Crossed roads
Palestinians passed the third year of the Intifada this week seeking leadership -- they didn't find it. Graham Usher reports from Jerusalem
Palestinians in the occupied territories observed the third anniversary of the Al-Aqsa Intifada less with a bang than a whimper. There were marches and rallies in Nablus and Gaza, staffed by Fatah militiamen vowing "revolution until victory". But the dominant mood was one of introspection, with Palestinians -- analysts, activists and people -- pondering a revolt that has so far been short on accomplishments and long on losses, including the death of 2,201 of their people, 400 of them children.
The sense of defeat was reinforced by two decisions, one Israeli and territorial, the other international and diplomatic.
On Wednesday the Israeli government approved construction of the central section of the West Bank "wall", including barriers that would go east of the settlements of Ariel and Kadumim, some 15 miles inside the West Bank. In deference to US misgivings these barriers will not yet be joined to the main wall, actually a vast rift consisting of electronic fences, concrete walls, trenches and military towers. But few Palestinians believe the linkage will be anything other than a matter of time. Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz have both made it clear that Ariel and other Jewish settlements "will be in the right place" when the decision is finally made -- ie within the wall rather than beyond it.
The second decision was the statement released on 26 September by the Middle East Quartet (the US, UN, European Union and Russia), authors of the now defunct roadmap "toward peace". It marked an international seal of approval for the Israeli-American view that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not one of a national liberation struggle against colonial occupation but rather another front in the "war against terrorism".
Thus while the Palestinian Authority was told to take "immediate, decisive steps against individuals and groups planning and conducting violent acts" (including those in defense of their communities in the occupied territories), Israel's "legitimate right to self- defense" was recognised, including the extra-judicial executions of Palestinian militants and political leaders.
And while Israel was urged to refrain from the construction of settlements and the West Bank barrier and other actions that "undermine Palestinian trust in the roadmap", there was no mention, let alone condemnation, of Israel's "in principle" decision to remove the elected leader of a nation it is supposed to be negotiating with over independence. In the words of one Jerusalem-based diplomat, much of the Quartet statement "could have been written by Silvan Shalom" [Israel's foreign minister].
Faced with these defeats the PA leadership remained locked in crisis mode, now expressing defiance to its people, now signaling accommodation to the non-American Quartet members.
On 28 September PA Premier Ahmed Qurieh submitted a provisional list of 24 ministers for the new Palestinian government. The "new" order not only represents a massive consolidation of Yasser Arafat's power at the helm of the Palestinian ship but also of the old Fatah guard that represents his most loyal constituency. Thus out went Mohamed Dahlan as security minister, Ziad Abu Amr as culture minister and Nabil Amer as information minister, all allies of outgoing PA Premier Mahmoud Abbas. And back came Arafat loyalists like Nasser Yusuf as interior minister, Yasser Abed Rabbo as information minister and Saeb Erekat as minister in charge of negotiations.
The new government was presented as one of "National Unity". It was anything but. Most obviously there was no presence of either Islamist or nationalist opposition, since Hamas, Islamic Jihad and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine will not and cannot join a government bound by the security provisions of the roadmap. Neither was there any more than the most token representation for Fatah's young guard leadership, including those who tactically support the roadmap as a means to further Palestinian reform and hasten new PA elections. Rather the new cabinet reflects a re-entrenchment of the same leadership "whose lack of strategy during the Intifada has led the Palestinians to the current crisis," said one West Bank Fatah leader.
Where strategy was debated it was between two Palestinians outside the government, both with ambitions to leadership, but both advocating wholly different roads to freedom. On 29 September Dahlan said the root cause of the present crisis was the PA leadership's failure to register the change in US policy wrought by 11 September, and particularly the designation of all forms of armed resistance with terrorism. Before the Intifada, "we were in a better position than we are now, politically and internationally," said Dahlan. The implication clearly was that unless the PA did the US bidding -- including a showdown with Hamas and Islamic Jihad -- the failures would only accumulate.
On the same day Fatah West Bank leader, Marwan Barghouthi, made his closing statement before the Tel Aviv District Court, where he was being tried on 26 counts of murder. Urging his people to fight the occupation "every minute", he said the Intifada, both armed and popular, was "justified" and must continue until independence is reached, either via a separate Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza or in "one state for two peoples". The choice, he said, was Israel's.
In essence the two positions have long been the hidden heart of the internal Palestinian debate on the way forward. Should the Palestinians, pace Dahlan, throw in their lot with the US and seek salvation through the "war against terrorism", disavowing their own resistance in the process? Or should they, pace Barghouthi, target Israeli opinion with the relentless message that it can have security or it can have occupation but it will never enjoy both? The tragedy of the Palestinians after three years of their uprising is that they have a leadership that is unable or unwilling -- or unwilling to the point of being unable -- to take either road.
Al-Ahram Weekly Online : 2 - 8 October 2003 (Issue No. 658)
Located at: http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2003/658/fr1.htm