After the fall
Once the world's conscience, the United Nations is now an accomplice to its greatest miscreant, writes Hassan Nafaa
In "Life after 1441", published in Al-Ahram Weekly 613 (November 2002), I argued that the US was seeking to take sole control of the Iraqi crisis with a view to overturning the Saddam Hussein regime, occupying Iraq and redrawing the map of the Middle East. I further suggested that if Washington succeeded in pushing Resolution 1441 through the Security Council, it would put the UN to a test that it would in all probability fail.
As we know, Washington had drafted a resolution that would have given it a mandate allowing automatic recourse to military force against Iraq in the event that the latter failed to cooperate with international arms inspectors and refused to disclose the WMDs which Washington maintained it possessed. However, the international community was not convinced. It strongly suspected a hidden American agenda for both Iraq and the rest of the region. It therefore urged the Security Council to focus exclusively on the WMD issue, as opposed to regime change. First it had to be proven that Iraq did, in fact, possess WMDs before deciding what "grave consequences" should be inflicted if this should prove to be the case. As a result, modifications were made to the draft resolution, and pressure increased on Iraq to comply positively, including from the Arab League.
Nevertheless, I still felt that the Bush administration was determined to press ahead with its plans, whatever the consequences. I thus concluded my November article: "If the most the UN can do to restrain the American raging bull from flouting international law is to issue Resolution 1441 as it now stands, and if the most the Arab League can do is to appeal to Iraq to abide by this resolution, then neither of these two international organisations have the power to prevent the forthcoming catastrophe which will sweep them both aside."
Subsequent events have proven that I was not exaggerating. The arms inspection committees, dispatched by the UN and the International Atomic Energy Agency, scoured Iraq from north to south in search of WMDs that Washington knew did not exist. Nevertheless, Washington stepped up its propaganda campaign. Iraq posed an imminent threat to international peace and security, it proclaimed, and was already in material breach of Resolution 1441. Then, having failed to convince others that 1441 gave it the right to have recourse to force without referring back to the Security Council, the US sought the backing of Britain and Spain for a new resolution that would explicitly sanction a military campaign.
However, the Security Council could not pass such a resolution in good conscience. The weapons inspectors were still at work, Iraq was clearly cooperating positively and Blix and Baradie wanted more time to submit their final report. In addition, backed by the global anti- war movement, several Security Council members had dug in their heels against Washington's drive to war, with France, in particular, openly threatening to use its veto.
Faced with an opposition unprecedented since the end of the Cold War, the US, Britain and Spain withdrew their proposal. Yet even this ignominious defeat could not deter the US from its warpath. In contempt of all international laws and conventions, President Bush delivered an ultimatum giving Saddam Hussein 48 hours to leave Iraq; once the 48 hours were up, the invasion began.
America's war on Iraq was not merely a flagrant, unprovoked attack against a UN member state, it was also a slap in the face to the UN itself, which now found itself in a cruel predicament. It could either issue an unequivocal condemnation of the aggression and safeguard the vestiges of its moral prestige, or it could stay silent. After hesitating for several weeks, it chose a third, completely unexpected, course. France, Germany and Russia having backed down from their initial positions, the UN, in a feat of cold-hearted calculation, made a pact with the devil himself.
At session 4761 on 22 May 2003, the Security Council passed Resolution 1483. The resolution recognised "the specific authorities, responsibilities, and obligations under applicable international law of the United States and the United Kingdom as occupying powers under unified command [the 'Authority']", and, in Article 4, called upon this "Authority" to "promote the welfare of the Iraqi people through the effective administration of the territory, including in particular working towards the restoration of conditions of security and stability and the creation of conditions in which the Iraqi people can freely determine their own political future." True, Article 8 requested the UN secretary-general "to appoint a special representative for Iraq whose independent responsibilities shall involve reporting regularly to the Council, [and] coordinating activities of the United Nations in post-conflict processes in Iraq". However, this special representative was given no autonomous authority or decision-making powers, but rather was merely called upon to "work intensively with the Authority and the people of Iraq". The resolution further refers to the establishment of a Development Fund for Iraq, in which are to be deposited all Iraqi revenues. Curiously, Article 13 states, "the funds in the Development Fund for Iraq shall be disbursed at the direction of the Authority, in consultation with the Iraqi interim administration." Clearly, the UN is to have no effective power over how these funds are disbursed.
