Neighbourly disaffection
Syria walks a thin line when it comes to Iraq says Imad Fawzi Shoeibi*, as it tries not to legitimise the status quo
A fair amount of ambiguity has surrounded Syria's recent position on the interim Iraq Governing Council (IGC) and its temporary representation at the Arab League. Unless this ambiguity is dispelled, some are bound to misinterpret Syria's motives, particularly since the Syrians are not in the habit of explaining their strategy, feeling perhaps that others should make an effort to figure out their motives. Damascus believes that its legacy of standing firm on Arab rights and its refusal to accept external dictates is a sufficient indication of its intentions. The Syrians may have changed their style slightly, but not the essence of their politics.
Indeed, Damascus is aware that it has to keep up with the changes in today's world, and avoid being left behind by events. The Syrians speak the language of our time, but they impart it with the political and strategic connotations of what they consider the inalienable rights of future generations. As a matter of principle, Syria does not accept the occupation of Iraq and reckons that anything borne out of this classical case of occupation (complete with government manipulation and reconstruction deals) is null and void, according to international law.
While the Americans have scant regard for the United Nations and international law, having the power to impose a new status quo should not entitle anyone to legitimacy. With the passage of time, it has become clear that Washington's irrationality did not pay, and it is once again seeking the cover of international legitimacy and the approval of the UN Security Council. Although Washington may be too proud to admit it, it is looking for an exit strategy from the tight spot into which its own military foolishness has led it. The return of the United States to the fold of the UN is a triumph for common sense and diplomacy over foolishness and unwise conduct. This is just fine with Damascus. Sentiments aside, Syria wants to see the international system avert a dramatic collapse that might lead to total chaos, and is always ready to shoulder its international responsibility.
Although Washington's return to the UN's fold deserves neither applause nor special credit, the trend should be encouraged, in order to allow the UN to get appropriately involved in Iraq. Although the media has welcomed the US change of heart, Syrian policy-makers have reservations about the US draft resolution on Iraq. One of the points raised by the Syrians is that the UN must be in charge. Syria opposes participation in any international presence under US command in Iraq for two reasons. First because this would legitimise the occupation and introduce a precedent for countries turning their back on the UN, its resolutions, and the UN Security Council, through the use of overwhelming force and in deviation from the opinion of the UN, UN members, and international public opinion. Such a state of affairs would mean the expiration of the post-World War II legacy of the UN with all its positive sides, laws, and regulations. Secondly, it would establish the US as an entity that is superior to the UN and entitled to lead it (politically, if not militarily).
2. Another point raised by the Syrians is that the political process in Iraq, regarding the constitution and the elections, should be placed under US supervision and neighbouring countries should be involved in this process. A third point is that the US, as an occupying force, is responsible for preserving the unity and sovereignty of Iraqi territories, and should not shift this responsibility to neighbouring countries. Syria refuses to see what happened in Iraq as falling under UN Resolution 1373 to combat terrorism (in reality and according to international law and by the admission of Britain itself, this was the work of a force of occupation. In international law, Iraq is now a country under occupation, suffering from a political and security vacuum, and subject to the Geneva Conventions and The Hague Agreements). The current responsibility for Iraq goes to the occupation authority, and the latter is required to establish a clear timetable for ending its occupation.
The situation in Iraq is therefore the responsibility of the US and should remain so. Meanwhile, Syria is ready to assume its responsibility as a historic and Arab neighbour of Iraq, as a country that represents the Arab group (and Arab interests) in the UN Security Council, and as a member state of the United Nations.
As for recognising the interim IGC, one has to address this matter from the political and strategic points of view. From the technical aspect, a new reality has been created. This new reality was born out of occupation, and anything that is born out of occupation is legally -- and must be in reality -- null and void. This does not mean that Syria must sever its links with Iraq and the Iraqi people. Some IGC members had lived in Damascus for years in the 1980s and 1990s, and Syria still communicates with them. Syria does not have to sever its relations with these individuals simply because they have mounted a wrong vehicle. Instead, Syria has chosen to maintain the communication, but not to cooperate with or recognise the IGC.
Some would argue that communication is a form of recognition. This may be true in form, but not in essence. Communication is different from recognition. Syria's political legacy is one of extreme accuracy when it comes to concepts. There is no political posturing here. In common as well as political language, to communicate is to keep an open dialogue and to maintain contact. Communication does not necessarily address the questions of equality or legitimacy. Rather, it averts animosity. Syria does not want to begin its relationship with future Iraq on a note of estrangement. It has chosen a method of communication that falls short of according legitimacy to a council that was not elected, and does not have the unequivocal support of the Iraqis. Iraq's governing council is not legitimate, but it is part of the process which would lead to the birth of the future Iraq.
From a strategic point of view, Syria has no interest in distancing itself from what is happening and what will happen in Iraq. Iraq, it seems, is faced with several scenarios which would set the tone for Syrian policy towards that country. For one thing, Iraq might come fully under a US mandate. This would pose a threat to Iraq's sovereignty and future role in Arab affairs. Should Syria distance itself from the Iraqis, it would be helping to consolidate a status quo born from occupation. But Syria does not wish to endorse a council that came into office in the military vehicles of the occupation, and who bases its calculations on the assumption that America is better than Saddam. The latter assumption is one with which Syria would take issue, regardless of how flawed Saddam's regime was. Iraq, alternatively, may be faced with the option of partition. To understand this perilous possibility, one has to keep in mind that states faced with collapse have no other recourse but to let their neighbours decide how things would proceed. This is the inevitable verdict of history and geopolitics. One of the immutable laws of politics is that when a centre (a state, say) collapses, the peripheries step in to sustain the regional balance.
Were Iraq to be left for the region to decide its future (one has to rule out the American option, as it has no geopolitical basis), it would face one of three options. The first option involves partition along ethnic lines, which would incur intervention from Iran, Iraq's northern neighbour with the most to fear under this scenario. This would be the start of an endless conflict, as the Arabs and Iranians are likely to be displeased. As the deck is reshuffled, clashes are likely to break out among Iraq's Arab, Kurdish, and Turkoman communities.
The second option involves partition along religious and sectarian lines, which would also invite Iranian interference. Iran has nothing to gain from this scenario, for it would distract it from giving prominence to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Iran's involvement in sectarian conflicts would threaten, rather than boost, its regional status. This option is neither in the interest of Iraq, Iran, or any other regional power, with Israel being the only exception. (There is also an option of combined ethnic and sectarian divisions, a scenario that would be worse than that seen in former Yugoslavia). Finally, there is the pan-Arab and democratic option, with a federal formula that protects minority groups. This is the option that Syria should endorse. The keyword here is "pan-Arab", a term that should not be maligned just because Saddam's Ba'athist regime was condemnable. Pan-Arabism is bigger than Saddam and the Iraqi Ba'ath Party.
This scenario is Iraq's only hope to remain a viable country in the region, and it is Syria's duty to stand by this option. Should Syria shun this duty, it would be committing a grave error. This might explain why Syria is keeping its channels of communications open with the IGC, while refraining from recognising the council or providing the occupation with legitimacy. Syria is keeping these channels open to help Iraq achieve its destiny. Iraq cannot possibly hope for better guidance than that inspired by Syria's rationalism, realism, and pan-Arabism. Regardless of how Damascus verbalises its policy or expresses its sentiments, history and geopolitics ultimately decide its course of action. Syria's wait-and-see policy is seasoned by political savvy and foresight.
* The writer is a political science professor at Damascus University.
Al-Ahram Weekly Online : 2 - 8 October 2003 (Issue No. 658)
Located at: http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2003/658/re6.htm