The first step
The present fragmentation of the Palestinian political polity could spell disaster. George Giacaman* says new Legislative Council elections are vital
The cease-fire that began at the end of June in more than one way marks a turning-point. Not that everyone expects that it will necessarily be extended, or if it is, that the conflict will cease. But for ill or for good, there is more clarity now about the future, more than was possible at the beginning of the Intifada.
Public opinion on both sides is for a continued cease-fire. On the Palestinian side the reasons for this are clear. The policy of closures, check-posts, barricades, and enclosures, enforced by the Israeli government has made normal life in any ordinary sense nearly impossible for Palestinians. On the first day the road connecting Ramallah to Birzeit and 33 other villages was opened, the extraordinary joy and celebration shown by commuters, betrayed the grim and pathetic reality they have been enduring.
On the Israeli side, there was also considerable relief at the prospect of walking around in public spaces without fearing an explosion or an attack. Such is the dire reality both sides have been locked into.
Still, peace is clearly not at hand. But what two years and nine months of conflict have shown is that there is no clear military solution to the conflict. Given the balance of forces, such a hope was first entertained by elements in the Israeli army at the beginning of the Intifada. But given political constraints on how many casualties the army can inflict among Palestinians, especially civilians, victory was seen to be a result of the power of endurance of each side. Both sides endured, if very unequally as far as losses are concerned, but the region could not endure indefinitely. Hence the "roadmap".
Both sides do not view the roadmap as the desirable political solution. From a Palestinian perspective, it has all the problems of the Oslo process and more: a long drawn-out series of stages divided into sub-stages, with multiple possibilities for stalling at every turn. The 14 conditions appended by the Israeli government to its decision to accept the roadmap, is clear evidence of this from a Palestinian point of view. Many also fear that even if the stage of the "temporary state" is reached, such a stage will last for an indefinite period. The foreign minister of Jordan recently expressed such a concern. He was told by Israeli officials in Aqaba that "an interim state is the end of the road" (Ha'aretz, 5 August 2003).
It is generally assumed even by commentators in Israel that a stable political solution will require external pressure, principally on Israel, the occupying power. If the US is the only country that can do that, and if this does not appear likely in the foreseeable future, then one can expect one of three possibilities during the coming two to three years.
First, a process where the cease-fire is extended but broken on occasion, followed by external intervention to rescue the situation, to be broken again, and so on, with the political track limping along. Second, a total breakdown and a reversion to the status quo ante with fiercer battles than before. Again this will generate intervention but not before stricter conditions are placed by the Israeli government for stopping the fighting. Third, in either case, it is not impossible that the "temporary state" stage is reached in the fullness of time, and after much water having flown under the bridge. Beyond that, it will take very considerable optimism to hope that "final status talks" will successfully end with an agreement ending the conflict.
Meanwhile, there are some vital issues that Palestinians have to address if cease-fire rounds last long enough. The main vital task ahead, and the essential pre-condition for management of the conflict without which Palestinians will face a sure loss, is the reform of the political system.
When a prime minister was appointed, Palestinians joked publicly about having two governments: Arafat's and Mahmoud Abbas's. In fact as the Cairo talks on a cease-fire have shown, they have at least six. For even if the representatives of various groups (Hamas, Jihad, PFLP, PDFLP) were sitting around one table in Cairo, bilateral negotiations were taking place with each group separately. And each group later also separately announced their acceptance of the cease-fire.
It is clear that the Palestinian Authority (PA), whatever that means today, is not accepted by other groups as representing them, especially after the failure of the Oslo process. This sentiment is widely shared by the Palestinian public given especially the record of the PA from before the Intifada, in relation to corruption, mismanagement, lack of rule of law, and a functioning court system. All of these consistently score high as demands for reform in opinion polls over a period of several years.
It is clear however that Palestinians cannot face the odds they are encountering without one strategy, and a unified decision-making process. The present fragmentation of the political system will spell disasters for the future. This is widely recognised by Palestinians and is a subject for continuing debate in newspapers and other public fora.
Many think that elections for a new and more inclusive Palestinian Legislative Council are an essential step in the right direction. The present council has proven to be weak and ineffective, composed as it is of a majority of "loyalists". Those that won in the 1996 elections received 40 per cent of the votes cast. Those that lost got 60 per cent of the votes! This is one result of an inadequate majoritarian electoral system. The legitimacy of the council is undermined at present primarily because it excludes "main actors", an opposition working within the system.
For reform to take place, the present elections law would have to be changed to allow for inclusiveness, and reflect the diversity that exists in Palestinian society. This process has been underway for several months but faces opposition from some quarters in the PA.
This is not a crowded agenda, nor is it unrealistic given the very high degree of support among Palestinians for elections and reform of the electoral system as shown in recent opinion polls. Failing that, Palestinians will remain fragmented. Various interested governments will also find that no matter whom they prefer to deal with in the equally fragmented PA system, will continue to lack internal legitimacy.
* The writer is a professor at Birzeit University and co-founder of The Palestinian Institute for the Study of Democracy (Muwatin).
Al-Ahram Weekly Online : 21 - 27 August 2003 (Issue No. 652)
Located at: http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2003/652/op41.htm