In addition to lifting the sanctions on Iraq, the resolution also extended the UN's administration of the food- for-oil programme for another six months, during which the programme will be phased out and any outstanding obligations and activities transferred to the Authority. In other words, after those six months have lapsed, the UN will have no more than a symbolic role in Iraq. It will have voluntarily handed over Iraq's resources and political fate to the Authority, which henceforth will have full discretion over how to dispose of those resources and will make all decisions pertaining to the political and economic reconstruction of Iraq. In short, Security Council Resolution 1483 has conferred a gloss of international legitimacy on the illegal US-British occupation of Iraq. In allowing it to pass, the UN has committed a moral and legal fault of the greatest magnitude.
When the world's policeman turns into a murdering thief, justice is lost forever, for such a thief, it might be said, is too powerful to be arrested and brought to trial. However, there is a vast difference between inability to act and complicity. During the Cold War and afterwards, the UN has frequently been unable to fulfill its responsibility under the Charter to furnish the necessary protection to victims of aggression. Nevertheless, it had always taken pains to safeguard its mantle as the embodiment of law, even if it proved incapable of enforcing it. Hitherto, it had never tried to legitimise the illegitimate. For example, when the Soviet Union invaded Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Security Council had its hands tied by Russia's readiness to exercise its veto. Still, in both cases, the General Assembly roundly condemned the invasions. The UN was similarly unable to deter or halt the US war in Vietnam in the 1960s. However, it never sanctioned such aggression or allowed it in any way to diminish the right to resist. Even in the post-Cold War period, when it was increasingly incapable of challenging the American will, the UN still managed to retain its moral status as the repository of the international conscience.
During the Kosovo crisis, the US, under a NATO umbrella, attacked Serbia without a UN mandate. However, the context of that campaign was far removed, legally, politically and morally, from what has happened in Iraq. During the Kosovo crisis, Russia stood alone beside Serbia, its veto a weapon drawn in the face of the international will. At the same time, Serbia had no oil, and the US no designs for eventual occupation. Iraq was a different matter entirely. Washington's determination to make war was abundantly apparent and its intentions highly suspect. At the same time, peoples around the world, together with most of their governments, stood vehemently opposed to the use of force. It follows that the UN should have condemned the US-led aggression against Iraq, which is precisely what it did not or, more accurately, could not do.
Obviously, the Security Council would never be able to pass a resolution against two of its permanent members. But it should have at least met to consider such a resolution, even if it was then vetoed. Unfortunately, the prospect of US pressure intimidated all concerned; none of the members dared to call a spade a spade. The General Assembly could have convened an emergency session in keeping with the resolution on unity for peace. But that, too, was not about to happen because, despite the presence of a significant block of third world countries in its midst, the General Assembly was also confused and intimidated. Finally, the UN could have sat back and waited, putting the aggressors to the test of their claim that they had invaded Iraq to liberate the country, not to occupy it, and making its assistance contingent upon manifestations of the earnestness of their intent to form a democratic government and withdraw as quickly as possible. Such a position would have been the very least expected of it.
However, the powers that had led the opposition to the war were keener to protect their own immediate interests and mend their fences with the US than they were to safeguard the dignity of the UN and the sanctity of international law and principle. Thus, on the pretext of seeking to revive the role of the UN, they transformed the international body into an accomplice in this crime. Having given its official seal to the Anglo- American occupation, what kind of role can the UN now expect to play in the world order?
The US, for its part, is now in a position to do exactly what it wants, wherever it wants, to whoever it wants.
The writer is professor of political science at Cairo University.
Al-Ahram Weekly Online : 12 - 18 June 2003 (Issue No. 642)
Located at: http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2003/642/op2.htm