Chasing illusions?
Until Arab governments wake up and act, only the Israeli right is gaining ground, writes Hassan Nafaa*
After lengthy secret negotiations in Geneva, a group of prominent Israeli and Palestinian figures met in Amman to put their initials to a summary of what has become known as the Swiss agreement. Subsequent news reports indicated that the signing ceremony for the complete text would take place on 4 November, in order to coincide with the eighth anniversary of the assassination of Rabin.
One is immediately struck by the remarkable difference between the two delegations that took part in these negotiations. The Israelis included former Minister of Justice under Rabin, Yossi Beilin, former Labour Party leader General Amran Mitzna, former Chief of Israeli Intelligence David Kimchi and a number of other political and intellectual figures with leftist leanings. The only individual who could be said to be near to Israel's ruling coalition was Najama Ronin, a Likud member who, to my knowledge, has never occupied an influential position within the party. The Palestinian delegation included Minister of Information Yasser Abed Rabbo, along with a number of other prominent Palestinian figures, most of whom are members of Fatah, the backbone of the PLO and PA. In other words, the Israeli negotiators represented the Israeli opposition (and only a segment of the opposition at that), while the Palestinian delegation consisted of current officials, some with close ties to Arafat, and could thus be characterised as semi-official.
All evidence indicates that the Geneva process was founded on the premise that if an influential group from the Israeli opposition could reach an agreement over final status issues with a similarly influential group of Palestinians, this would put paid to Sharon's favourite claim that there is no Palestinian partner to talk with. Presumably, once the Israeli public realised the fallacy of this claim they would pull the rug out from under the Sharon government.
If this reading of the background to the Geneva process is correct, one must conclude that the Palestinian and Israeli teams entered negotiations with a single common purpose: to mobilise and channel Israeli public opinion and force open a route towards a possible settlement. The Palestinians taking part in the negotiations were especially keen to demonstrate their willingness to be accommodating. The Israelis taking part in the negotiations were just as keen to prove that they could obtain more from the Palestinians through political means than Sharon could with his guns and Apaches. From the outset, therefore, they were in a position to blackmail their Palestinian counterparts into yielding more and more concessions. It was as though they were telling them, "It's either us or Sharon."
A setting such as this was bound to be a formula that enabled the two sides to overstep many red lines. Had they not, the agreement they were attempting to produce would have lost its mobilising power and opened the Israeli delegation to ridicule. Judging from what has been revealed so far, the Swiss agreement seems to be primarily based on the formula of Palestinian sovereignty over Al-Aqsa Mosque in exchange for their relinquishing the Palestinian right of return, with the recognition this implies of the Jewish character of the Israeli state. This formula is of grave significance. The right of return is one of the most fundamental principles of the Palestinian cause. No power has the right to relinquish it, apart from the Palestinian people as represented by a legitimate authority in which all Palestinian factions participate, and in the context of a final and comprehensive settlement process with a party that possesses the legitimate jurisdiction to implement it on the ground. That this right was conceded by a Palestinian party, semi-official in capacity and of limited representation, to an Israeli party representing a segment of the opposition and lacking any authority to compel its own government to abide by such a commitment is dumbfounding.
It will not, I believe, preempt events to predict that the Israeli right will succeed, not only in killing this initiative, but also in coming out stronger than before. The waters of Israeli society are far too stagnant to be rippled by such a small pebble. Had the architects of the Geneva process managed to bring on board significant figures representing all major factions on both sides it would have been a different matter. In all events, it is perhaps too early to assess the response of the Israeli people to this initiative. It will probably take some time before they absorb its true ramifications and treat it with the attention it merits. Still, their initial reactions do not bode well. The Geneva agreement came under an intensive barrage from all sides, including the Israeli left. Quite evidently, the Israeli team that took part in the negotiations represents no more than an isolated and beleaguered minority within Israeli society, and this minority would need a miracle before it could move the silent majority enough to generate the impetus to topple Sharon.
Had the attack come from the extreme right, alone, or even from the parties participating in the ruling coalition, this might have been an encouraging sign. The vehemence of their reaction might then have signified that the initiative had, indeed, stirred the hornets' nest. But the left too, including its major body in the Labour Party, lashed out at the agreement, even though one would have supposed that the initiative would have inspired it to shake itself free of the despair and docility into which it had sunk since the collapse of Camp David II and the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada. Both Shimon Peres, current leader of the Labour Party, and Ehud Barak, former prime minister, charged that the agreement was a threat to the security and future of Israel. Had they not been so sure that the majority of their party shared their sentiments they would not have hastened to declare their positions in such unambiguous terms.
This, in itself, requires an explanation. There are two reasons why the majority of the Israeli Labour Party could not have been expected to show any great enthusiasm for the Geneva project. First, they would never consider going further than Barak had gone in Camp David II and, because that "offer" was turned down, they at least silently applaud the Likud's current mission of "disciplining" the Palestinians and "ripening them up" for a settlement whose time has not yet come. Second, they are aware that the current US administration would not favour the ousting of Sharon at this juncture. The Labour Party as a rule does respond to initiatives supported by outside forces unless it has to -- specifically, only if US-Israeli relations would be endangered were it not to. If the Labour Party had for a moment believed that the US would lend its weight to the Geneva agreement, even furtively, it would have snatched up the opportunity. However, it knows that the administration's weight is fully behind Sharon, and it is not about to embark on a project that would jeopardise that government which the US regards as one of its most important strategic cornerstones in the war against terrorism.
Clearly, therefore, the architects of the Geneva process had not taken into consideration the US administration factor and the mechanisms of its impact inside Israel. When Richard Perle, a senior advisor to the US secretary of defence, goes so far as to describe the Israeli signatories to the Geneva agreement as "outlaws", we know how intimately connected the American and Israeli domestic situations are. But let's be pragmatic. I have no objection to creative attempts to extricate ourselves from the current impasse and to cooperating with all forces sincerely committed to halting the violence. However, the Arab world will not wake from this nightmare unless it realises two very important realities. First, a just settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict is a fundamental prerequisite for progress at any level in all Arab and Islamic countries, for all are targeted. Second, we will never reach a just solution by depending on an American mediator or pro-peace forces in Israel, but, rather on how well we manage the process and rally all of our own resources towards our ends. For the Arabs to believe that it is possible to change Israeli society with an initiative advocated by what is for the present a very marginal group inside Israel, simply because that initiative enjoys the support of Egypt, Jordan and a handful of European nations, reflects a mindset that is addicted to chasing after mirages.
* The writer is professor of political science at Cairo University.
Al-Ahram Weekly Online : 6 - 12 November 2003 (Issue No. 663)
Located at: http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2003/663/op5.htm