issues. Musharraf is unwilling to give in to the requests of the political parties, and is particularly unwilling to give up his uniform. But the price allegedly being demanded for endorsement of the LFO by the Pakistan Muslim League-N (PML-N) and the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) -- two of the main opposition parties -- is also unacceptable to him: dropping all charges against former leaders Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto and allowing them to return to Pakistan.
The third main opposition force is the Islamist six-party alliance, the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA). The MMA did surprisingly well in the elections, thanks both to widespread anti-US sentiment and Musharraf's strong criticism of Sharif and Bhutto -- this created a political vacuum which was filled by the MMA. Should Musharraf and Jamali manage to convince the MMA to drop its opposition to the LFO, its support would be sufficient to allow the federal government to function.
But the demands being made by the MMA in return for endorsing the LFO are as difficult for Musharraf to accept as those of the "secular" PPP and PML-N. The MMA wants to push towards the Islamisation of Pakistan. This would entail, for example, abolishing banking interest, ending co-education and implementing all the recommendations of the Islamic Council of Ideology. Given that Musharraf is striving to portray Pakistan as a liberal, non-fundamentalist country to the outside world, he can hardly agree to the MMA's Islamisation (some would say 'Talibanisation') agenda.
Last week the MMA decided to go ahead with implementing this agenda anyway -- albeit only in the NWFP.
The MMA forms the provincial government in the NWFP, and was able to secure unanimous approval in the provincial assembly for its Shari'a Bill. Passed last week, the Shari'a Bill abolishes interest, closes cinemas and cable operators, makes the hijab compulsory for women, replaces trousers and shirts in school uniforms with the national dress of shalwar qameez, and implements Islamic education curricula.
Those alarmed by the Shari'a Bill have even more reason to be concerned about what is next on the MMA's legislative agenda: the passage of the Hisba Bill. This would establish a "morality" force along the lines of the Taliban's notorious Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice. The morality bureau would be charged with enforcing the MMA's Islamisation drive. There was a vivid demonstration in Peshawar recently of what this would mean in practice. Dozens of religious zealots took to the streets, closed down all cinemas and music shops, and defaced all public billboards displaying pictures of women.
In a further sign of the escalating tension between the provincial and federal governments, 24 District Nazims in the NFWP threatened to resign en masse. The District Nazims are the heads of the new local government system established by Musharraf under the LFO. This takes power and decision-making to the grass- roots level, and is therefore opposed by national and provincial governments who see decentralisation as a threat to their own power.
One of the six parties in the MMA, the Jamiat Ulema-i-Pakistan headed by Maulana Fazal-ur- Rehman, has been particularly vehement in its opposition to the new local government system.
The resignation of the Nazims came because of what they described as intolerable pressure from the NWFP government. Since the Nazims are, in effect, the creation of Musharraf, the tussle between the Nazims and the MMA government in the NWFP is actually a tussle between Musharraf and the MMA.
The federal government clearly cannot allow the MMA government to implement its Islamisation agenda in the NWFP -- not least, because of the huge discrepancies it would create in banking and legal practice between the NWFP and Pakistan's three other provinces. Nor can Musharraf allow his painstakingly erected local government system to be undermined by the MMA. The Islamist alliance, however, shows no sign of backing down.
On Sunday, addressing members of the Lahore Bar Association, the president made clear his displeasure with the MMA. "The people of Pakistan do not want a theocratic state and are strongly opposed to the Talibanisation of society," said Musharraf.
He went on to warn of the negative economic impact of such "Talibanisation": "Pakistan cannot make economic progress in a vacuum...We must try to grasp the regional and international situation, and behave accordingly if we wish to move forward."
How can a way be found out of this crisis? So far, a petition has been lodged with the Supreme Court challenging the legality of the Shari'a Bill. In addition, the federal government has replaced senior bureaucrats within the NWFP government and threatened further "administrative action". But none of this has had any impact on the MMA. The only real option for the federal government to impose its will is to dissolve the provincial assembly and impose the Governor's Rule.
Getting rid of the MMA government in NWFP would solve some of Musharraf's problems, but it would also create a host of new ones. The MMA forms part of the coalition government in neighbouring Balochistan province. It has vowed to withdraw from that government if its NWFP government is removed, thereby creating a political crisis in Balochistan too. It has also threatened mass action against Musharraf and the Jamali government. Other "secular" parties would also be likely to join in anti-Musharraf protests if the NWFP government were dismissed.
The timing of the political crisis could not have been worse. President Musharraf is due to leave shortly for the US and meetings with President George Bush. One of the items on his agenda will be to refute accusations that Pakistan is not doing enough to capture Al-Qa'eda and Taliban fugitives from Afghanistan. The last thing he needs is signs of a Talibanisation drive within Pakistan itself.
There is no obvious way out of Pakistan's current political crisis. Until it is resolved, governance in the country will remain on hold and, in the long run, international confidence in Pakistan will be eroded. All of this could reverse the mini- economic boom that Pakistan has been enjoying in recent months. President Musharraf needs to find a way out of the crisis -- quickly.
Al-Ahram Weekly Online : 12 - 18 June 2003 (Issue No. 642)
Located at: http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2003/642/in3.htm